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1 Introduction
1.1 The Motivation for Studying the Wives of Unemployed Men
It is difficult to think of a more convincing justification for an investigation of the 
labour supply of the wives of the unemployed than that suggested by Table 1.1.
Table L i. The employment rates o f married women in various countries, percentages.
Country Year
LIS Data
Husband
Employed
Husband
Unemployed
Eurostat, PSID, HUS, DLDB
Husband Husband Husband 
Employed Unemployed Unemployed 
< 1 Year > 1 Year
France 1981 54.5 43.8 59.0 44.8 40.3
Netherlands 1983 31.0 26.9 36.6 26.7 14.4
Germany 1983 53.1 51.8 48.0 38.8 29.0
Italy 1986 37.3 41.2 37.2 9.8 14.0
UK 1979 61.5 47.3 60.9 33.6 18.4
US 1986 67.0 59.3 64.5 57.4 N/A
Australia 1985 61.8 22.7 - - -
Belgium - - - 46.3 33.3 19.9
Canada 1987 65.8 45.7 - - -
Denmark - - - 75.6 71.2 68.2
Greece - - - 414 23.5 31.1
Ireland - - - 24.6 19.7 13.4
Israel 1979 49.3 30.3 - - —
Norway 1979 68.0 42.6 - - -
Sweden - - - 80.1 94.4 N/A
Switzerland 1982 43.9 26.4 - - -
Notes: 1. Figures in the ‘U S’ columns are from the Luxembourg Income Study data. Differences in 
employment rates for Australia, Canada, France, Israel, Norway, Switzerland and the UK are all 
significant at a confidence level of 99%, and that for the US is significant at the 95% level. Source: 
Giannelli and Micklewright (1995). 1  Figures in the other columns are from the 1985 Eurostat 
Labour Force Surveys, except for the US (1986 PSID), Sweden (1984, HUS Panel Survey), Denmark 
(1985, Danish Longitudinal Data Base). Source: Dex cta l. (1995).
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This table shows that, with the exception of Sweden, and Italy1 in the LIS data, the 
wives o f unemployed men work less than the wives of employed men. Given that this 
table represents the situation in sixteen countries, the consistency with which this result 
is obtained is remarkable. Interestingly, the table also shows that in most of the 
countries for which such data are available, the longer a husband’s spell of 
unemployment, the greater the difference in wives’ participation rates in comparison 
with those of the wives of unemployed men.
This is not, however, the pattern that a text-book account o f labour supply 
would predict. A woman’s husband becoming unemployed is expected to  have an 
‘added-workcr effect’ (AWE) on her labour supply, and indeed on the labour supply of 
other household members. The AWE is expected to arise because unearned income for 
family member j  falls when member i loses a job,1 2 thus reducing j 's  reservation wage 
and making it more likely that she will enter the labour force, the pure income effect on 
j ’s labour supply reducing the amount of leisure she can afford.
There are several explanations as to why the AWE might be absent, 
outweighed, or fail to translate into an increase in employment among the wives of 
unemployed men. Most fundamentally, it may be that casting the labour supply of 
women in terms of the household is simply inappropriate, and that women do not take 
their husbands’ incomes into consideration when deciding whether to work or not. 
Such a conclusion would upset one of the tenets of the theory of labour supply, to the 
extent that it implies that membership of a household is irrelevant in making labour 
supply decisions. There are, however, other reasons that would explain the absence of 
an AWE within the context of a household model o f labour supply, which should be 
investigated before drawing such a strong conclusion. These are enumerated here.
• Spouses live in the same place, so the shock to the local labour market that caused 
the husband’s unemployment may also make it less likely that his wife is in work.
1 Note that according to the Labour Force Survey data, the wives of the unemployed in Italy work 
much less than the wives of the employed, suggesting a difference in definition between the two 
surveys.
2 In many models of household labour supply, the income of other household members is assumed to 
be treated in the same way as unearned or property income by an individual what making her labour 
supply decision.
2
This ‘local labour market conditions' explanation suggests that the unemployment 
of a husband has an AWE on his wife's desired labour supply, but that she cannot 
increase her labour supply because of a lack of opportunities in the local labour 
market.
• Poor local labour market conditions may further act to suppress any AWE if they 
also make it more likely that the wife is a discouraged worker. A rise in the level of 
local unemployment may make unemployed workers in that area so discouraged 
about the possibility o f finding a job, or, more formally, cause them to increase
their expectation of the search costs o f finding a job to the extent that they stop
f-
seeking work, thus becoming non-participants.
• There may be ‘assortative mating*,3 whereby marriage sorts individuals according 
to characteristics that are relevant to their labour supply, such as the level of 
education and taste for labour market work. In support of the hypothesis of 
assortative mating, Maloney (1991) reports that the correlation in cognitive ability 
between spouses is 0.9, which is higher than the correlation between siblings, or 
between parents and children. If this theory o f the importance of ‘similar 
characteristics* is correct, then the type o f man who is more likely to be 
unemployed is also likely to be married to the type of woman who is unlikely to be 
employed.
• Leisure times of husband and wife may be complements rather than substitutes, 
again because of their liking each other, so that the AWE may be outweighed. This 
may be particularly relevant for older couples, if they regard a husband's 
unemployment as early retirement, albeit unplanned.
• Women may be very reluctant to take over the role of the ‘breadwinner* in the 
household. McKee and Bell (1985) report that, in their interviews with couples in 
which the husband was unemployed, both husbands and wives mentioned, and 
indeed became emotional at the prospect of wives becoming the chief breadwinner, 
with stereotypes of the ‘kept man’ often mentioned.
3 Assortative mating is a cumbersome term that means that people «ho like each other tend to be
• Women may take their decisions according to dynamic rather than just static 
considerations. In this case, it may be reasonable for a woman to continue not to 
participate in the labour market if she believes that her husband’s unemployment 
will not last long enough to justify the transactions costs associated with finding a 
job, only to give it up again when he has returned to work, and the household 
situation returned to ‘normal’. The mechanism for the suppression of the AWE in 
this case can be thought of as a  kind of ‘rational inertia'.
• Equally, in a dynamic context, there may be delays in putting into effect changes in
desired labour supply, since it usually takes time to find a job, particularly if it is
E
also necessary to make alternative child-care arrangements.
• The provision of Unemployment Insurance (UI), which insures individuals against 
the loss of income in the case of their becoming unemployed, replaces income, thus 
reducing the AWE.
• Social security systems that provide benefits in the case of unemployment which 
are means tested4 against family income may generate disincentives to work for a 
spouse that are unrelated to the benefit’s function of replacing lost income.
It is this last explanation o f the absence of an AWE which has been the focus of 
the attention of much of the literature that exists to date on the labour supply of the 
wives o f unemployed men. This is understandable, as only this explanation of the 
absence o f an AWE is directly affected by government policy. Few commentators 
suggest that there should be no public provision of an alternative source of income to 
ensure a minimum level o f welfare in the case of genuine unemployment. But the 
possibility that the administrative rules governing the entitlement to such income may 
discourage women from entering the labour market in order to offset the loss of 
household income, or, worse, encourage working women to leave the labour market, is 
an unhappy one, suggesting that these rules may increase the likelihood that a spell of 
unemployment entails long-term poverty.
4 ‘Means testing* means that the individual’s entitlement to a benefit is judged on the basis of whether 
his other resources, or means, are low enough to justify its receipt
4
In the light of the possibility that it is the means testing of benefits that 
generates the unexpected result that the wives of the unemployed are less likely to be 
employed, it is interesting to see whether there is a pattern of correlation between the 
rate o f employment of women married to unemployed men in the countries included in 
Table 1.1 and the type of benefit system that operates in those countries. The details of 
the benefit systems in these countries are given in OECD (1988).
In fact, it is difficult to see a pattern of this type. For example, the largest 
difference in employment rates is that for Australia, where the wives o f the
unemployed are less likely to be employed than the wives of the employed by 39
»*
points, and in Australia, all unemployment payments are means-tested, there being no 
UI scheme in operation. This supports the hypothesis that the means testing of benefits 
is crucial in explaining differences in employment rates. On the other hand, in Canada, 
where there is a difference in employment of 20 percentage points, only non-means- 
tested UI is available, up to 60% of gross wages being paid for up to 12 months, 
depending on the employment record of the claimant and the regional rate of 
unemployment.
In Sweden, where the wives of the unemployed work more than the wives of 
the employed, unlike in other countries, there is no means testing of benefits, and 
benefits are available indefinitely, lending support to the means testing explanation of 
the differences between countries in the table. And in the Netherlands, where the 
difference in employment is at the lower end of the scale, the Unemployment 
Assistance (UA) benefit is means-tested, but since Unemployment Insurance (UI) is 
paid, at 70% of the previous gross salary, for up to 36 months, many unemployed 
households are never subject to a means test to qualify for benefits.
But on the other hand, in Belgium, where there is a difference o f 13 points in 
employment rates, the benefit system is based only on UI, so that no benefits are 
means-tested. Similarly, in Norway, where the wives of unemployed men work much 
less than the wives of employed men, by 25 points, the system provides only non­
means-tested UI, with 62% of the gross wage paid for 19 months.
It seems that, although the means testing of benefits may have a role to play in 
the explanation o f the lower rates of employment of the wives of unemployed men than
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of the wives of employed men, the other possible reasons for the absence o f the AWE 
given above must also be factors, to varying extents. This thesis attempts to establish 
the relative importance of the various reasons, in one country, the UK.
The remainder o f the chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 explains why the British 
case is particularly interesting to study. Section 1.3 describes the British benefit 
system, including the reforms which have been implemented recently. Section 1.4 gives 
an overview of the existing literature on the subject o f the labour supply o f the wives 
o f unemployed men, both British and otherwise. Finally, in Section 1.5, the approach 
taken in the remainder o f the thesis to examining the labour supply o f  the wives of the 
unemployed in Britain is outlined, and the structure of the thesis explained. '
1.2 The Motivation for Studying the British Case
There are two primary reasons why the labour supply o f the wives of unemployed men 
is a topic that is particularly interesting in Britain.
First, the difference in the labour supply of wives according to the labour 
supply status of their husbands is particularly high in Britain. Table 1.1 showed that 
according to 1979 US data, the difference is 14 points, a difference that is significant 
at the 99% confidence level, whilst the Labour Force Survey data from 1985 indicates 
a difference of 27 points in the employment rate. Even more strikingly, Pudney and 
Thomas (1992, 1993) mention that, according to the 1989 General Household Survey, 
71 % of women married to employed men were in work, whilst just 28% o f those 
married to unemployed men were. This indicates a difference in employment between 
the two groups of 43 points, a remarkable statistic.
Thus, the wives o f the unemployed in Britain are interesting because they work 
significantly less than the wives o f the employed. It also seems possible from these 
figures that the gap in employment rates is growing over time, although the differences 
in the figures given above may be due to changes in definitions between surveys and 
over time. However, Kell and Wright (1988) show that information from one survey, 
the General Household Survey, indicates that between 1973 and 1984, the 
participation rate of the wives o f unemployed men decreased, whilst that of the wives
of employed men increased, leading to a increasing gap in participation rates between 
the two groups.
The second major reason why Britain is interesting is because of its benefit 
system. In Section 1.3.1, this system is described in general terms, so here it is 
necessary to say only that the degree of means testing that has applied in Britain has 
been high. Moreover, the system has recently been changed, according to proposals 
which came into force in late 1996, in a way that extends the means testing of benefits 
further. Therefore, if it is the case that means testing has been an important disincentive 
to work for the wives of the unemployed in the past, then these changes to the system, 
detailed in Section 1.3.3, can be expected to widen the gap in employment between 
these two groups of women even further. The implications o f the further concentration 
of unemployment and non-participation in the labour force into particular households, 
in a country where income inequality has been increasing since the 1980’s, are clear.3
1.3 The British Benefit System
1.3.1 The Benefit System in the UK, 1983-1984
In the UK, the social security system has two tiers. Unemployment Benefit (UB) is 
received by those who have built up an entitlement to it by making insurance 
contributions during previous periods of working; it is, therefore an insurance-based 
benefit. UB is paid only for a year, after which time the unemployed person drops to 
the second tier of the system. This second tier is Supplementary Benefit (subsequently 
Income Support), which does not depend on insurance contributions, and is therefore 
classified as an Unemployment Assistance (UA) benefit 5*7
5 Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) document the increasing polarization between workless households 
and other households in OECD countries and conclude that, for the UK, most of this polarization can
be attributed to the increasing numbers of household types with an incidence of worldessness that is 
typically high, such as single parent families. Nonetheless, a higher than average proportion of 
increased polarization was found to be due to increases within household types in the UK.
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Figure 1.1. The budget constraint faced by the wife o f an unemployed man
who receives UB.
Note: The budget constraint is calculated for an hourly wage rate of £1.77, the average net wage in the 
LSUS data used later in the thesis, and for a UB entitlement of the husband of £25, plus £15.45 
dependant’s allowance. These were the prevailing rates in 1983-84. The tax system is ignored.
Figure 1.2. The budget constraint faced by the wife o f an unemployed man 
who receives SB.
Note: The amount of SB entitlement illustrated is the same as for Figure 1.1 when the wife works zero 
hours, so that the differences between Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 reflect only the difference in 
treatment of the wife's income between UB and SB.
The budget constraint associated with UB is shown in Figure 1.1. UB is not 
means-tested except that an addition for a dependant spouse is paid only if she is 
earning less than the amount of the addition. This means that there is a region on the
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household budget constraint where family income is lower if the wife works than if she 
does not, between b and c in Figure 1.1. In effect, this rule introduces an element of 
means testing into the British UI scheme, which is unusual, resulting in the normal 
distinction between UI and UA being blurred to some extent.
SB is means-tested, so that earnings of other family members cause a reduction 
in benefits paid6 one-for-one with those earnings, beyond a £4 disregard. This means 
that the benefit to a wife's working is just £4 unless she is earning more than the 
family's SB entitlement; the marginal tax rate on her earnings is effectively 100%
between the level of the earnings disregard and the amount of benefit entitlement,
?•
between b and c in Figure 1.2. The disregard operates over the short range o f hours 
between points c and d.
It can be seen by comparing Figures 1.1 and 1.2 that the range of hours over 
which there is no gain from working an extra hour is greater for the wife of an SB 
recipient than for the wife of a UB recipient. It is also clear that the effective average 
tax rate is generally higher for a woman whose husband is on SB.
If the needs of a household receiving UB are judged to be above its resources, 
including UB, then SB may be received in conjunction with UB. Unlike the situation in 
many other countries, the level of UB, which is usually classified as a UI-type benefit, 
is flat rate, so that it is unrelated to the level of previous earnings. Moreover, the rate 
of payment is low. Thus, just 29% of unemployed claimants were receiving UB in 
November 1983, for example (Department of Social Security, 1989). The budget 
constraint that is relevant to many households whose head qualifies for UB when 
unemployed is, therefore, that illustrated in Figure 1.3. Although this budget constraint 
resembles that depicted in Figure 1.2, it is notable that the flat region of the budget 
constraint, from b to c, extends over a smaller range of hours than in the case o f a 
woman whose husband is entitled only to SB.1 Moreover, the absolute level of 
household income is higher at all hours of work of the wife beyond b. *7
* Ownership of more than £2,000 of financial assets also reduces entitlement to benefits.
7 12 hours compared to 23 hours in the examples shown in Figures 1.2 and 13.
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Figure J.3. The budget constraint faced by the wife o f an unemployed man
who receives both UB and SB.
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Note: The amount of UB entitlement illustrated is the three-quarter rate of £18.75 plus £11.59 
dependant's allowance, with household income topped up to £40.45 by SB. Thus, the total benefit 
entitlement at zero hours of work of the wife is the same as for Figures 1.1 and 1.2.
A third benefit that is means-tested is housing benefit (HB). If  the household 
qualifies for SB, then rent and rates are automatically paid by HB, but if the household 
does not qualify for SB, then a comparison o f needs and resources is made that 
typically results in a payment that is less than the amount of the rent, so that 
ineligibility for SB affects household income also through its effect on the basis on 
which HB is calculated.
It is clear from the above description of the benefit system that much of the 
income that is made available by the State in the case o f unemployment is means- 
tested, even when a claimant is eligible for coverage under the UB scheme. It should 
also be noted that the extent of means testing increased when the eamings-related 
supplement formerly included in UB was ended in 1982, since it increased the number 
for whom it was necessary to top up UB income with SB, thus increasing the range o f 
income of the wife over which there was no benefit to working.
1.3.2 Indifference Curve Analysis
This section provides some comparative static analysis of the effects of several possible 
reforms on the effect of the means testing of benefits. Figure 1.4 shows the effect of 
increasing the level of SB payments on the labour supply decision o f a woman not
10
working initially. The diagram shows that non-participation will remain her optimal 
choice, although the extra income to the household will raise her utility, as indicated by 
the shift from indifference curve A to B.
Figure 1.4. The effect o f increasing the level o f her husband's SB payment from  
£40.45 to £60 per week fo r a woman not working under the present system.
New Budget Constraint
Figure 1.5. The effect o f increasing the level o f her husband's SB payment from  
£40.45 to £60 per week fo r  a woman working full-time under the present system.
New Budget Constraint
In Figure 1.5, it can be seen that for a woman initially working the hours 
indicated by the tangency shown at a, corresponding to full-time work, the increase in 
the SB entitlement makes no difference to her optimal hours decision. However, if her 
initial point of maximization is at a lower level of hours o f work, working part-time,
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then the increase in SB will cause her to reduce her hours of work. This is shown in
Figure 1.6. Here, the woman reduces her hours to those represented at the kink point, 
b. Note that if fixed costs of working are important, or if there are demand-side factors 
which make offering such a low level of hours expensive for employers, then this low 
level of hours of work may not be feasible, in which case, the best available alternative 
may be non-participation, at point c. Note also that a woman with a different 
indifference map could optimally choose to cease working after such an increase. This 
is an interesting result; an increase in the SB entitlement of a household may make a 
woman who is working initially less likely to participate, or may cause her to reduce 
her hours o f work to those represented at the kink point where the earnings disregard 
is exhausted, if this is feasible.
Figure J.6. The effect o f increasing the level o f her husband's SB payment 
from  £40.45 to £60 per week fo r  a  woman working part-time under the present 
system.
A reform which could be introduced in order to reduce the disincentive to 
participate in the labour market caused by means testing is illustrated in Figure 1.7. 
Here, the earnings disregard for the wife is increased from £4 per week to £15 per 
week. Again, for a non-worker, this reform has no effect on the probability of 
participation. But note that if the woman's optimal choice prior to the increase in the 
disregard is, in fact, the kink point on the existing budget constraint at b, with non­
participation observed because it is the second best choice given the non-availability of 
jobs with such low weekly hours o f work, then the second best option may, after the
New Budget Constraint 
Existing Budget Constraint
Hours of Leisure
reform, be on the region between b and c, which is more likely to be offered by 
employers.
Figure 1.7. The effect o f increasing the earnings disregard fo r  SB entitlements o f her 
husband from £4 to £15 per week fo r a woman not working under the present system.
Figure 1.8. The effect o f increasing the earnings disregard fo r SB entitlements o f her 
husband from £4 to £15 per week fo r women working full-time under the present 
system.
New Budget Constraint
Note, however, that such a change in the means testing structure of the system 
may make a difference to the optimum number of hours of work. Figure 1.8 illustrates 
the case o f a woman working initially, at point a, who is better off if she works the low 
number o f hours indicated by b after the increase in the disregard. Thus, this reform
13
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may entail changes in the optimal number o f hours of work, and not just the 
participation decision.
Finally, Figure 1.9 illustrates the effect of abolishing the dependant’s allowance 
o f UB. This would eliminate the kink in the UB budget constraint, so that a tangency 
at point b  would be possible, whereas under the present system, no woman will work 
between a and c.8 Thus, the disincentive to work caused by the element of means 
testing in UB would be eliminated. However, the consequence of the household being 
more likely to need SB to bring income up to that identified as the minimum necessary 
under SB entitlement rules would tend to increase the range of hours over which a 
spouse was not prepared to work.
Figure 7.9. The effect o f discarding the dependant’s allowance ofUB.
From the above analysis, it is clear that the interaction of UB and SB entitlement 
complicates the revision o f the optimal hours of work decision in the light of reforms 
o f the Social Welfare system considerably. In the next section, the reforms that have 
been put into effect very recently are discussed. *
* Note that locating at the kink point c may be optimal for some at present.
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1.3.3 Recent Changes to the UK Benefit System
The interest in the possibility that the means testing of benefits generates a disincentive 
effect is heightened by the fact that the British government has abolished UB and SB 
and replaced them with contributory Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) and means-tested 
JSA respectively. These benefits are the same as the benefits they replace, except in the 
following important details:
• The duration for which UB is payable has been reduced from a year to six months. 
Then, the higher degree of means testing associated with SB applies to the income 
of many more unemployed people. -s- Since two thirds of the inflow into 
unemployment find work within six months (Employment Gazette, 1994) and 
about one third of unemployed people qualify for UB, approximately 10% of the 
inflow into unemployment are likely to be affected by this change in regulation. Of 
course, a higher proportion of the stock of the unemployed will be affected.
• The dependant’s allowance paid with UB has been abolished. This means that the 
amount of UB payable has fallen; thus, a higher proportion of households will 
qualify for top-up SB as well as UB, so that more wives face the budget constraint 
shown in Figure 1.3, rather than that shown in Figure 1.1.
• A ‘Back to Work* bonus has been introduced, specifically with the aim of reducing 
the disincentive to re-enter the labour market o f both claimants and their spouses. 
The previous situation was that for every £1 earned beyond a £5 disregard, SB was 
reduced by £1. Under the new scheme, a credit of 50p is built up for every £1 
earned by either a claimant or his spouse in part-time work, defined as less than 16 
hours per week for a claimant and less than 24 hours per week for his spouse, and, 
on finding a full-time job, also defined as working over 24 hours per week, the 
amount of credit built up is re-paid in a lump sum.
This aspect of the recent reforms is particularly complex, because it increases the 
importance of dynamic considerations in the decision-making process. For 
example, a woman has to weigh up the probability of her husband finding a job in 
the future, and if that is unlikely, whether she will wish to work full-time in the 
future. It also makes part-time employment a much more attractive option than
15
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full-time work in the short-term, since if a woman begins to work full-time, ‘Back 
to Work* credits are not built up.
A less important point included in the reforms is that the higher earnings disregard for 
long-term unemployed has been abolished, so that their wives, if not participating, are 
less likely to begin to participate, as illustrated in Figure 1.9 above.
1.4 A Survey of the Existing Literature on the Labour Supply of the 
Wives of Unemployed Men
f  '
The literature that exists on the subject; of the labour supply o f  the wives o f 
unemployed men is small, and diverse both in methodological terms and in the results 
obtained. The work that has been carried out is introduced in this section and the 
support that has been found for each of the explanations o f the labour supply of the 
wives of unemployed men offered in Section 1.1 is then discussed in turn. Finally, the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the review of the literature are outlined.
Three papers have been published which examine the added worker effect 
(AWE) without reference to the role of unemployment payments in determining labour 
supply; they all refer to the US, where unemployment payments are not means-tested, 
which may explain the absence o f a focus on benefits. These papers are by Lundberg 
(1985) and Maloney (1991 and 1987).
In Lundberg (1985), the question of whether there is an AWE of a husband’s 
unemployment is cast in terms of changes in the probabilities of transitions between 
labour force states when one family member becomes unemployed, where the labour 
force status of the wife, given her labour supply in the previous month, is modelled 
separately for each possible labour market status o f the husband; for both husband and 
wife, the labour force status may be either employment, unemployment or non­
participation. If there is an AWE, employed wives are less likely to leave employment 
when their husbands are unemployed, non-participating wives are more likely to enter 
the labour force and unemployed wives find more jobs acceptable, because o f the 
lowering o f their reservation wages caused by the reduction in household income, and 
thus become employed more quickly. The data used are from the Seattle and Denver 
Income Maintenance Experiments panel, collected between 1969 and 1973.
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A second paper that focuses on the AWE emphasizes the importance of 
unobserved characteristics in determining labour supply, an issue that is not specifically 
addressed by Lundberg. Maloney (1991) attempts to distinguish between three 
explanations for the absence of an AWE in aggregate data - local labour market 
conditions, similar characteristics in husbands and wives and complementarity of 
leisure times of the spouses; the 1982 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) is used.
As in Lundberg’s paper, the emphasis is on participation rather than hours 
worked. Here, however, the model used is a static one. The core of the approach used 
is the decomposition of the probability of unemployment of the husband into an ageing 
component, a permanent component that summarizes the effect of all personal 
characteristics other than age on the probability of unemployment, and a transitory 
component. If the AWE outweighs any complementarity of leisure times of the 
spouses, then the transitory component of the husband’s unemployment probability 
should lower the wife’s reservation wage, and if complementarity dominates, the 
opposite is true. If transitory factors causing both to be unemployed, such as local 
labour market conditions, are the source of the outweighing of the AWE, then the 
transitory component of the husband’s unemployment should reduce both the wife’s 
participation probability and her market wage. Finally, if characteristics common to 
both husband and wife are obscuring the AWE, then the permanent component o f the 
husband’s unemployment probability should reduce the wife’s market wage.
In a further paper, Maloney (1987) uses the 1976 wave of the PSID, and a 
model accounting for constraints on the labour supply of both the husband and wife, in 
terms of upper limits on hours worked as well as in terms of unemployment per se.
Gruber and Cullen (1996) focus on the effect of Unemployment Insurance on 
the labour supply of spouses in the US. To test for the effect of UI, predicted UI 
payments are included in a model in which the unit of observation is the husband’s 
spell, so that the dependent variable is the average labour supply of the wife during a 
spell, and there may be more than one spell per person. The data used are the 1984-88 
and 1990-92 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Here, labour 
supply is measured both in terms o f hours of work and participation. Tobit and 
Heckman selectivity bias-corrected models of hours worked are estimated, as well as a
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participation model; both hours and participation models are also estimated with 
couple-specific fixed effects,9 to account for heterogeneity.
European work on this subject tends to focus to a greater extent on the
possibility that it is the disincentive effect of means testing that obscures the AWE,
even in the absence of data on benefit entitlement. An example of such a study is
provided by Davies et al. (1992). Here, a fixed effects model of the monthly labour
supply of the wife is used on data from the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative
Survey, which contains life history data10 on married couples in six British localities,
and was collected in 1987. In order to capture the effect o f means testing, the duration
t
of a husband’s unemployment is used. Since UB is payable for a maximum o f 12 
months, after which point SB, which is much more heavily means-tested, is payable, a 
difference in the behaviour of wives according to the length to date of their husband’s 
unemployment spell is expected. The problem with using this as a way of capturing the 
effect of means testing is that it takes no account of the fact that many men do not 
qualify for UB at the start o f their spell o f unemployment, nor that many households 
qualify for both SB and UB at the same time in the first twelve months of 
unemployment. Both of these matters will tend to blur the ‘twelve month effect* 
sought.
Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) also use the twelve month effect as one way 
of assessing the disincentive, if any, o f means testing for the wives of the unemployed. 
In this case, the country studied is Germany, using five years of monthly data from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel, beginning in 1984. The receipt of Unemployment 
Assistance (UA) is first used as an indicator of the means-test disincentive. This is also 
a problematic variable for capturing any disincentive effect, but this time because o f its 
endogeneity. Since the wife’s income, and hence labour supply, is used to determine 
the entitlement, if any, to UA, the receipt of UA is endogenous to the wife’s labour 
supply, so that the causality of the relationship being investigated is reversed, a 
problem that is recognized by the authors. Two models are used: one is a model that
9 How these fixed effects models are estimated is not clarified. If, as seems possible, the estimates are 
from an unconditional fixed effects model, then the results o f the participation model are inconsistent. 
I return to this point in Section 4.2.1.
10 This term refers to data recording relevant events throughout life, collected retrospectively.
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accounts for heterogeneity by incorporating individual effects that are fixed over time, 
whilst the other is a model of transitions between employment and non-employment.
Another paper in the literature that uses a dummy for the receipt of means- 
tested benefits to indicate the disincentive effect is Dex et al. (1995). This paper is 
unusual in that it is a cross-country study; the countries included are Britain (1980), 
Ireland (1986), the US (1986-87), Sweden (1984) and Denmark (1980). Cross-section 
models of participation are estimated separately for each country.
Again for Britain, Kell and Wright (1990) use the 1983 Family Expenditure 
Survey (FES) to estimate the effect of means-testing of benefits on the labour supply of 
wives. Here, they account partially for the endogeneity of the receipt of benefits by 
including a dummy for the entitlement o f the household to SB if the wife works zero 
hours. The receipt of UB is used as an indicator of a non-means-tested benefit, which 
is not problematic, given that receipt of this benefit does not depend on the wife’s 
labour supply, although the amount received does. The model is also an improvement 
on others that have been estimated in that it allows for a distinction between 
participation on a part-time or a full-time basis, which is clearly important. However, 
the distinction between part-time and full-time work is not extended to the variable for 
the entitlement to SB, although the receipt of SB certainly depends on the hours 
worked by the wife. Labour supply is modelled as a double hurdle; the decision to 
participate is taken first, and, conditional on participation, the wife chooses between 
full-time and part-time work.
There are three studies, all for Britain, which explicitly model the budget 
constraint generated for the wives o f unemployed men in order to assess the effects of 
the means testing of benefits. In this way, the problem of the endogeneity of the receipt 
of benefits is overcome. Garcia (1989, 1991) uses data that have the advantage that 
they come from a survey o f the unemployed, the DHSS Cohort Study of the 
Unemployed, conducted in 1978. The data used here are from a cross section, and the 
model is therefore static. Three budget constraints are possible, for the case where the 
husband works full-time, where he is unemployed and entitled to UB, and where he is 
unemployed and entitled to SB. For all three situations, the budget constraints are 
convex at the point of participation, but for the third case, where there is an SB 
entitlement, this convexity arises only because of the £4 disregard o f the wife’s
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earnings. In this situation, it is assumed that the £4 disregard does not exist, 
presumably because of the difficulty in reality o f finding a job with very few hours per 
week, and so the fact that the resulting budget constraint is non-convex at the point of 
participation must be addressed. On the other hand, the discontinuity in the budget 
constraint for UB receivers’ wives at the point o f the withdrawal of the dependant’s 
allowance is ignored.
In order to deal with the non-convexity on the SB budget constraint, a 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function is specified, and a threshold 
condition for a wife’s participation is derived from this utility fiinction. P o r  those 
whose husbands are entitled to SB, this is complicated, as it requires the calculation of 
the optimal hours of work on each segment of the budget constraint that lies beyond 
the flat segment that reflects the 100% marginal tax rate o f  the withdrawal of benefits, 
using the type of procedure proposed by Burtless and Hausman (1978); hence, the 
threshold condition that is relevant is specified.
The likelihood function is specified so that the contribution to the likelihood of 
an individual depends on whether the husband receives SB or not, and the sample 
likelihood is maximized with respect to the coefficients on the parameters of interest as 
well as the elasticity of substitution of the utility function and the standard error of the 
random variable that defines the participation threshold condition. The variable used to 
capture the means-testing disincentive is the level of entitlement to SB o f the husband 
if the wife does not work.
Papers by Pudney and Thomas (1992, 1993) also model the budget constraint, 
albeit in a more reduced form context than Garcia's. Their model also allows both for a 
distinction between part-time and full-time work and for some dynamic aspects of the 
decision making process. This is possible because they exploit the panel structure of 
the data they use, the Survey of Incomes In and Out of Work, collected in Britain in 
1987. They estimate a model which jointly estimates the desired states at the beginning 
and end of the nine month sample period together with the time taken to make any 
transition; for women who make no transition and for women who make a transition 
into unemployment, allowance is made for the possibility that the destination state may 
be as observed because of a delay in the implementation o f  a decision to  change to a 
new optimal state. The modelling o f the observed states entails a conditional logit
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model with three possible desired states, whilst the time to transition is modelled as 
having a log-normal distribution.11
Finally, a recent paper by Bingley and Walker (1996), also for the UK, uses a 
third approach to the estimation of the determinants of the labour supply of the wives 
of the unemployed which again entails the modelling of the budget constraint beyond 
the participation margin; like Pudney and Thomas, the authors choose to model the 
constraint as a series of three discrete points. The data used here are pooled from 
fifteen years of FES cross-sections, 1987-1992, giving a large sample size.
The approach used is the estimation of a discrete choice, multinomial probit 
model of a wife’s labour supply jointly with models of the rationing of both the wife’s 
and husband's labour supplies, using information on unemployment collected in the 
surveys. Unusually, rationing is also a multinomial variable, with distinctions drawn 
between short-, medium- and long-term unemployment, presumably to indicate the 
degree to which the individual is constrained. However, the concept of rationing used 
is not entirely clear, since, for example, the ages of children are significant determinants 
of being constrained for both husbands and wives.
Variation in tastes is allowed for by using a random coefficients, co-varying 
disturbances model of choice, as suggested by Hausman and Wise (1978), which 
means that the error term in the labour supply model is not problematic, since it no 
longer includes unobserved variation in tastes. The error terms of the husband’s 
rationing equation and the wife’s labour supply choice are allowed to be correlated, 
although the correlation between the wife’s unemployment and labour supply equation 
errors is restricted to zero, as is the correlation between husbands’ and wives’ 
unemployment error terms; this latter restriction would appear to rule out the 
possibility of shocks to the labour market affecting both spouses.
The results obtained using these various approaches are discussed below.
11 In Pudney and Thomas (1993), the time to transition is modelled using a truncated normal 
distribution.
The importance of the local unemployment rate may be assessed in two ways. One way 
of addressing the issue is to focus on whether a husband's unemployment is positively 
correlated with a wife's unemployment. Finding such a positive correlation is 
inconclusive, however, as it may indicate that the wives o f unemployed men have 
higher reservation wages, perhaps because of unobservables such as lower taste for 
labour market work. Moreover, examining the matter in this way requires data on 
participation in the labour market, both employment and unemployment, rather than 
just the former.
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The alternative is to include the local rate o f unemployment as a determinant o f 
either participation - both employment and unemployment - or of employment. Where 
used as a determinant of participation, a negative effect indicates a discouraged worker 
effect, whilst as a determinant of employment, it also reflects true labour market 
constraints.
Maloney (1991) tests explicitly for the effect of local labour market conditions 
on the labour supply of women married to unemployed men. In a preliminary analysis, 
he finds that the county unemployment rate has a negative effect on the employment 
probability o f married women that is significant at the 1% level. He then goes on to use 
a more elaborate model in order to distinguish between the effect of the local 
unemployment rate on the probabilities of both participation and employment 
conditional on participation and the effect of shocks to local labour markets. He finds 
that the local unemployment rate has a negative effect on labour force participation, 
but not on employment conditional on participation, suggesting that a high local 
unemployment rate discourages women from participating in the labour market. He 
also finds that the ‘transitory* component of the husband's unemployment - the shock 
to the local labour market - has no effect on a wife's participation probability, but has a 
negative effect on her employment probability. Thus, the evidence suggests that both 
the increase in the discouraged worker effect and the reduction in job opportunities 
due to a high local unemployment rate are important factors in the effect of the latter 
on the employment probabilities of the wives of unemployed men.
1.4.1 Local Labour M arket Conditions and the Discouraged W orker Effect
Using a different approach to the subject, Maloney (1987) finds that accounting 
for the possibility of wives being unemployed or under-employed dramatically 
increases the estimates o f the effects of a husband’s unemployment or 
underemployment on his wife’s labour supply, tripling her predicted annual hours. The 
main conclusion of this paper is that, although a wife’s labour supply is found to be 
positively associated with her husband’s unemployment, this response is often 
unobserved. This suggests that the discouraged worker effect of a high local 
unemployment rate is unimportant, a result that contrasts with Maloney (1991), but 
that its effect in reducing the probability of finding employment is crucial.
In Bingley and Walker (1996), the rate of regional unemployment is included as 
a regressor in rationing equations for both husbands and wives, where it reflects a true 
demand-side constraint, with a strong effect in the expected direction for both 
husbands and wives. Dummies for the husband’s rationing are included in the wife’s 
labour supply equation as well as the unemployment rate, and the rationing and labour 
supply equations are estimated simultaneously, so that the effect of the unemployment 
rate on labour supply reflects only a discouraged worker effect; the coefficient on the 
unemployment rate in the labour supply equation is significant and negative. Overall, 
the authors conclude that a 1 point increase in the unemployment rate reduces the 
wife’s employment probability by 0.8 points, of which about three quarters is due to 
discouragement, with the remainder due to the increasing constraints.
Other studies are less conclusive in their findings about the importance of local 
labour market conditions. Thus, Gruber and Cullen (1996) find that the relevant female 
unemployment rate by state, level of education and year has an effect on the labour 
supply of married women that is only marginally significant for employment and 
insignificant for hours of work. Lundberg (1985) examines the transitions from non­
participation to unemployment for wives of unemployed men compared with those for 
the wives of employed men to indicate the role of local labour market conditions in 
suppressing the AWE, since the data used contain information on unemployment. The 
results show that for white and Hispanic wives, the relevant transition rate is higher for 
the wives of unemployed men, about twice as high for white wives, but is almost 
exactly the same for black wives of employed men as for black wives of unemployed 
men. Overall, the evidence suggests that the wife of an unemployed man is more likely
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to be unemployed if she decides to enter the labour market than the wife o f an 
employed man, but as pointed out above, it is not certain that this result arises because 
of constraints in the local labour market, as it may be that the wives of unemployed 
men have higher reservation wages.
Several studies have found no effect of the local unemployment rate. Among 
these are Kell and Wright (1990) who find no effect of the regional rate of female 
unemployment on either participation or hours o f work and Dex et a l (1995) who 
report that regional-level demand indicators are insignificant for the countries in their 
study. Similarly, Pudney and Thomas (1992, 1993) find no significant effect o f the
ip
local unemployment rate and suggest that demand-side constraints operate on labour 
supply by depressing wages.
1.4.2 Sim ilar Characteristics of Husbands and W ives
In accounting for the similar characteristics of husbands and wives in determining a 
woman's reaction to her husband’s unemployment, both observables and 
unobservables are relevant. However, it is only in accounting for unobservables that 
difficulties arise. These unobservables may be specified as either individual-specific or 
couple-specific; but in neither case can the extent to which these unobservables are 
similar in both spouses be measured. Hence, the emphasis in the literature is on 
abstracting from unobservables, where data allow such effects to be tackled, with an 
assumption implicitly made that these unobservables are indeed correlated between 
spouses.
For the UK, Davies et aL (1992) account for unobserved heterogeneity both by 
including an individual-specific error term and by allowing for a ‘stayer’ component in 
the model, and find that both of these features significantly improve the explanatory 
power of their model, indicating the importance o f this explanation. Education is 
observable for both husbands and wives in one o f the six localities studied, but it is 
difficult to interpret the results obtained, as no data on wages or household income are 
available, so the extent to which educational qualifications proxy taste for labour 
market work is confused with the correlation between wages and education. However, 
when the 27 point shortfall in employment between the wives of employed and 
unemployed men is decomposed, they find that the account that is taken o f
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heterogeneity, both observed and unobserved, accounts for about 17 points of that
shortfall.
Using German data, Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) also reach the 
conclusion that unobservables are important, by estimating both models that take 
account of unobserved heterogeneity and models that do not, and testing the former 
against the latter using a Hausman test of the hypothesis that unobservables are 
unimportant This null hypothesis is firmly rejected.
On the other hand, Gruber and Cullen (1996) find for the US that accounting 
for couple-specific fixed effects has little effect on their estimates of labour supply. The 
details o f the estimation method used are sparse, so this result may be aberrant for 
econometric reasons. Moreover, no formal test of the result is reported. Many of the 
relevant unobservables have been successfully proxied by variables such as the 
husband’s work history and job type, and also by the husband’s entitlement to UI, 
which is also correlated with labour market characteristics. Such variables do not have 
direct explanatory power in an analysis of a woman’s labour supply, so their 
significance must arise because they are effective proxies o f her husband’s labour 
market characteristics, which she shares. Thus, these results are consistent with the 
importance of common characteristics.
The above-cited papers all use panel data to draw conclusions about the 
importance of common characteristics. In studies that use cross-section data, it is much 
more difficult to allow for this factor, a fact that is reflected in the neglect of the issue 
in many papers. In one paper based on cross-sectional data, Garcia (1991) allows for 
heteroskedasticity of the errors by specifying their distribution as a function of the 
educational qualifications of the wives, and finds that the results as to whether 
specifying heteroskedastic error terms is necessary to be inconclusive. This may be the 
result of having assumed a specific functional form for the errors, which, if incorrect, 
may not account for individual-specific effects adequately.
Bingley and Walker (1996) use a random coefficients, co-varying disturbances 
model, which entails the estimation of the effect of a deviation o f the individual’s tastes 
from the average, and in this way allows for individual-specific effects. These effects 
are significantly different from zero. Moreover, the duration of a husband’s
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unemployment, if any, is included in the wife’s labour supply regression, with results 
showing insignificant effects o f the husband’s having a short unemployment spell, but 
large significant effects reducing the probability of the wife’s working for longer 
unemployment spells. Given that the longer spells have larger effects, this result might 
also be interpreted as reflecting unobserved characteristics shared by husband and wife.
Maloney (1991) uses a third approach to cross-section data to isolate the effect 
of common characteristics on wives* labour supply. Here ‘permanent’ aspects o f a 
husband’s unemployment are separated from ‘transitory* ones; the permanent 
component, which summarizes the impact of all personal characteristics apart from age 
on the probability of the husband being unemployed has a  large significant negative 
effect on the probability of the wife being observed in employment, and this is found to 
be because, although it positively affects the labour force participation probability of 
the wife, it also negatively affects the market wage o f the wife, and increases the wife’s 
unemployment rate.
1.4.3 Complementarity of Leisure Times of Husbands and Wives
According to this explanation of the level o f labour supply o f  the wives o f unemployed 
men, women choose not to enter the labour market, or indeed drop out o f the labour 
market when their husbands become unemployed because they enjoy spending time 
with their husbands.
It is important to note here that it is not possible to  distinguish between this 
explanation and an alternative explanation given in Section 1.1 of the absence o f an 
AWE at the aggregate level, that women are reluctant to become the household’s 
breadwinner when the husband becomes unemployed. It seems likely that if this is the 
source of the complementarity of leisure times, rather than a more positive desire to 
spend time together, then the effect will be stronger for women who do not usually 
work than for those who usually do work, because in the latter case, continuing in a 
job already held would not have the same significance as for a woman who has never 
worked during her married life beginning to work, for example.
The complementarity o f leisure times can be isolated only once the financial 
effects of unemployment and similarities in characteristics have been accounted for.
26
WWW* H KWH
The conclusions of the existing literature as to the importance of the 
complementarity of leisure times between husbands and wives in determining the 
reactions of wives to their husbands* unemployment are mixed. Pudney and Thomas 
(1992» 1993) find that complementarity of leisure times is a significant determinant o f 
the labour supply behaviour of the wives of unemployed men, the coefficients on 
dummies for the husband’s unemployment being large, negative and significant in the 
model of the wife’s choice of labour market state, even after the effects of changes in 
household income and adjustment delays have been accounted for. They conclude that 
in the absence of this complementarity, a slight AWE would emerge, and hence that 
complementarity is a dominant factor in the labour supply decision.
Bingley and Walker (1996) also include the husband’s unemployment in the 
wife’s labour supply equation, although in this case, they use three dummies for short-, 
medium- and long-term unemployment of the husbands. The effects are found to be 
significant for both medium and long spells of unemployment, in a direction consistent 
with complementarity of leisure times. However, the significant differences between 
the coefficients for long and medium spells raise questions about the interpretation of 
these coefficients as reflecting complementarity.12 Whilst it might be argued that some 
increase in the effect of the husband’s unemployment might be expected as the spell 
lengthens, because of delays in implementing decisions or because the longer the spell, 
the more worthwhile a transition becomes, it seems that some unobserved 
heterogeneity is being captured here also, so that the extent to which this result is due 
to complementarity of leisure times alone is difficult to determine.
Maloney (1991) finds inconclusive evidence of complementarity o f leisure 
times being the reason for the absence o f an AWE. He points out that the transitory 
component of a husband’s unemployment should raise a woman’s reservation wage if 
leisure times are complementary, but lower it if there is an AWE. He finds no effect o f
12 The interpretation of complementarity is not, incidentally, made by the authors, who see the role of 
these regressors as allowing for the endogeneity of the husband’s labour force status to the wife’s 
labour supply.
this transitory component on reservation wages, so that either it is the case that neither 
complementarity nor an AWE arise, or both do, and offset each other.13
In Davies et al. (1992), no distinction is made between any means-testing effect 
and complementarity of leisure times between husbands and wives; instead reference is 
made to a ‘cross-couple state dependence*. It is true that there is evidence of a twelve 
month effect, with a husband who has a spell o f a longer duration causing his wife’s 
probability o f employment to reduce. However, some of this effect may well be due to 
complementarity of leisure times between husbands and wives.
In their model, Gruber and Cullei^(1996) find that having accounted for
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couple-specific fixed effects, a husband’s unemployment still has a negative effect on 
his wife’s probability of employment, which may indicate complementarity o f leisure 
times.
Using German data, Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) find that, even after 
unobserved characteristics have been accounted for, a husband being unemployed or 
out of the labour force reduces the probability of a wife participating in the labour 
market, indicating complementarity o f leisure times. Curiously, before unobservables 
have been factored out, the effect of a husband’s unemployment is positive, suggesting 
that the unobservables work to increase her participation, which is difficult to 
rationalize.
In none of the models estimated by Kell and Wright (1991) are both the 
husband’s unemployment and the effect of means testing included. Where the 
husband’s unemployment is included, it has a large, negative, highly significant effect 
on the wife’s participation, but it is difficult to be sure that this is capturing 
complementarity o f leisure times, as neither unobserved characteristics nor the effect of 
means testing are controlled for here.
Garcia (1991) does not explicitly mention the possibility o f the 
complementarity of leisure times in his analysis. He does include the unemployment of
13 Note that the author concludes that complementarity of leisure times cannot be the reason for the 
absence of an AWE, as the transitory component of the husband’s unemployment also raises his 
wife’s market wage; however this conclusion would appear to be rather strong given that the relevant 
coefficient is insignificantly different from zero.
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the husband as an explanatory variable in the participation estimation, and indicates 
that he expects it to have a negative coefficient in line with complementarity; the 
coefficient is, however, reported to be positive, although insignificant14
In the remaining studies, no mention is made of complementarity of leisure 
times, and no inference can be drawn on the topic from the results reported, as either 
benefit effects or unobserved heterogeneity, or both, have not been accounted for.
1.4.4 Inertia and Adjustment Delays
In Section 1.1, it was noted that the fact that women make their labour supply 
decisions in a dynamic rather than a static world may be very important in suppressing 
any AWE. First, if women expect their husbands to return to employment relatively 
quickly, then they may be reluctant either to give up a job if they are in employment, or 
to search for a job if they are not. Secondly, there are delays in implementing decisions 
taken to change employment status. Finding a job takes time, particularly if child- 
minding arrangements must also be put in place, while in order to give up a job, some 
notice must usually be given in advance of leaving.
Few studies to date have focused explicitly on adjustment delays as a reason for 
the absence of an AWE. An exception is Pudney and Thomas (1992, 1993), who find 
that such delays are central in explaining this fact. The authors account for adjustment 
delays by estimating the time taken to a transition jointly with the choice eventually 
made. Only dummies for the type of transition made are included in the specification of 
the adjustment delay, but only for transitions from full-time or part-time work to non­
participation are the effects significant. This runs contrary to expectations, since the 
transition from non-participation to work might be expected to entail a longer delay 
than a transition from work to non-work. In particular, it is difficult to believe that the 
mean adjustment lags are as estimated - over two and a half years for exiting part-time 
work, and almost four years for exiting full-time work. These results surely indicate 
unobserved heterogeneity that is unaccounted for rather than adjustment delays in the 
sense of difficulties in putting into effect decisions that have already been taken. In
14 In the text, the author claims that the coefficient is significant and negative, which renders 
commenting on this result difficult
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particular, it seems likely that some individuals who are inherently stayers are driving 
these results.
None of the other existing studies claim to have captured the effect o f inertia or 
adjustment delays in their analyses, preferring to view adjustment delays as deviations 
from the utility maximizing outcome, but those that are inherently dynamic can be 
assessed for evidence of such delays nonetheless. Thus, for example, in Davies et a l , 
the current state is allowed to depend on the state in the previous month, in a first- 
order Markov structure, which will account for any differences between the rates of 
transitions out o f work and those from non-work into work. When this is introduced, 
much of the employment shortfall between the wives of employed and unemployed 
men previously ascribed to cross-state dependence is accounted for - about nine points 
of a ten point shortfall; this may be because of unobserved heterogeneity being 
successfully reflected in the initial state occupied, but may also be due to adjustment 
delays.
On the other hand, Lundberg (1985), finds that transitions into employment are 
more probable than transitions out of employment in the sample she uses, after 
demographic and income variables have been taken into account, a pattern that is not 
expected to arise if finding a job takes more time than quitting a job.
Finally, as noted in previous sections, Bingley and Walker (1996) find that the 
longer her husband’s term of unemployment, the less likely a woman is to work, which 
may indicate that a woman waits to see if her husband’s situation is likely to last before 
making the transition which is optimal.
Other papers on the subject of the labour supply of the wives of unemployed 
men are set in static frameworks, so that no evidence of the importance of adjustment 
delays and inertia can be inferred.
1.4.5 Unemployment Insurance and the Added W orker Effect
The AWE arises because a husband’s unemployment entails a drop in income for the 
household, which is a drop in non-labour income for his wife, and which therefore 
reduces her reservation wage and makes it more likely that she will participate in the
labour market. Clearly, the extent of the AWE depends on the amount by which 
household income is reduced by a husband’s becoming unemployed.
The benefit system replaces income lost due to unemployment. The income the 
system provides to an unemployed man may be means-tested, as described in Section 
1.3.1, in which case the issues involved are not related to the presence of an AWE, 
since the means-tested income received is endogenous to rather than exogenous to his 
wife’s labour supply. A negative effect on the labour supply o f wives of exogenous 
income is a necessary condition for the emergence of an AWE. However, it is 
important to note that if low market wages or low tastes for labour market work are 
also present, or if there is a strong complementarity of spouses’ leisure times, an AWE 
will not occur. Thus, testing for the importance of a reduction in a husband’s income is 
not synonymous with testing for an AWE.
Gruber and Cullen (1996) find no evidence o f an AWE in their data, and 
conclude that this is due to the payment of Ul, as they find that non-participation 
would drop by 45 points in the absence of UI. Thus, their conclusion about the 
importance of replacement income when a husband is unemployed is a strong one.
Maloney (1991) does not include U l payments in his analysis, maintaining that 
they would have no effect on an AWE, although this is certainly not true; clearly any 
compensation for lost income will reduce the AWE. The husband’s wage income has a 
negative effect on a woman’s labour supply, suggesting that the amount of UI received 
would also affect labour supply. However, the author does test for an AWE by 
inspecting the effect of a husband’s unemployment per se on a wife’s reservation 
wages; finding no such effect, he concludes that no AWE occurs because of the extent 
to which common characteristics determine wives’ labour supply.
Pudney and Thomas (1992) do not separate endogenous from exogenous 
income received by the husband, so that the results for the husband's income cannot be 
taken as an indication of an AWE. However, the authors do carry out simulations to 
isolate any AWE, and find that only in the absence of a very strong complementarity of 
leisure times does a small AWE emerge.
Simulations conducted by Bingley and Walker (1996) show that if a woman’s 
husband finds a job, the effect of the change in household income alone, abstracting
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from the fact of his being employed and any consequent complementarity effects, is to 
increase the probability of a woman’s participation by over 6 percentage points, spread 
fairly evenly between part-time and full-time work. This indicates that there is an AWE 
of the change in the husband’s income.
In some other studies, it is difficult to interpret the effects o f UI on the
recipients’ wives’ labour supply. For example, in Dex et al. (1995), a negative effect of
the receipt of UB is reported for both Britain and Ireland, but it is difficult to interpret
this result since the benefit receipt variables also reflect the fact of a husband’s
unemployment, and therefore any unobserved characteristics that this might represent,
f
as well as any complementarity of leisure times between spouses. A similar problem 
arises in Kell and Wright (1990). Where the husband’s unemployment is controlled for 
in this study, UB receipt has a significant positive effect on the wife’s probability of 
participation, which is inconsistent with an AWE, and probably indicates the type of 
women whose husbands receive UB as opposed to SB.
1.4.6 The Means Testing o f Unemployment Payments
The results of the studies published to date regarding this issue, which is the crucial 
one associated with the labour supply of the wives o f unemployed men, are very 
mixed. Pudney and Thomas (1992, 1993) find that the income received by a woman’s 
husband has no significant effect on her labour supply; this result emerges from a 
model that specifies the household budget constraint carefully, as well as taking into 
account the dynamics of the labour supply decision.
On the other hand, Bingley and Walker (1996) find clear evidence that means 
testing generates a disincentive to work for the wives o f the unemployed. In 
simulations, they find that a shift from UB entitlement to SB entitlement reduces the 
probability of participation of the wife by about 3.5 points; it increases the probability 
of full-time work by 1.5 points and decreases the probability of part-time work by 
about 4.5 points.13
13 A complication with interpreting this result as a pure means-testing effect is that the shift from UB 
to SB can entail some, typically small, difference in the maximum level of entitlement, which changed
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Garcia (1991), also using a careful specification of the household budget 
constraint, albeit in an entirely static framework, reports an elasticity of participation 
with respect to means-tested benefits of -0 .36 , and by simulating the effects of 
means-tested benefits being at different replacement rate levels, shows that the effect o f 
the level o f these benefits is significant. It may be that inadequate account is taken of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the model used, so that the apparent relationship between 
means-tested benefits and the participation in the labour market of the wives o f 
unemployed men is actually reflecting the relationship between unemployment per se 
and participation. A further possibility is that unobservables are correlated with the 
type of benefit received, so that SB receipt'indicates labour market characteristics o f 
the husband that are shared by his wife. The importance of adequately accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity in models of the labour supply o f women married to 
unemployed men is underlined by the problems of interpreting results such as these.
In Davies et al. (1992), the income data available were limited, so that the 
‘twelve month effect* was relied on for evidence of a means-testing effect. Such a 
twelve month effect was found, with wives of men with unemployment spells longer 
than a year being less likely to be in employment even after accounting for unobserved 
as well as observed heterogeneity. However, as pointed out in Section 1.1 the twelve 
month effect is not a very satisfactory way of establishing the size of the means testing 
effect. But the fact that there is much means testing entailed in the system also before 
the twelve month point in an unemployment spell implies that any estimated difference 
between short spells and long spells in their effect on the wife’s labour supply is likely 
to be an understatement of any means-testing effect, as long as the characteristics that 
cause a man to have a longer unemployment spell have been accounted for.
Giannelli and Micklewright (1995), analysing German data, also test for the 
‘twelve month effect’ to establish the presence of a means-testing disincentive. First, 
using a fixed-effects model, they test for the effect of the husband’s unemployment on 
his wife’s labour supply and find a negative effect; when the receipt of UA is added to 
the specification, the effect of unemployment per se becomes insignificant, and that o f
over the years in which the data were collected in a way that may not be perfectly captured by a linear 
time trend.
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UA significant and negative. This negative effect is not surprising, given the 
endogeneity of this variable discussed above. In order to test the result, the UA 
variable is dropped and the duration of the husband’s unemployment added to the 
specification, in the expectation that these will indicate a twelve month effect if a 
means-testing disincentive is indeed driving the negative UA effect. No such pattern is 
found. Neither do they find any effect o f a means-testing disincentive in their model of 
transitions between participation and non-participation; even UA receipt does not 
affect the probability of changing state, despite its endogeneity.
As for the estimation of the effect o f SB receipt by a husband on the labour
v
supply of his wife, the results o f Kell and Wright (1990) are difficult to interpret. They 
find that entitlement to SB has a significant negative effect on the probability of a 
woman participating. However, in none of the models reported is the husband’s 
employment status included in the same specification as the variable for the entitlement 
to SB. Therefore, this negative coefficient may be reflecting the effect o f a husband’s 
unemployment, and hence such effects as the similar characteristics effect, as well as 
any disincentive effect of means testing.
Finally, the problem of the endogeneity of UA receipt arises in interpreting the 
results of Dex et a l (1995). The results show strong negative effects of means-tested 
benefits on the participation of the wife for the three countries for which sufficient data 
are available to estimate their effect - Britain, Ireland and the US. In the cases of 
Britain and Ireland,16 the receipt of UI, which is means-tested to a lesser degree than 
UA also has a large negative effect, which the authors interpret as reflecting the 
withdrawal o f a dependant’s allowance if the wife earns more than the amount of the 
allowance. However, no control for the husband’s work status per se is included, so 
that these coefficients must be capturing any complementarity or substitutability o f 
leisure times o f husband and wife and similar characteristics in the two of them, as well 
as a correlation between the receipt o f a benefit and participation. The authors 
emphasize that the difference in the magnitude of the two variables supports the 
presence of a disincentive effect; however, this may also arise if the groups receiving 
UI and UA are different in unobservable characteristics, as seems likely.
16 The Irish benefit system is similar to the British one.
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1.4.7 Conclusions
Having reviewed the existing literature on the subject of the labour supply of the wives 
of unemployed men, it is now possible to draw several specific conclusions as to the 
issues that have tended to be neglected in previous work, with a view to avoiding these 
problems in this thesis. The main conclusions are as follows:
• It is important to model the budget constraint beyond the participation margin, as
the results obtained for the effect of the husband's unemployment on the 
probabilities of working high and low hours can differ markedly, as indeed might be 
expected. ~
• The specification of appropriate variables to capture the effect of means testing of 
benefits on the labour supply of the wives of unemployed men is crucial; variables 
representing benefit receipt are endogenous, and those relying on a ‘twelve month 
effect’ of unemployment will tend to underestimate the effect of means testing.
• Accounting for individual heterogeneity and the complementarity of leisure times at 
the same time as the means testing of benefits is important because of the difficulty 
in interpreting the results of a model in which one of these factors is omitted.
1.5 The Approach of this Thesis
This thesis uses data from a survey of households headed by unemployed individuals in 
Britain, conducted in the 1980’s, to attempt to explain the lower level of participation 
in the labour market of the wives of unemployed men. This chapter has introduced the 
issues motivating this study. It remains to outline the approach taken in the remainder 
of the thesis.
In Chapter 2, the data used to analyse the reasons for the absence o f an AWE 
in Britain are introduced. These data are from the Living Standards during 
Unemployment Survey (LSUS), from 1983-84. Having described the data and 
established their suitability for the task in hand, a descriptive analysis of the data is 
undertaken. Thus, using non-parametric techniques, a preliminary assessment of some 
explanations of the low participation rates of these women is made, using data on 
labour force status and attitudes to work of the wives.
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In Chapter 3, the construction of variables representing the household income 
that would apply in different labour market states o f the wife is described. These 
variables will be used in the parametric analysis conducted in later chapters to pinpoint 
the effect of means testing on women’s labour supply, but in Chapter 3, the emphasis is 
on establishing the link between the means testing o f different types of benefits and 
household income. To do this, both absolute amounts of household income in different 
labour market states o f the wife, and the effective tax rate implied by means testing are 
examined. The link between women’s attitudes to work and the effect of means testing 
on household income is also examined. Finally, the assumptions underlying the 
construction of a variable based on household income are discussed.
In Chapter 4, the variables constructed as described in Chapter 3 are used in an 
econometric analysis of the LSUS data, using a model developed by Chamberlain 
(1980) that accounts for the possibility that unobservable individual-specific fixed 
effects are important in determining the labour supply o f married women. This model, 
the multinomial fixed effects conditional logit model (FECL) has not been applied to 
the labour supply o f the wives of unemployed men previously, nor, with few 
exceptions, elsewhere17 and so a detailed exposition of the model is included in 
Chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, the variables constructed according to the description in Chapter 
3 are again used, but in this case in a dynamic model of labour supply, the Mover- 
Stayer model By using a Mover-Stayer framework, it is anticipated that both 
dependence of observed labour supply on previous labour market experience and 
heterogeneity in the sample can be controlled for.
Chapter 6 compares the results o f the econometric models employed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, and also places these results in the context o f the findings of the 
work that has been done to date on the subject of the labour supply of the wives of 
unemployed men, outlined in Section 1.4. A summary of the main conclusions drawn 
brings the thesis to an end.
17 The exceptions of which I am aware are Bdrsch-Supan (1990), BOrsch-Supan and PoIIakowski 
(1990) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994).
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2 , Data Description and Preliminary Analysis
2.1 Introduction
The data source for the present study is the Living Standards During Unemployment 
Survey (LSUS), a British longitudinal household survey conducted in 1983 and 1984. 
These data have not previously been used to examine the labour supply of the wives of 
the unemployed, so it is important to describe the data set and discuss its suitability for 
the analysis o f the issues outlined in Chapter 1. To this end, the structure of the LSU 
survey and the nature o f the data collected are described in Section 2.2.1 and an out­
line of the sample selection criteria used given in Section 2.2.2. The advantages and 
disadvantages of the data set for the analysis of the labour supply o f women married to 
unemployed men are discussed in Section 2.2.3.
The remainder of the chapter entails a descriptive analysis of these data. The 
descriptive analysis of a data set is useful for three reasons. First, such an analysis can, 
o f itself, provide answers to the questions of interest in a study. Secondly, it can indi­
cate the features of the data whose explanation is most important in more elaborate 
analytical methods. And thirdly, as well as guiding the choice of modelling strategies, 
the descriptive analysis of data can indicate likely difficulties in implementing preferred 
strategies.
In Section 2.3 below, the sample matrices of transitions between labour market 
states over time are presented. In their raw form, included in Section 2.3.1, these tables 
describe the extent of ‘movement’ in the data, indicating whether the data are adequate 
for the detailed analysis of the labour supply of women married to unemployed men. 
Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 give transition matrices for various population sub-groups so 
that a preliminary assessment can be made of the relative importance of the explana­
tions suggested in Section 1.1 for the patterns observed in aggregate data, particularly 
the lower participation rates of the wives of the unemployed.
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Having presented an analysis of the data on labour force transitions, other data 
collected in the LSI) survey are utilized. In Section 2.4, a non-parametric analysis of 
weekly labour force status information is presented which can be used to indicate 
whether the exhaustion of UB is important to the labour supply of the women sur­
veyed. In Section 2.5, data on the attitudes of the women to participation in the labour 
force are examined. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Living Standards During Unemployment Survey
*
2.2.1 Survey Structure
The LSUS surveyed the unemployed and their families directly. The individuals in­
cluded were randomly selected from those starting to register as unemployed between 
July 21 and August 20,1983 in Britain. Thus, the procedure used was to sample from 
the inflow into unemployment, a strategy which is generally used to eliminate the 
length bias that results from stock sampling of a population o f unemployed. In this 
case, however, the sample was deliberately truncated by discarding all observations on 
those whose unemployment ended within three months. The reason for this was that 
the survey planners were primarily concerned with the effect on living standards of un­
employment, and were, therefore, less interested in those unemployed for short peri­
ods. The effect o f this strategy was that all the household heads sampled had been un­
employed for at least three months.
The unemployed individuals included in the survey were all between 20 and
58.5 years of age.1 No married women who were living with their husbands were in­
cluded as household heads, possibly because, until 1984, such women were not entitled 
to claim SB (Stancanelli, 1994).
The structure of the survey is shown in Figure 2.1. At the first interview, held 
about three months into the unemployment spell, questions concerning the date at 
which the interview was held and the ‘key date*, one month before the unemployment
1 This upper limit was chosen to ensure that the retirement age would not have been reached by the 
end of the sampling period.
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spell began, were asked. The second interview was held a year after the first, and hence 
fifteen months after the sampled unemployment spell began and sixteen months after 
the key date. It is important to bear in mind that all sampled individuals were still un­
employed at the three month stage, whereas some had obtained employment again by 
the time of the second interview.
Figure 2.1. The Structure o f  the Living Standards During Unemployment Survey.
Start of Husband’s 
Unemployment
Key
Datet
h
-1
A
0
First Interviewt
3
Second
Interview
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— I
----------- >
Months after unemployment spell began
At the first interview, detailed information was collected about the situation of 
the household at that date and at the key date, one month before the unemployment 
spell began. The data collected included information for both husband and wife on la­
bour force status, wage and property income, savings and debts, occupation and in­
dustry. Similarly detailed questions were asked at the second interview a year later. 
Also at the first interview, week by week information about labour force status for the 
previous year was asked of the husband. Further questions about the number of spells 
of unemployment in the previous five years and whether a job lasting more than a year 
had ever been held were also asked of the husband, contributing to a picture of his la­
bour market history. None of these latter questions were asked of the wife.
The questionnaire at the second interview contained similar questions to those 
asked at the first. The main difference between the two interviews was that information 
on labour force status for each week of the year between the two interviews was asked 
of the wife as well as the husband at the second interview.
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Finally, at both interviews, a series o f qualitative questions on the standard of 
living in the household, travel and job search, the extent of help obtained from friends, 
families and charities, recreational activities, marital problems, general stress levels and 
opinions on the effects of unemployment were asked.
Throughout the thesis, the key date, first interview, and second interview, 
which are the dates for which detailed information was collected, are referred to col­
lectively as the ‘principal dates*, and where appropriate, the key date is referred to as 
t = -1 ,  the date of the first interview as t =  3 and the date o f the second interview as 
'  = 15.
f
2.2.2 Selection of a  Sample from the LSUS data
The LSUS contains information on 2925 households. However, some of these house­
holds are not relevant to the issue being addressed in this thesis, while others did not 
respond at the second interview, either because they refused to co-operate with the 
surveyors, or because they could not be traced. In this section, the groups omitted in 
order to arrive at the sample used throughout the rest of the thesis are specified.
First, only those households who responded at both interviews are included. 
79% of the total sample responded at the second interview; o f those who did not, 47% 
could not be contacted, usually because they had moved home, 51% refused to co­
operate and 1% had died. Heady and Smyth (1989) discuss the possible bias from non­
response. They conclude that, in terms o f family composition, the rate of non-response 
at the second interview is very similar for all groups, apart from single men aged under 
35, who are not included in the final sample used here in any case. But of more con­
cern is the information collected from 83% of those who refused to co-operate at the 
second interview as to their current economic status; 47% of these were in work, com­
pared to 35% of those who did respond, suggesting that a loss of interest on the part 
of those who returned to work may have been an important source of non-response. 
Hence, it seems likely that the sample used for this thesis is different in some respects 
from the total sample. However, the alternative of using all those who responded at the 
first interview where possible, regardless o f whether they responded at the second in­
terview, would, for the very reason o f a possible difference between the two groups, 
have led to a  lack of comparability in assessing the results o f models using different
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samples. For this reason, I considered the reduction in sample size of 502 households 
due to this criterion o f sample selection to be justified.
A second source of reduction from the 2925 households in the total sample was 
the exclusion of households not headed by a married man. Thus, all households headed 
by women are excluded from the analysis. As mentioned above, these households were 
only included in the survey if the husband was no longer present, in which case, the 
response of the wife to the husband's unemployment is not relevant. By the same logic, 
households containing only one person are excluded, as are households containing a 
married man and his children with no wife present
Thirdly, only households where the wife was present at all three principal dates 
are included. This means that households in which the wife was not present at one of 
the three dates are excluded, as are households where the wives change over the pe­
riod, so that although the head of household's wife was present at all three dates, she 
was not the same woman at all three dates. Thus, all results are conditional on the sta­
bility of the family; households affected by severe marital difficulties are excluded from 
the analysis.
The final sample of households headed by unemployed men who were married 
to and living with the same woman throughout the sample period is 1727 households.
2.2.3 Advantages and  Disadvantages o f the LSU Survey for the Analysis of the
Labour Supply of the Wives of Unemployed Men
The single greatest advantage of the LSU survey for the investigation of the issues of 
interest in this thesis is the fact that only households headed by the unemployed were 
sampled, which means that the sample size is more likely to be large enough to be able 
to draw statistically valid conclusions. Many of the analyses o f the labour supply of 
women married to unemployed men outlined in Section 1.4 were undertaken using 
data on the whole population, o f which a small proportion is typically unemployed, 
thus requiring very large sample sizes in order to be able to draw any valid conclusions. 
Here, since the sub-population sampled is the one of interest, a sample size of 1727 is 
likely to be adequate. It is interesting to note that this sample size compares favourably 
with the 692 couples from the Survey of Incomes In and Out o f Work (SHOW), used 
by Pudney and Thomas (1992, 1993), and with the 946 wives in the DHSS Cohort
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Study of the Unemployed used by Garcia (1989, 1991) in the only other studies on this 
topic which analyse a sample of households headed by unemployed individuals.
A second advantage of this data set is that it is from a panel survey, and more 
particularly that the survey period is reasonably long. Because o f its length, the reac­
tion of the women surveyed to several events may be observed. For all women, their 
husbands become unemployed between the key date and the first interview. However, 
some husbands become employed again in the year between the two interviews; in­
deed, they may be employed and unemployed several times between these two dates. 
Thus, the reaction of a wife to her husband’s re-employment may be observed.
Moreover, for men who do not exit their sampled unemployment spell by the 
date of the second interview, but who qualify for UB, the exhaustion of their entitle­
ment to UB and the consequent change in the means-testing structure of household 
income during the year between the two interviews provides another event in the 
household to which their wives may react. Again, this compares favourably with the 
data set used by Pudney and Thomas, in which the final interview is conducted about 
nine months after the husband first signed on to the unemployment register, and 
therefore before the exhaustion of UB.
There are, however, several features of the data which are disadvantageous. 
The most important deficiency in the survey is the fact that no data on education levels 
or experience in the labour force were collected for any household members.2 It is usu­
ally necessary in analyses of the labour supply of married women to impute the wage 
which non-working women would earn if they were working, a  task which is rendered 
difficult by the absence of an education variable, since it is the most direct measure of 
human capital. I return to this point in Section 3.2. Another important demographic 
variable that was not collected is the race o f the household members, which is usually 
found to be important to the labour supply o f wives in British studies.
A second disadvantage of the survey is that weekly labour force participation 
details were not collected for the wives o f the household heads for the year before the 
first interview. This means that between the start of the husband’s spell of unemploy­
2 Data on the husband’s experience of unemployment were collected, as mentioned in Section 2.1.
ment and the first interview, there are no weekly data for the wives, making the use o f 
the weekly data that were collected problematic. The use of these data is discussed in 
greater detail in Section 2.4.
Thirdly, the exclusion of all households headed by individuals whose unem­
ployment lasted for less than three months is problematic for the interpretation of the 
results, since they strictly apply only to those who are unemployed for more than this 
length of time. However, this aspect of the sampling strategy has one advantage. It is 
well known that data on unemployment payments are unreliable in the initial signing on 
period, because the appropriate level of payment is not always immediately obvious to 
the administration. Narendranathan et al. (1985) actually discard all individuals whose 
unemployment spell end within four weeks to deal with this problem. This particular 
measurement problem is, therefore, not one that needs to be considered here.
A further, more minor disadvantage of the survey is its timing. The interviews 
were conducted in 1983 and 1984, at a time when both the level of unemployment, and 
the proportion of it that was long-term, increased dramatically in the UK, and indeed in 
other countries (OECD, 1993). Between 1981 and 1983, the proportion of unemploy­
ment that lasted for over a year increased from less than 30% to almost 50%. This is a 
disadvantage because if women update their expectations of the duration of their hus­
bands* unemployment on anything other than a Rational Expectations basis - for exam­
ple, with a partial adjustment mechanism - then more women will make mistakes in 
calculating their best response to their husbands* unemployment.
Finally, a feature of the data set that may be a disadvantage should be men­
tioned: at the three principal dates, labour force status is collected in four hours ranges 
- full-time work, part-time work of more than ten hours per week (high part-time 
hours), part-time work of less than ten hours per week (low part-time hours), and no 
work.3 This method of grouping the variable of primary interest in this survey is cer­
tainly a disadvantage in some ways. First, it makes the calculation of precise hourly 
wage rates impossible, a point that I return to in Section 3.2. Secondly, it makes it im-
3 Full-time work appears to have been self-defined, although interviewers were instructed to count two 
part-time jobs which totalled more than thirty hours per week as a full-time job, so it may be that an 
ad hoc adoption of a ‘more than thirty hours’ definition was in operation.
possible to estimate a model of the type used by Garcia (1989* 1991), where an explicit 
utility index is specified and optimization based on the comparison of utility levels as­
sumed, as described in Section 1.4. Thirdly, as regards the particular choice of groups, 
the fact that no distinction is made between those not working by choice and those 
constrained in their labour market supply behaviour is a drawback for investigating the 
possibility, mentioned in Section 1.1, that local labour market conditions affecting both 
spouses may be an important determinant o f  the labour supply o f women married to 
unemployed men.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the grouping o f hours is a valid way 
of dealing with the presence o f demand-side constraints on the hours that may be 
worked; for institutional or other reasons, firms may not offer a continuum of hours, so 
the hours distribution may be bunched at a few points.4 However, even if a decision 
were taken to group hours in the analysis of the labour supply of these women, the 
grouping chosen might not necessarily be the one used by the LSUS surveyors.
2.3 Preliminary Analysis: Transition Matrices
2.3.1 Transition Matrices: A ll Individuals
The LSUS data show that, as regards the situations at the three principal dates for 
which information is collected, 466 women (27%) change from one of the four status 
categories (full-time work; part-time work of more than ten hours per week; part-time 
work of less than ten hours per week; no paid work) to another between two of these 
principal dates. 85 (4.9%) change their status twice; for 45 of these (2.6%) the second 
change is back to their original status; so they change status between the key date and 
the first interview, only to make a transition back to their original status by the second
4 This point is discussed further in Section 3.7.
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interview. Again, this level of transitions compares favourably with the SHOW used by 
Pudney and Thomas (1993), where about 15% of individuals record transitions.5
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the patterns of movement between the key date and 
the first interview, and between the first interview and the second. In these tabulations, 
the highlighted figures on the diagonal indicate individuals who are in the same state at 
both dates; those to the left of the diagonal are working more at the second date than 
at the first, while those to the right of the diagonal are working less at the second date 
than previously.
The first point that can be made about the information in these tabulations is
x
that the employment rate of these women before their husband’s unemployment began 
was 36%. According to the 1983 General Household Survey, the rate of employment 
prevailing among all married women in the UK in that year was 57% (OPCS, 1983), so 
the participation of the wives surveyed in the LSUS is clearly lower than average.
Table 2.1. Transitions between key date and first interview. Percentage o f total sample in brackets.
Job status at f = 3
Job Status at t -  -1 Full-Time Part-Time, > Part-Time, < None Total
10 hours 10 hours
Full-Time 227 17 1 54 299
t (13.5) (1.0) . (0.1) (3.2) (17.8)
Part-Time, > 10 hours 2 181 12 42 237
(0.1) (10.8) (0.7) (2.3) (13.9)
Part-Time, < 1 0  hours 1 6 56 9 72
(0.1) (0.4) (33) (0.5) (4.3)
None 12 24 13 1023 1072
(-7) (1.4) (0.8) (60.9) (63.8)
Total 242 228 82 1128 1680
(14.4) (13.6) (4.9) (67.1) (100.0)
As to the transitions themselves. Table 2.1 indicates that, initially at least, the 
forces inducing the women concerned to work fewer hours - which may be because of
5 These transitions levels are not strictly comparable, since the definitions of states in the SHOW and 
in the LSUS are different: in the former survey, the states are defined as full-time work, part-time 
work, no paid work and unemployment
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disincentive effects or a labour market shock affecting both partners - seem to be 
stronger than the added-worker effects. 135 women (8%) are working fewer hours at 
t~  3 than they were at t = -1 , while 58 (3%) are working more hours.
Table 2.2. Transitions between J im  and second interviews. Percentage o f total sample in brackets.
Job status at t ~  15
Job Status at / = 3 Full-Time Part-Time, > Part-Time, < None Tota]
lOhours lOhours
Full-Time 201 8 1 37 247
(11*7) (0.5) (0.1) (2.2) (14.4)
Part-Time, > 10 hours- 24 156 £ 14 35 229
(1.4) (9.1) = (0.8) (2.0) (13.4)
Part-Time, < 10 hours 5 17 34 27 83
■r (0.3) (1.0) (2.0) (1.6) (4.8)
None 38 62 38 1016 1154
(2.2) (3.6) (2.2) (593) (67.4)
Total 268 243 87 1115 1713
(15.6) (14.2) (5.1) (65.1) (100.0)
The cross-tabulation of the states occupied at t = 3 and t = 15 given in Table
2.2 shows a reversal o f this pattern, however. More individuals have changed state, as 
would be expected given the longer time available. But the number of transitions to­
wards fewer hours o f work is very similar to that between the key date and the first 
interview, despite there being more time available; a further 122 women (7%) work 
fewer hours at the second interview than at the first interview, compared to 135 (8%) 
working fewer hours at the first interview than at the key date. Movement towards 
working more hours shows a much greater increase, however, at the date o f the sec­
ond interview, 184 (11%) are working more than they were at the first interview, com­
pared to the 58 at the date of the first interview working more than previously. It 
seems that adjustment towards paid work is slower than from work to non-work. This 
is reasonable, as it is likely to take more time to find a job than to quit a job. This sug­
gests that adjustment delays are important, and more important for an added-worker 
effect than for a disincentive effect
Notably, however, the pattern does not appear to support a conclusion that the 
increased means testing applicable after a year of unemployment increases the disin­
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centive effect. These are, of course, just head-count figures, and it may be that for 
those women to whose income the means test began to apply at this stage, the disin­
centive effect did indeed have an effect, but that this was counteracted by a move back 
to work by those whose husbands became employed before the second interview.
Table 2.3 shows the changes in states occupied between the key date, before 
the husband’s unemployment began, and the second interview. As expected given the 
content of Tables 2.1 and 2.2, over the entire period, the disincentive effect6 is still 
stronger than the added-worker effect
Table 2.3. Transitions between key date and second interview. Percentage o f total sample in brackets.
Job Status at / = 3
Job Status at / = — I Full-Time Part-Time, > Part-Time, < None Total
10 hours 10 hours
Full-Time 203 25 4 65 297
(12.1) (1.5) (0.2) (3.9) (17.7)
Part-Time, > 10 hours. 20 141 19 56 236
(1-2) (&4) (1.1) (3.4) (14.1)
Part-Time, < IO hours. 5 15 24 28 72
(0.3) (0.9) (1.4) (1.7) (4.3)
None 33 59 40 936 1068
(2.0) (3.5) (2.4) (56.0) (63.8)
Total 261 240 87 1085 1673
(15.6) (14.3) (5.2) (64.9) (100.0)
Throughout the discussion above, the term ‘added worker’ has been used to 
mean those working more hours at a particular point than previously. In fact, most of 
the increases in hours o f work do indeed come from former non-participants beginning 
to participate rather than those participating before the husband's unemployment began 
increasing their hours o f work. Thus, most of the added workers fit into the usual 
meaning of the term. The more general point here is that most o f the transitions are 
between working and non-working states, in both directions.
6 The movement to fewer hours may entail a local labour market shock, or indeed strong complemen­
tarity of leisure times, rather than a disincentive effect
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The fact that so many of the transitions are between working and not working 
means, however, that many of the other cells are very sparse. The lack of transitions is 
particularly noticeable between full-time work and working low part-time hours. Other 
cells of the transitions matrices are also quite sparse, particularly for transitions be­
tween the key date and the first interview, such as from high part-time hours to full­
time work, and from low part-time hours to both high part-time hours and to no work. 
The implications of small cell sizes for the econometric analysis of the data are dis­
cussed in Section 5.2.2.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the level of transitions among these women 
with that in the general population of married women in Britain. Data from the Lux­
embourg Employment Study (LES), which date from 1989 for the UK, show that of 
married women not working in 1988,10.4% were working in 1989; 2.5% worked full­
time, whilst 7.9% worked part-time. This compares with a rate of entry into full-time 
work between the first and second interviews in the LSUS data o f 3.3%, and into part- 
time work of 8.7%, giving a total entry rate of 12%, which is similar to the general 
rate. However, for the rate of entry to work between the key date and the first inter­
view, 1.1% of women not working at t = -1  are working full-time at t = 3 , and 3.5% 
are working part-time. If annualized, these figures indicate a rate o f entry to full-time 
work of 3.4% and of 10.4% to part-time work. The latter figure is clearly higher than 
for the general population.
More striking however is the comparison of rates of exit from the labour mar­
ket. The LES data show that 7.8% of married women in Britain who were working in 
1988 were not in the labour force in 1989. This compares with a rate of exit from the 
labour force of women in the LSUS data o f 17.7% between the first and second inter­
views, which is clearly significantly higher. Even more remarkable is the fact that be­
tween r = -1 and r = 3, and hence in the space of four months, 17.3% of working 
women left employment, which rate, if annualized, is equivalent to a rate o f exit o f 
51.8%. Thus, it does seem that a woman’s husband becoming unemployed tends to 
cause a re-consideration of the labour supply decision, making it much more likely that 
a labour market transition will be observed. Of course, given that the LSUS and LES 
apply to different years, changes in macro-economic conditions may be affecting the 
comparison o f transitions made; in 1989, the level of unemployment was relatively low,
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at 7%, and had been falling steadily since 1984, whereas in 1983, the unemployment 
rate was over 12%, and had been rising since the late 1970’s. These differences might 
be expected to produce more transitions out of employment in the LSUS data than in 
the LES data, and more transitions into employment in the LES data than in the LSUS 
data. Thus, it may be that the comparison used makes the difference in exits greater 
and that in entries lower than if both sets of data applied to the same year.
2.3.2 Transition Matrices: By Initial Job Status
It was noted in the previous section that there was some evidence of adjustment delays 
in moving to paid work from outside the labour force. This suggests that the timing of 
transitions is affected by the state occupied initially; it is also likely that the destination 
state is affected by the initial state. Tabulations of the data are used to shed some light 
on these points in this section.
Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 show the detailed breakdown of transitions by a 
woman's job status prior to her husband's sampled unemployment spell beginning. In 
each case, the highlighted figure shows those in the same state at all three principal 
dates, the ‘stayers’, while those represented in the other cells are individuals who make 
a transition at some stage during the sample period.
Table 2.4. Transitions between first and second interviews fo r women working full-time at the key 
date.
Job status at t = 15
Job Status at f = 3 Full-Time Part-Time, > Part-Time, < None Total
10 hours 10 hours
Full-Time 188 8 1 28 225
- (63-3) (2.7) (0-3) (9.4) (75.8)
Part-Time, > 1 0  hours 4 10 0 3 17
(1.4) (3.4) (0.0) (1-0) (5.7)
Part-Time, < 1 0  hours 0 0 1 0 1
(0.0) (0.0) (0.3) (0.0) (0.3)
None 11 7 2 34 54
(3.7) (2.4) (0.7) (11.5) (18.2)
Total 203 25 4 65 297
(68.4) (8.4) 0 .4 ) (21-9) (100.0)
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Table 2.5. Transitions between first and second interviews fo r women working part-time. >10 hour* &
the key date.
Job status at / = 15
Job Status ai f -  3 Full-Time Part-Time, > 
10 hours
Part-Time, < 
10 hours
None Total
Full-Time 2 0 0 0 2 ’
(0.9) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.9)
Part-Time, > 10 hours 14 133 12 22 181
(5.9) (56.4) (5.1) (9.3) (76.7)
Part-Time, < 10 hours 2 2 6 2 12
(0.9) (0.9) _ (2-5) (0.9) (5.1)
None 2 6 T 1 32 41
(0.9) 0 5 ) (0.4) (13.6) ' (17.4)
Total 20 141 19 56 236
(8.5) (59.8) (8.1) (23.7) (100.0)
Table 2.6. Transitions between first and second interviews for women working part-time, 
at the key date.
< 10 hours
Job status at / == 15
Job Status at t = 3 Full-Time Part-Time, > 
10 hours
Part-Time, < 
10 hours
None Total
Full-Time 1 0 0 0 1
(1.4) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (1.4)
Part-Time, > 10 hours 1 5 0 0 6
(1.4) (6.9) (0.0) (0.0) (8.3)
Part-Time, < 10 hours 2 10 24 20 56
(2.8) (13.9) (33.3) (27.8) (77.8)
None 1 0 0 8 9
(1.4) (0.0) (0.0) (11.1) (12.5)
Total 5 15 24 28 72
(6.9) (20.8) (33.3) (38.9) (100.0)
Several patterns are evident from the data. First, the point made above about 
the extent to which transitions are dominated by movements between working and not 
working, rather than among working states is underlined by these tables. In each one, 
the cells which are most occupied are those entailing combinations of the state occu­
pied at t = - l  and ‘none*. Thus, for example, Table 2.4 shows that apart from those
who do not change state at all during the survey period, the most common transitions 
by those working full-time at f = -1  are to full-time work at t — 3 and no work at 
/ = 15, and to no work at both t = 3 and t —15. Because making two transitions over 
the survey period is relatively rare other cells are typically sparse.
Table 2.7. Transitions between first and second interviews fo r women not working at the key date.
Job status at t «  15
Job Status at r = 3 Full-Time Part-Time, > Part-Time, < None Total
10 hours 10 hours
Full-Time 4 0 0 8 12
(0.4) (0.0) > (0.0) (0.8) (1.1)
Part-Time, > 1 0  hours 5 7 2 10 24
(0.5) (0.7) (0.2) (0.9) (2.3)
Part-Time, < 1 0  hours 1 5 3 4 13
(0.1) (0.5) (0.3) (0.4) (1.2)
None 23 47 35 914 1019
(2.2) (4.4) (3.3) (85.6) (95.4)
Total 33 59 40 936 1068
(3.1) (5.5) (3.8) (87.6) (100.0)
A second point is that the proportion of the sample who stay in the same state 
throughout the sample period - the ‘stayers’ - varies significantly according to the ini­
tial state occupied. Inspection of Table 2.1 shows that 76% of those working full-time 
before their husbands’ unemployment began are in the same state three months after 
the spell began. Similar figures for stayers in each group apply to those who are work­
ing part-time initially. The figure for those not working at first is substantially higher, 
however, 95% of them are in the same state four months after the key date. This might 
be explained by the argument that it takes longer to find a job than to quit a job, or 
even to find another job.
Yet the pattern remains one year later, when it might be expected that such 
adjustment delays are less relevant.7 Tables 2.4 to 2.7 show that fifteen months after 
their husbands’ unemployment began, women who were not working before their hus-
7 At the fifteen month stage many women are facing another situation - being affected by a means test, 
or husbands having exited unemployment - to which they must adjust.
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bands became unemployed still tend to be stayers to a greater extent than other women 
- 86% as opposed to  63% of initial full-timers, 56% of part-timers who worked more 
than ten hours, and just one third o f part-timers working less than ten hours per week 
initially. This point is emphasized by Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2. Proportion o f those initially in each state who are still in that state at 
t - 3  and t *  15.
— ♦  - ■ Full-Time
— o -  Part-Time
>10
— - •  - -Part-Time
<10
— x — None
Months
Although a greater proportion of women working low part-time hours at 
t -  -1 make transitions than any other group, the fact remains, as mentioned in Sec­
tion 2.3.1, that in absolute terms, very few transitions are made by women working 
low part-time hours.
1 3 3  Transition M atrices: By Heterogeneous Groups
The possibility was mentioned in Section 2.3.1 that differences in the transition rates 
between those working at the key date and those not working at that point arise be­
cause of greater adjustment delays for those entering the labour market. Another pos­
sible explanation is that the type o f woman who does not work is basically different to 
the type o f woman who does work. In this section, some evidence for this argument is 
sought, using the proposition that the labour market characteristics of a man may be 
reflected in his wife. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 allow a comparison of women whose husbands 
are unemployed for more than fifteen months and those whose husbands have returned 
to work by the second interview.
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Table 2.8. Transitions between the key date and the second interview fo r  women whose husbands had
not left the sampled unemployment spell by the second interview.
Job status at / = 15
Job Status at r = -1 Full-Time Part-Time, > 
10 hours.
Part-Time, < 
10 hours.
None Total
Full-Time 36 9 2 21 68
(5.4) (1.4) (0.3) (3.2) (10.2)
Part-Time, > 10  hours. 2 38 7 26 73
(0.3) (5.7) (1.1) (3.9) (10.9)
Part-Time, < 10 hours. 0 4 12 13 29
(0.0) (0.6) 0-8) (1.9) (4.3)
None 7 9 " 11 470 497
(1.1) (1.3) (1.7) (70.5) (745)
Total 45 60 32 530 667
(6.8) (9.0) (4-8) (795) (100.0)
Table 2.9. Transitions between the key date and the second interview fo r  women whose husbands had 
left the sampled unemployment spell by the second interview.
Job status at t = 15
Job Status at t = -1 Full-Time Part-Time, > 
10 hours.
Part-Time, < 
10 hours.
None Total
Full-Time 167 16 2 44 229
(16.6) 0 .6 ) (0.2) (4.4) (22.8)
Part-Time, >10 hours. 18 103 12 30 163
(1.8) (10.2) (1.2) (3.0) (16.2)
Part-Time, < 10  houis. 5 11 12 15 43
(05) (U ) (1.2) (15) (4.3)
None 26 50 29 466 571
(2.6) (5.0) (2.9) (465) (56.8)
Total 216 180 55 555 1006
(215) (17.9) (55) (55.2) (100.0)
The first point that should be made about these tables is that even before their 
husbands’ sampled unemployment spells began, just 25.5% of women whose husbands 
were still unemployed at the second interview worked, as opposed to 43.2% of those 
whose husbands were employed again by the second interview. The most obvious ex­
planation for this is that the couple share characteristics which make both his re-
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employment and her doing paid work at any stage less likely, as suggested in Section
1.1.
One other possibility is that those men who tend to have longer unemployment 
spells also have more frequent spells, so that the wife's non-participation prior to the 
sampled spell is a long-term response to her husband's labour market behaviour. How­
ever, this suggestion is not supported by the data. Those men who exit their sampled 
unemployment spell before the second interview are actually slightly more likely to 
have been unemployed in the previous five years, and more likely to have had more
spells o f unemployment during that time, the correlation between exiting the sampled
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spell and having been unemployed in the previous five years being 0.06, and that be­
tween exiting and the number of spells of unemployment 0.08.
A second point that can be made about these tables is that women whose hus­
bands are longer-term unemployed are more likely to be stayers; 83.4% of women 
whose husbands are still in their sampled unemployment spell fifteen months after it 
began stay in the same state throughout the sample period, while 74.4% of women 
whose husbands are not do not change status.8 This is consistent with the pattern es­
tablished above that women who are not employed prior to the start o f their husbands' 
spells also tend to be stayers to a greater extent
Thirdly, women whose husbands have exited the sampled spell by the second in­
terview are substantially more likely to be added workers; 13.8% of these women 
work more hours at the second interview than initially, compared to just 5% of women 
whose husbands are longer-term unemployed. About the same proportions of each 
work less hours than initially, which means that the lower level o f movement among 
those whose husbands are unemployed for longer comes almost entirely from a lower 
level of added-worker behaviour. A difference in the extent of movement away from 
work might be expected to hold between these two groups, since all of those whose
8 Of course, not all men who exit their sampled unemployment spell do so to full-time employment; of 
the 1038 men who did exit, 79% of them did so to full-time work. For the remainder who exited, but 
not to full-time work, 8% did so to ‘sick and out o f work’, 4% did to ‘part-time work, more than ten 
hours* and 3% left to ‘government schemes*. Interestingly, the proportion o f women whose husbands 
exited to full-time work and who are stayers is lower again: 69% of them never change status, sup­
porting the ‘similar characteristics’ hypothesis.
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husbands did not exit unemployment are subject to means-tested benefits by the time of 
the second interview. The fact that this is not the case suggests that the disincentive 
effect arising from means testing may not be very important
It is interesting to note the outcome of similarly disaggregated cross-tabulations 
between states at the key date and at the first interview, when all husbands are unem­
ployed. The data show no statistically significant difference in the transition matrices 
according to the eventual length of the husband’s unemployment spell: 90.9% of those 
whose husbands’ spells last over fifteen months are in the same state at t = -1  and 
t = 3 , compared to 86.9% of those whose husbands’ spells are eventually shorter. 
Moreover, the levels o f movement towards and away from work are similar for both 
groups. Thus, the wives of men with shorter unemployment spells have a higher level 
o f added-worker behaviour between the first and second interviews, but not in the first 
three months o f unemployment, which fact militates against an explanation of the dif­
ferences that is based on the importance of similarities between spouses, since in this 
case, the differences would be expected to be observable even before the exit from the 
sampled unemployment spell occurred.
A similar exercise was carried out in comparing those women whose husbands 
were eligible for UB at the first interview and those whose husbands were not. UB 
might be expected to be an indicator of a man’s type, since only those with reasonably 
stable employment histories qualify for UB. Again it was noted that 40% of women 
whose husbands were eligible for UB when they became unemployed were working at 
the key date, while only 27% of those whose husbands did not qualify for UB worked, 
indicating a difference in a woman’s ‘type* according to her husband’s UB eligibility.
On the other hand, the proportions of both groups who stay in the same state 
during the sample period, and the proportions moving towards both more and fewer 
hours of work, are very similar. This is interesting because here, similar characteristics 
do not seem to affect whether the wives are movers or stayers, which may be due to 
the lower level of means testing associated with UB receipt
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2.4 Preliminary Analysis: Weekly Data
2.4.1 The Hazard o f Making a Transition
One of the features o f the LSUS data, mentioned above, is that weekly information on 
each wife’s labour force status was collected for the year between the first and second 
interviews. During that time, some women’s husbands returned to work, and others’ 
entitlement to UB was exhausted. In this section, the weekly data are inspected for an 
indication o f the importance of this latter fact; in particular, evidence that women make 
transitions to a greater extent around the ¿ime of UB exhaustion, particularly from 
working states to non-work, is sought. From this preliminary investigation of the 
weekly data, the advantages and disadvantages of using them can be established, and in 
Section 2.4.2 their suitability for further analysis is discussed.
To check for a  UB exhaustion effect, a non-parametric method, life-table esti­
mation o f the hazard of making a transition, is used. Transitions both from non-work 
to work, and from work to non-work are analysed. Non-parametric methods of esti­
mation are useful for the inspection of data because they impose no functional form, 
and thus allow the interesting features of the data to emerge. In life-table estimation, 
the probability of making a transition in an interval of time L = [at-\,ai\, conditional 
on not having made a transition before then, f t , is estimated from
*
ft = Dt
Nt -  Mt/2
Dt_
Nt (2J)
(Lawless, 1982), where Dt is the number of relevant transitions made in interval It, 
Nt is the number who have not yet made a transition at the start o f the interval, and 
Mt is the number o f  observations withdrawn during the interval because of censoring.9 
ft is known as the hazard rate. Usefully, confidence intervals can be estimated for the 
hazard at each interval, using Greenwood’s formula for the variance of the hazard rate
V (ft) =  - L = - ±  
N t
(2.2)
9 The adjustment in the denominator for censored observations amounts to an assumption that obser­
vations withdrawn during ƒ» were at risk for half the interval.
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Presenting the data in this way is more sophisticated than a plot of the number making 
their first transition at a particular time, since it takes account of the fact that if the first 
transition has already been made, it cannot be made again.
Clearly, however, this way of representing the data does not exploit some fea­
tures of the information contained in the LSUS. First, it uses only the first transition 
made by each woman, while the women sampled make up to thirteen transitions be­
tween the first and second interviews. Secondly, it does not distinguish between differ­
ent working states; full-time work and both part-time work states are treated as one. 
This treatment implies that there is no difference between the hazard of making a tran­
sition from full-time work and the hazard o f making a transition from part-time work. 
This is clearly a strong assumption, but there are too few transitions between individual 
working states and other states on a weekly basis to draw any interesting conclusions 
about the effect of UB exhaustion on the hazard of making more narrowly defined 
transitions.
Figure 2.3. Life-table estimates o f the hazard o f making a transition from  not working to 
working fo r women whose husbands qualify fo r  UB at the first interview and have not 
exited their unemployment spell by the second. 95% confidence intervals shown.
Weeks After Husband Signed On
Figure 2.3 shows life-table estimates of the hazard of starting to work, with 
confidence intervals, for those women whose husbands qualify for UB and are still in 
their sampled unemployment spell at the second interview; thus, the women repre­
sented in this graph are all married to men to whom UB exhaustion is relevant. The 
hazard rate has been graphed against the number of weeks that have passed since the 
woman’s husband first signed on, rather than against specific calendar dates, so that
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the 52 week point indicates the point of UB exhaustion for all husbands. The weeks 
are grouped so that each interval contains four weeks. The confidence intervals are 
large because of the small number of women involved: 472 women are married to UB 
qualifiers who do not exit their sampled unemployment spell, o f whom just 29 make 
transitions into one of the working states, whilst even fewer, 10, make transitions from 
working into non-working. Thus, the hazard of making a transition out of employment 
is uninteresting, as in no case is the estimate, of the hazard significantly different from 
zero.
Given such large confidence intervals, the hypothesis cannot be rejected that 
the hazard rate is constant over the duration of the husband’s unemployment spell. 
There does appear to be an increase in the hazard at the 40 week stage, but there is a 
sharp drop in it immediately afterward, which makes it unlikely that this is, in fact, a 
UB exhaustion effect. When a likelihood ratio10 (LR) test is carried out on the hy­
pothesis that there is no difference in the hazard between the group used above whose 
husbands do not exit their unemployment spell and are entitled to UB, and the group of 
those whose husbands do not exit their spell and are not entitled to UB, the hypothesis 
is comfortably accepted, with a probability that the hypothesis is correct of 0.4. Thus, 
conditional on a woman’s husband not exiting his unemployment spell, there is no sta­
tistical difference, in terms of the hazard o f making a transition from not working to 
working, between those whose husbands qualify for UB and those whose husbands do 
not.
Figure 2.4 shows the life-table graphs of the hazard of beginning to work for all 
women, according to whether their husbands are entitled to UB or not. The husbands 
of women in both these groups may have exited unemployment by the end of the pe­
riod; indeed they may have moved between employment and unemployment several 
times. From an inspection of the plots, it appears that there is no systematic difference 
in the hazard rate according to qualification for UB. This is confirmed by the results of 
the LR test o f the differences between groups: the hypothesis of homogeneity between 
the two groups is accepted at usual levels of confidence.
Figure 2.4. ¡Jfe-table estimates o f the hazard o f making a transition from  not working to 
working, according to whether husband qualifies fo r  UB or not.
Weeks After Husband Signed On
Husband 
Entitled to UB
Husband Not 
Entitled to UB
Figure 2.5. Life-table estimates o f the hazard o f making a transition from  working to not 
working, according to whether husband qualifies fo r  UB or not
— Husband
Entitled to UB
Husband Not 
Entitled to UB
Weeks After Husband Signed On
The above figures show no evidence o f an effect o f the exhaustion of a hus­
band’s UB on his wife’s probability of making a transition. There are several possible 
reasons for this. One is that life-table estimation takes no account o f individual hetero­
geneity, beyond one or two grouping criteria at a time; within these groups, the indi­
viduals are assumed to be homogeneous. Perhaps if enough characteristics could be 
held constant for a given life table, a pattern indicating a UB exhaustion effect would 10
10 A Likelihood Ratio test is an asymptotic hypothesis test based on the statistic LR = -2(ln L - \ n L ) , 
where L  and L are the log-likelihood functions evaluated at the restricted and unrestricted estimates
emerge. A second explanation is that decisions to make a transition, once made, take 
time to implement, particularly for transitions towards working states. On the other 
hand, if UB exhaustion is anticipated, then the expected adjustment time can be taken 
into account. Nonetheless, the combined uncertainties of the time required to effect 
any decision to make a transition and the probability that a woman’s husband will re­
main unemployed long enough to be affected by UB exhaustion make a distinct ex­
haustion effect difficult to detect. A third possibility is that the women in the sample 
perceive no substantial difference between the effect of the means test applied to their 
earnings under SB and the limited means test applied under UB. -
Similar life-table-based analyses were carried out according to grouping criteria 
other than the husbands’ eligibility for UB. The hazard functions were statistically non- 
homogeneous across groups when the data were categorized according to whether the 
husbands exited their sampled unemployment spells before the second interview or not, 
according to the wife’s job status at the key date, and by age groups. Although these 
grouping criteria certainly captured heterogeneity in the sample, in no case did the 
graphs of the life-table estimates of the hazard rate show a clear pattern over time.
2.4.2 The Value o f the Weekly LSUS data
The preceding section entailed a preliminary examination o f weekly transitions by the 
women in LSUS. Here, the advantages and disadvantages of the further use of these 
data are discussed.
The main advantage of using the weekly data is that it is certainly true that the 
data for the principal dates do not fully reflect the extent of transitions towards and 
away from work in the sample. There are 65 women who make transitions among the 
four main labour market states between t — 3 and f = 15, but who are in the same 
states at the first and second interviews, and who therefore do not register as having 
made any transition in, for example, Table 2.2. Of these 65 women, 12 make one tran­
sition,* 11 39 make two transitions, 7 make three transitions, 5 make four transitions and
respectively. This statistic is distributed as x \  » where q  is the number of restrictions imposed.
11 The fact that these woman register as being in the same state at two successive principal dates de­
spite having made just one transition is discussed below.
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2 make six transitions between the two principal dates. This leads to a very different 
picture of labour market behaviour than would be gained from inspecting only the data 
from the principal dates. Because of the small intervals of time used, the weekly data 
yield a much truer picture of labour market activity than do the principal dates data.
However, there are several problems with using these data, over and above 
those that exist for the whole data set, discussed in Section 2.2.3, that should be taken 
into consideration. First, the questions asked about the weeks between the two inter­
views involved only information on job status. No data on the wage corresponding to 
any new job were collected, for example, unless the individual was still in that job at 
the date of the second interview, in which-case the transitions are registered in the 
principal date information in any case. So estimating the role of economic incentives in 
determining these transitions is difficult
Secondly, the problem of the reliability of information collected retrospectively 
arises. When questions are asked about the past, the issue of difficulties on the part of 
the respondents in remembering details arises. This problem may not be very severe for 
the LSU survey, compared to others that go back over many years, but the fact that 
data is sought on a week-by-week basis makes inaccuracies more likely. Evidence of 
this exists for the LSUS, to the extent that there are inconsistencies between the data 
given about job status at the first interview and at the second. The weekly data col­
lected began in the week after the first interview; 7% of women claim, during the sec­
ond interview, to have been in a different state in the week after the first interview than 
they said they were in at the time of the first interview. It is possible that there was a 
very high rate of transitions during that week, but it is unlikely, particularly given the 
fact that the proportion of women giving a different job status for the week before the 
second interview and the date of the second interview is just 1%. This type of incon­
sistency between the weekly data collected at the second interview for the time around 
the first interview and the principal date information for the first interview is responsi­
ble for 8 of the 12 cases cited above who were in the same state at both the first and 
second interviews, but who claimed to have made just one transition according to the 
weekly data.
A third problem, also already mentioned, is the fact that weekly data are not 
collected from the time o f the husband’s first signing on, or before then, but only from
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the date of the first interview. In Section 2.3.1, it was pointed out that the level of 
transitions between the key date and the first interview is much higher than that be­
tween the two interviews, so the detail of the timing of a significant number of transi­
tions is not available in any case.
Moreover, the point emerged in the preceding section that there appeared to be 
no very striking benefit from using the weekly data. The preliminary analysis of the 
weekly data confirmed that there was no clear UB exhaustion effect, and that grouping 
data according to either the job status occupied before the sampled unemployment 
spells began or according to whether the husband exited that unemployment spell 
within fifteen months indicated that these were important indicators o f heterogeneity in 
labour market behaviour. Both these points had already been established in Section 
2.3, using the data for the principal dates, so the additional insights gained from using 
these data appear to be limited.
For these reasons, the remainder of the thesis entails an analysis of the informa­
tion collected at the principal dates.
2.5 Preliminary Analysis: Data on Attitudes
Both interviews of the LSU Survey include a question, asked of the wife, on whether 
having an unemployed husband makes it more or less sensible for her to have a job, 
and why. The question is put only if the husband is signing on at the time, so all wives 
are asked at the first interview, but only 927 are asked at the second interview. Of 
those asked at the second interview, some are women whose husbands have exited the 
sampled unemployment spell, but who have become unemployed again.
These questions are interesting for the information they provide on attitudes to 
work, since one of the reasons that the wives may choose for thinking that a husband’s 
unemployment makes it less sensible to work is that it is not worthwhile financially, so 
the question can give a good indication of the extent of the perceived disincentive ef­
fect of the means testing of benefits.
Table 2.10 summarizes the answers to the question about whether a woman's 
husband’s unemployment makes it more or less sensible for her to work. The second
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column shows the replies given at the first interview by those who answered also at the 
second interview, so those whose husbands were working at the second interview are 
excluded. This column is included in order that the responses o f those answering at 
both interviews may be compared
$
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Table 2 JO. Wives * views on paid work at the first and second interviews. Percentages o f 
total in brackets.
Does Unemployment 
of Husband Make 
Working
First Interview 
(all women)
First Interview 
(if answer at 
second also)
Second Interview
More Sensible? 735 (44.4) 291 (36.0) 252 (31-2)
Less Sensible? 479 (28.9) * 267 (33.0) 338 (41.8)
Neither? 443 (26.7) 251 (31.0) 219 (27.1)
Total 1657 (100.0) 809 (100.0) 809 (100.0)
The first point to make about this table is the surprisingly high number of women 
who believe that their husbands* unemployment makes it neither more nor less sensible 
for them to work. The proportion giving this response is fairly constant at both inter­
views, and the small differences which do exist are not statistically significant. To the 
extent that the unemployment of the household head will typically entail significant 
changes in household income, these replies indicate that economic considerations are 
not the only ones regarded as important. O f course, if unemployment does not, in fact, 
entail an important loss of household income, as would be the case if the replacement 
ratio were high for the husbands of the women surveyed, then this interpretation is not 
valid.
The second obvious point to make about the table is that the attitudes of these 
women appear to change over time. At the first interview (first column), the most 
common answer given is that the unemployment of a woman’s husband makes it more 
sensible for her to work, whereas at the second interview, the most usual response is 
that it makes it less sensible. The differences between the numbers answering ‘more 
sensible* and ‘less sensible* at the two interviews are statistically significant at the 99% 
level of confidence. There are several possible explanations for this change over time. 
One is that more households are affected by means testing at the second interview, be­
cause of the exhaustion o f UB, and that the changing answers directly reflect the in­
creased disincentive associated with means testing. A second possibility is that, as the
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spell o f unemployment goes on, more is learned about how the benefit system works, 
and the effect of means testing is better understood
When those who do not answer at the second interview are excluded from the 
first interview answers, the difference between the two interviews in the number be­
lieving working to be more sensible loses its significance. But although the difference 
in the number replying that working is now less sensible is not as striking when women 
whose husbands are employed at the second interview are excluded, there remains a 
difference between the two interviews that is statistically significant at the 95%, al­
though not at the 99% level.
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A final issue which arises in discussing Table 2.10 is the source of the difference 
between the first and second columns. The table records that women whose husbands 
turn out to have a worse labour market performance, being unemployed at the second 
interview, are more likely at the first interview to think working less sensible (33%, as 
opposed to 28.9% for the whole sample) and less likely to think working more sensible 
(36% against 44.4%). This point is made more explicit by Table 2.11, which classifies 
responses according to whether they come from women whose husbands exit from the 
sampled unemployment spell before the second interview or not
Table 2.1 L  Wives’ views on paid work at the first 
interview, by whether the husband’s unemployment spell 
lasted over fifteen months ( Exit = 0 ) or not ( Exit =  1).
Percentage o f each group in brackets.
View on Work Exit = 0 Exit = 1
More Sensible 244(373) 491 (48.8)
Less Sensible 213 (32.6) 266(26.4)
Neither 196(30.0) 247 (243)
Total 655 (100.0) 1004 (100.0)
The figures show that women whose husbands have longer spells of unemploy­
ment view working as less sensible because of their husbands* unemployment than 
women whose husbands have shorter unemployment spells, even before the duration of 
the unemployment spell is revealed. One reason for this may be that longer term unem­
ployed men are less attached to the labour market, and that their wives are similarly 
less attached, either due to lower wages or low taste for work.
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Table 2.12 shows the breakdown of reasons for the beliefs expressed at both in­
terviews about the sense of working. It is reassuring to note that the answers given 
here are compatible with those given to the more general question, shown in Table 
2.10. At the first interview, 35% of women refer to the positive financial benefit of 
working in motivating their replies, while at the second interview, just 20% do. But at 
the second interview, 37% mention that working is not worthwhile financially, an in­
crease from 27% saying this at the first. Although it is tempting to interpret these latter 
responses as referring directly to the disincentive effect of means testing, these women 
may also be considering the fixed costs of working, as well as the low wages that they 
may command on the labour market. Nonetheless, the sizeable increase over time in 
the proportion with the perception that working is not worthwhile financially indicates 
that means-testing disincentives may be relevant to these answers. Again, the higher 
proportion giving this reason at the second interview could be because of the increase 
in the number receiving SB rather than UB, or because o f an increasing realization of 
the effect of means-testing rules on the family’s income.
Table 2,12. Reasons fo r  views on paid work at first and second interviews. Percentages fo r  each
interview in brackets.
Reason for View on Paid Work First Interview 
(all women)
First Interview (if 
answer at second 
also)
Second Interview
Positive Financial Benefit 568 (34.9) 213 (27.1) 153 (19.5)
Social Benefit 122 (7.5) 59 (7.5) 56 (7.1)
Not Worthwhile Financially 435 (26.8) 232 (29.5) 293 (37.3)
Domestic Commitments 228 (14.0) 131 (16.7) 110 (14.0)
Other Commitments 130 (8.0) 83 (10.6) 49 (6.2)
Other 143 (8-8) 68 (8.7) 125 (15.9)
Total 1626 (100.0) 786 (100.0) 786 (100.0)
As before, the gap between the proportion believing paid work to be more sensi­
ble than if the husband were employed - here largely represented by 'positive financial 
benefit’ - at the first and second interviews is reduced when those whose husbands are 
employed at the second interview, and therefore do not answer the question, are ex­
cluded from the responses at the first interview (second column); nonetheless, the dif­
ference between the second and third columns remains significant at the 95% level.
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The impact of excluding these women on the gap between those answering that work 
is ‘not worthwhile financially’ is smaller and again, there remains a large and statisti­
cally significant difference between the two interviews in the proportion answering in 
this way.
Thus, after excluding women whose husbands are employed by the second inter­
view, there remain significant differences between the proportions o f ‘not worthwhile 
financially’ responses at the first and second interviews and between the proportions o f 
‘positive financial benefit* responses at the two dates. This indicates that a ‘similar 
tastes for work* explanation may not be sufficient to account for all o f the difference in 
the wives’ views about the impact o f a huslSnd’s unemployment at the two interviews. 
This point is reinforced by the fact that the proportion who cite ‘social ^ benefits’ to 
working is constant across groups. The data in this table indicate that the most likely 
explanation for differing attitudes to work is that spouses are likely to have similar lev­
els of human capital; hence low-skilled men are likely to have low-skilled wives, who 
command a low wage on the labour market and thus perceive little financial benefit in 
working when their husbands become unemployed.
A tabulation of attitudes according to the labour market status of the wife, 
shown in Table 2.13 is also interesting. The table shows that the more hours a woman 
works, the more likely she is to view work as being more sensible when her husband is 
unemployed, and the less likely to view working as less sensible. This may be because 
hours worked are a reflection of a woman’s labour market attachment.
Table 2.13. Wives ’ views on paid work as the first interview, classified by their job status at that 
date. Percentages o f each group in brackets.
Job Status at t = 3
Views on Work Full-Time Part-Time, > 
10 hours
Part-Time, < 
10 hours
None Total
More Sense 202(83.5) 165 (72.4) 44(53.0) 324(29.3) 735 (44)
Less Sense 13 (5.4) 43(17.8) 23 (27.7) 400(36.2) 479 (29)
Neither 26(10.7) 2 0 (8 3 ) 16(19.3) 381 (343) 443 (27)
Total 242(100.0) 228(100.0) 83 (100.0) 1105 (100) 1658
Some o f the results for non-working women are especially interesting. In par­
ticular, the number o f non-working women who believe their husbands' unemployment
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to make their working more sensible is surprising, albeit lower than in the case of 
working women. This may indicate labour market constraints, if these women wish to 
work, but do not; alternatively, it may mean that although these women can appreciate 
that working makes more sense when their husbands are unemployed, it still does not 
make enough sense to justify entry into the labour market. This raises the issue of what 
‘more sense* means to the women surveyed; although it might be hoped that it means 
that a husband’s unemployment makes the probability of working higher, even if not to 
the extent that a transition would be optimal, it may in fact be understood by the 
women surveyed to apply only if a transition into work has become optimal.
A final interesting point is the high number of non-working women who believe 
that their husbands* unemployment makes no difference to whether they work or not - 
34.5% think working to be neither more nor less sensible as a result of their husbands* 
unemployment, a figure that is significantly higher than for any other group. This may 
be a reflection of the impression formed in Section 2.3 that non-working women tend 
to be stayers to a greater extent than working women.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the Living Standards During Unemployment Survey, from which the 
data used in this thesis come, has been introduced, and attention called to the main 
features of the data.
The main advantage of this survey over others which have been used to study 
the labour supply of the wives of unemployed men is the fact that the data were col­
lected over a sixteen month period, from one month before the husband’s unemploy- \
ment began to a time when he may have returned to work, or his entitlement to UB 
may have been exhausted. However, several disadvantages of the data were also enu­
merated, particularly the absence of data on education, work experience and race, and 
the fact that hours of work were collected in grouped format
The preliminary analysis of the data indicated that the women surveyed make 
transitions to a greater extent than British married women do in general, suggesting 
that they are responding to their husbands' unemployment. The patterns found in a 
preliminary analysis of the transitions matrices of the women include;
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• Lower employment rates amongst the wives of men whose spells last longer and 
those whose husbands do not receive UB, even before the sampled unemployment 
spell begins.
• A greater movement away from work than towards work, particularly in the early 
stages of the unemployment spell.
• A predominance o f transitions between working and not working, rather than 
among working states.
• A markedly higher tendency among initial non-workers to be stayers than among 
those working before their husbands' spells began.
• A higher proportion of added workers amongst women whose husbands* unem­
ployment spells were shorter.
Weekly data on the labour force status of the wives were also examined for 
evidence of an effect o f a husband's UB exhaustion on the wives* labour supply, but 
none was found. The conclusion was drawn that the data on week-by-week labour 
supply were inadequate for further more detailed analysis.
Finally, data on the attitudes to work o f the wives were examined. These pro­
vided some support for the hypothesis that increased means testing after UB entitle­
ments have been exhausted creates a disincentive to work. Again, differences in 
women according to the eventual duration of their husbands* unemployment spells 
were found, wives of men with longer spells being more likely to perceive no benefit to 
their working, probably because of low wages earned in the labour market.
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3. An Analysis of Household Income when Benefits 
are Means-Tested
3.1 Introduction
From the descriptions giverr in Section 1.3 of the rules of the British benefit system, it 
is clear that the operation of the system must have important implications for the in­
come of the household, both because of the level of income that is paid to the house­
hold and because of the fact that that income is means-tested. In this chapter, a variable 
representing total household income under the rules of the benefit system as it operated 
in 1983-84 is constructed for each o f the households in the LSUS. Because the level of 
household income depends on the labour supply o f the wife, total household income is 
calculated for each of the four alternative labour market states in which she may be ob­
served, and for each of the three principal dates. Of course, household income depends 
also on the husband's labour supply, but unemployed household heads are assumed to 
be genuinely constrained in their labour market behaviour,1 so that the variable is con­
structed by taking as given the observed job status of the husband, rather than for each 
possible combination of labour market states of husband and wife.
The first issue that arises in simulating these total household income variables is 
that, as usual when dealing with the labour supply of married women, no wage rates 
are reported by women who do not work at any of the three principal dates,1 2 so that in 
order to evaluate the household income that would pertain for these women if they did 
work, their market wage rate must be estimated. The estimation of the gross hourly 
wage is reported in Section 3.2.1, the calculation of the net wage from the gross in
1 This assumption is discussed further in Section 3.7.
2 If a woman worked between the two interviews, but not at any of the principal dates, so that her 
having worked is recorded only in the weekly data collected at the second interview, then her wage 
rate is not reported.
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Section 3.2.2, and an assessment o f  the reliability of the results is given in Section 
3.2.3.
The wife’s wage income is just one component o f the calculation of the total 
income that each household would receive given her labour market state. The benefit 
income that the household would receive for each possible state must also be simu­
lated. There are three elements to be included - UB, SB and HB. These calculations 
are outlined in Section 3.3.
Having calculated total household income in each state, attention is turned to 
the analysis of the variables for the remainder o f the chapter. In Section 3.4, the total 
household income variables are analysed for evidence of the effect o f unemployment 
and means testing on household income. Also, the income which would apply in the 
absence of means testing is compared with income under the system as it stood in 
1983-84. In Section 3.5, the rate o f withdrawal of benefits - the ‘tax rate’ implied by 
the means testing of benefits - is calculated and discussed. In Section 3.6, the data on 
women’s attitudes to working when their husbands are unemployed, introduced in 
Section 2.5, are examined for evidence that these attitudes reflect the negative effects 
of means testing on the incentive to work. Finally, in Section 3.7, the assumptions 
which are implicit in the construction and use o f a household income variable are iden­
tified and discussed. Section 3.8 concludes. :
3.2 The Estimation of a Wage for Non-Working Women
3.2.1 Wage Estimation
Many of the disadvantages of using the LSUS data which were enumerated in Section
2.2.3 are relevant to the estimation o f a wage equation to a greater extent than to any 
other element of the analysis in this thesis. The steps taken to deal with these problems 
are outlined in this section.
The first inport ant problem faced in estimating the wage is that hours o f work 
data are collected in three hours ranges - full-time work, part-time work of more than 
ten hours per week, and part-time work of less than ten hours per week. This means 
that, even for those women who do work, their exact hourly wage, either gross or net,
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is not known, since the wage information collected is for the amount earned in the last 
pay period, which ranges between a week and a year. The frequency with which each 
individual is paid is known, so that the calculation of the weekly wage of each woman 
is straightforward, but the adjustment to the hourly wage is not.
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The approach taken in dealing with the absence of information on hours 
worked is to assume that full-timers work 37 hours per week, those working high part- 
time hours work 20 hours per week and low-hours part-time workers work 7 hours 
per week. These figures for the hours typically worked in each hours range are the 
mean hours worked in the relevant hours ranges by a sample of married women from 
the 1981 Family Expenditure Survey (FES). Weekly pay is divided by the applicable 
number of hours for each working woman. In a small number of cases (fewer than 20 
for each principal date), women report the same wage at two consecutive dates, but 
different hours of work ranges; in these cases, it is assumed that a woman works 10 
hours at both dates if she reports working low part-time and high part-time hours at 
two consecutive dates, and 30 if she reports high part-time hours and full-time work at 
two consecutive dates.
A second significant problem with the LSUS data for the estimation of wages 
for non-workers is the absence of several key variables which are explanatory of 
wages. Most importantly, the education levels of neither spouse are available. The 
education level of the husband could have been used as a proxy for that of the wife had 
it been included, given the correlation between spouses’ education levels. Secondly, as 
is often the case, women who are not working are not asked to indicate with what in­
dustry or occupation they are associated. Thirdly, labour market experience variables 
are not included. Finally, there is a problem of missing wage data for husbands; 143 
men do not report a wage at any date. This complicates the use of the husband’s wage 
as an explanatory variable in the wife’s wage estimation.
Because of the problems with suitable explanatory variables, the approach to 
estimation is pragmatic, both in the choice o f the estimation method and the model 
specification. The criterion used in deciding on the final version is the maximization of 
the explanatory power of the model, as given by the adjusted R2.
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A first step towards this goal is to maximize the number of individuals over 
whom estimation is performed. Thus, for women who report a wage at one or two o f 
the three principal dates, but not at one of the others, the gross wage rate for the 
missing date is calculated as the reported one appropriately adjusted for wage inflation. 
The rate o f increase in the within-sample median wage between dates is used in prefer­
ence to the national rate of wage inflation on the basis that the wives of the unem­
ployed are unlikely to be typical o f all women. Between the key date and the first in­
terview, median wages for workers in the LSUS sample increased by 2.4%, and be­
tween the first and second interviews, the increase was 3.3%, giving an increase over 
the whole sample period of 5.7%, and these are the figures used in imputing the wage 
rate from dates at which it is provided to dates at which it is not. A related point is that 
at any one date, there are several women who report a net wage but not a gross wage. 
However, all o f these women do report a gross wage at another date, so the gross 
wage rate, where reported, is used to calculate the gross wage rate for the date at 
which it is missing, in preference to making some guess as to the difference between 
the gross and net wages.
The estimation method used is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This method has 
been criticized for yielding biased estimates in wage estimations using workers only 
because of the problem of sample selection. This results from the fact that, although in 
the population, unobservable variables that determine the wage rate, such as motiva­
tion and ability, are normally distributed:
Wi — ƒ  ( - i fC i , f in ) f i»  ** ( 0 ,  Gw)
where Wt is the individual f s  wage, represents the unmeasured factors and H O , 
the human capital variables, it is likely that those with higher motivation and ability also 
have higher wages so that,
£{£*,1 i works] *  0
Thus, to the extent that the are correlated with the Wi, the regression o f the latter 
on human capital variables, but not on the non-zero conditional mean of ©*», yields bi­
ased estimates of the population wage parameters.
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Heckman (1979) proposed a method of addressing the problem of selection 
bias which is based on the fact that the mean of £», conditional on working can be 
shown to be
K i  — cjwAi
where h  is the inverse of Mill’s ratio, defined as
X i  =  / ¡ / I  —  F t .
In the two step Heckman procedure, estimates of h , and hence o f £ ,  are obtained 
for all individuals from a logit or probit estimation of participation and then K  is in­
cluded in an OLS regression of wages.
The paucity of the information available for wage estimation has implications 
for the implementation of such a selection bias-corrected estimation, however. This is 
because the procedure requires at least one variable in the participation equation that is 
not in the wage equation in order to identify the equation.3 Often, a variable such as 
the age of the youngest child might reasonably be regarded as having little influence on 
the wage that a woman can command in the market, while being an important determi­
nant of the participation decision, and therefore suitable for use as an identifying vari­
able. However, in the absence of other data on past labour market experience, and 
years out of the labour force in particular, the number and ages of children are the only 
variables available as a proxy and must therefore be used in the wage equation.
Several alternative identifying variables were experimented with, such as the 
local unemployment rate, whether the husband had ever held a full time job, and 
whether the husband had been unemployed in the five years prior to his sampled spell. 
However, in each case, the correlation between the participation and wage equations, 
which indicates the extent o f the selection bias, was insignificant at all usual levels of 
confidence.
3 Formally speaking, this is not true, since it is theoretically possible to identify the wage equation 
from the difference in functional form between the two equations. In practice this is difficult.
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A final point is that the wage regression is carried out only for one date, that o f  
the first interview. The predicted wages for non-workers are then extrapolated to the 
other two dates using the adjustment for wage inflation described above. This proce­
dure is used in preference to running separate regressions for all three dates in order to 
avoid the complications that would arise if the predicted wage o f a woman at r =  15 
were lower than that at t = 3 , without any change in her circumstances having oc­
curred, simply because of a slight difference in a parameter estimate between dates. 
The first interview was chosen because the R2 associated with the ‘best* specification 
at that date proved higher than the R1 values o f the best specifications at other dates.
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.1. Estimations are carried out and 
wages predicted separately for those whose husbands report a wage arid for those 
whose husbands do not. The alternative to this is to estimate over all women, including 
both the husband’s wage, replaced by zero if not reported, and a dummy for the non- 
reporting of his wage. But when this procedure is used, an F-test does not reject the 
exclusion of the husband’s wage. Yet the correlation between actual and predicted 
wages for workers is reduced with respect to the model reported below both when the 
husband's wage is included, and when it is not and estimation is carried out over all 
individuals.
The variables for a woman’s age and the number o f children she has had com ­
bine to represent her potential labour market experience, although clearly age also 
captures a cohort effect. Age is included as a  linear spline, and the results shown in the 
table indicate a positive but insignificant effect of age up to 40 years old on the wage 
rate, and a significant negative effect of age between 40 and SO years old and over 60 
years. The more children a woman has, the lower her wage, as indicated by the nega­
tive coefficients on the children dummies that increase in the number of children.
The husband’s wage, where reported, has a strong positive relationship with 
the wife’s wage, as can be seen from Model 1 o f Table 3.1; the coefficient indicates an 
elasticity of the wife’s wage with respect to the husband’s wage o f about 7%. The 
husband’s occupation and industry are proxies for social class, and hence education. 
Because o f the combination of categories that are omitted, it is difficult to comment on 
the interpretation o f the results, but it is not clear that education is, in fact, being 
proxied, given that the effect of being married to an employer or manager, which might
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Table 3.1. Results o f O IS Wage Estimation. Dependent variable is the log gross hourly wage.
Variable Husbands Reporting 
Wages (1)
Coefficient t-Statistic
Husbands Not 
Reporting Wages (2)
Coefficient t-Starisric
Log of Husband's Wage 0.0694 ¡.65 - -
Age Spline: under 40 0.0060 1.45 0.0089 1.05
40 to 50 years -0.0190 ’2.26 -0.0317 -1.92
50 to 60 years 0.0078 0.46 0.0441 1.60
over 60 years -0.1889 -2.24 - -
Dummy: One Child -0.1409 -2.57 - -
Dummy: Two or Three Children -0.2226 -4.09 -0.4357 -4.71
Dummy: Four or More Children 
Husband's Occupation Dummies:
‘ *0.2437 -1.78 -0.5025 -2.87
Employer/Manager in Large Establishment -0.1453 -1.69 -0.2243 -1.26
Employer/Manager in Small Establishment -0.1372 -1.58 0.4867 2.65
Self-Employed Professional 0.6658 1.32 0.9557 2.04
Personal Services Worker -0.3561 -1.81 - -
Manual Foreman -0.2416 -2.83 - -
Skilled Manual Worker -0.1631 -2.50 -0.1106 -1.32
Semi-Skilled Manual Worker -0.1711 -2.26 - -
Unskilled Manual Worker -0.1873 -1.58 - -
Self-Employed Non-Professional -0.3996 -3.47 - -
Farmer Employing Others -0.9486 -1.88 - -
Agricultural Worker -0.4301 -2.41 - -
Member Armed Forces -0.2852 -1.46 - -
Husband’s Industry Dummies: Other Services 0.1589 2.76 - -
Other Manufacturing -0.1354 -1.96 - -
Metal, Engineering and Vehicles - - -0.1106 -1.32
Dummy: London Resident 0.1697 2.55 0.4805 3.47
Dummy: Resident Rest of South-East England 0.1813 3.13 0.3168 2.37
Dummy: Resident South-West England -0.2470 -2.73 -0.3851 -1.83
Dummy: Resident Wales - - 0.1752 1.44
Constant 4.9658 19.47 5.1511 20.02
No. Observations: 618 
R1: 0.153
No. Observations: 143 
R1: 0.314
Notes: Omitted occupational groups in Model 1 are: Employed Professional Worker» Intermediate 
Non-Manual Worker; Junior Non-Manual Worker; Not Stated. Omitted child variable is ‘none’. 
There were no women aged over 60 among those whose husbands did not report a wage; hence its 
omission in Model 2.
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be expected to reflect a higher level o f education, is negative for women whose hus­
band’s report their wage rates. Combining occupations according to the education 
level likely to be required was experimented with - for example grouping all occupa­
tional categories requiring a degree - but this did not improve the model’s adjusted R1.
The dummies for the region the household is in allow for local labour market 
conditions. Living in London or the rest o f the south-east o f England, and, for those 
whose husbands do not report a wage, in Wales, means being paid more, while living 
in the south-west of England is associated with a lower wage. The fact that the coeffi­
cients are larger in Model 2, where the husband’s wage is not included, suggests that, 
in addition to the regional effects, this variable captures the correlation between hus­
bands’ and wives* earnings, by way of the regional variation in male wages.
Having predicted the hourly wage at / = 3 for the sample according to the pa­
rameters shown in Table 3.1, then, for each date, the constructed wage variable is de­
fined as:
• The actual wage rate, if reported.
• The actual wage rate for another date, adjusted for wage inflation if the wife does 
not report a wage for the date in question, but does report one for another date.
• The wage predicted on the basis o f Model 1 in Table 3.1, including the husband’s 
wage as a regressor, if the wife reports no wage at any date, but her husband does 
report a wage at some date; the predicted wage rate is adjusted for wage inflation 
for the key date and second interview.
• The wage predicted on the basis of M odel 2, if the wage rate is not available for 
either husband or wife, again adjusted for wage inflation for t ~ - \  and t = 15.
The summary statistics for the actual gross wage rate and the variable gener­
ated as described above are shown in Table 3.2. The table shows, as would be ex­
pected, that the medians of the constructed hourly wage variables, which cover both 
workers and non-workers, are lower at each date than those of the actual hourly wage 
variables, which are, by definition, for woricers only.
The figures reported in the table may also be compared with the national distri­
bution in the relevant years. In April 1983, at around / =  -1 , the median gross hourly
wage of all women was higher than that of either actual or constructed wages for the 
LSUS sample, at £2.62; the same point holds for April 1984, when the national median 
gross hourly wage was £2.80 (CSO, 1987). Even if non-manual workers are excluded, 
both actual and constructed LSUS wage distributions have lower medians than the dis­
tribution of female manual workers* wages; nationally, the median wage for manual 
workers was £2.16 per hour in 1983 and £2.27 per hour in 1984. This comparison 
highlights one o f the differences between the average British woman and those whose 
husbands are unemployed.
Table 3.2. Summary statistics fo r actual gross hourly wage, adjusted fo r  inflation where 
necessary, and the constructed hourly wage variables, in pounds.
Variable No. Obs. Median Minimum Maximum
Actual Gross Hourly Wage at / = —1 761 1.99 0.30 20.00
Actual Gross Hourly Wage at t -  3 761 2.01 0.30 20.00
Actual Gross Hourly Wage at ƒ = 15 761 2.12 0.30 17.14
Constructed Hourly Wage at t *  -1 1727 1.83 0.23 20.00
Constructed Hourly Wage at r = 3 1727 1.86 0.24 20.00
Constructed Hourly Wage at r = 15 1727 1.95 0.25 17.14
3.2.2 The Calculation of Net Wages
Gross wages having been estimated for everyone in the sample, the next step is to cal­
culate net wages. Although data on net wages are collected in the LSU survey, the 
level of taxation does not increase linearly with gross income, so that the proportion of 
gross income paid in taxation is not the same if working 7 hours as if working 37 
hours. Moreover, because of the lower and upper earnings limits which apply in calcu­
lating the amount of National Insurance (NI) contributions payable, the same point ap­
plies to these contributions. Because of the non-linearity generated in the budget con­
straint by the tax and NI systems, the rules of the systems are used to simulate the net 
income that would be received in each of the three hours regimes, using the gross 
hourly wage figure obtained as described above as the basis of the calculations. All 
details of the tax system are provided in Appendix A.
The net wage figure is arrived at as follows:
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• The gross hourly wage is converted to  a weekly wage for each of the three hours 
regimes, by multiplying by the number o f  hours assumed to hold in that range; this 
yields nine variables for each woman - one for each hours regime and for each date.
• The annual wage in each hours regime is calculated. For t =  -1  and t = 15, this 
involves multiplying by 52, but since the tax year relevant to t =  3 begins in April, 
at around the key date, the wage rate at r =  -1  is assumed to hold until half way 
between that date and the first interview, so that the annual wage for t = 3 is a 
weighted average of the weekly wage at t — -1  and that at t =  3 .
• Tax free allowances are allocated nexL_ In the relevant years, 1983 and 1984, a
*
couple could choose to be assessed either individually o r together. Being assessed 
together involved an assumption that the wife's income was the husband's; the 
husband was given a married m an's tax free allowance, and wife's earned income 
relief was added to this. Being assessed separately, on the other hand, meant that 
both partners were allocated the allowance of a single person. At the time most 
couples were assessed together, as this was the default. However, treating couples 
in this way would require that the unemployment payments the husband would re­
ceive at different hours of work of the wife be calculated, since these are also tax­
able. Since these are based on the net income of the wife, the calculation becomes 
circular. For this reason, women are treated as though their taxable income is as­
sessed independently of their husbands'. Taxable income for each of the three pos­
sible hours of work is generated by subtracting the relevant tax free allowance, 
given in Section A l, from each o f the three annual gross income figures at the three 
dates.
• Taxes payable in each hours regime are calculated according to the tax rates given 
in Section Al.
• The amount of NI contributions payable is calculated, according to the rules given 
in Section A2.
• Finally, total deductions in each hours regime and at each date are calculated by 
adding together the tax and NI payable. The total deductions figure is subtracted 
from the relevant annual gross income figure to give net income at each o f three 
dates and three hours regimes, and from this a weekly figure is obtained.
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Table 3.3. Summary statistics fo r  the constructed net wage variables, in pounds, fo r  each principal 
date, t, and each hours range.
Net Wage t = -1 t = 3 f = 15
Statistic FT P T >  10 PT < 10 FT
oAfc PT < 10 FT PT > 10 PT < 10
Mean 55.91 34.86 14.01 56.83 3538 14.24 60.09 37.35 14.91
Mean Hourly 1.51 1.74 2.00 1.54 1.77 2.03 1.62 1.87 2.13
Median 51.54 32.60 12.80 52.69 33.25 13.06 55.46 35.30 13.65
Minimum 8.65 4.67 1.64 8.85 4.79 1.68 9.15 4.94 1.73
Maximum 423.43 258.91 95.70 442.97 264.18 96.78 382.89 228.25 84.77
Mean Tax 
Rate
0.229 0.103 0.003 0.231 0.107 0.003 0.221 0.099 0.003
The distribution o f the net wage variable calculated as described above is 
shown in Table 3.3. The row showing the mean hourly wage for each date and hours 
of work combination is particularly interesting, illustrating, as it does, that the hourly 
net wage depends to a large degree on the number of hours worked because of the 
non-linearity in the budget constraint introduced by the tax and NI system. The last 
row, which shows the average rate of deductions of tax and Nl from gross weekly 
wages echoes this point. The table confirms the advisability of having calculated the 
net wage rates for different hours from the gross wage variables, rather than using a 
rule of thumb such as ‘less one third*.
3.2.3 An Assessment o f the Accuracy of the Wage Variable
There are two main stages in the construction of the net wage variable whose distribu­
tion is summarized in Table 3.3. The first is the construction o f a gross wage variable 
and the second is the calculation from that gross wage of the net wage received. In this 
section, an attempt will be made to evaluate the reliability of the results obtained at the 
two stages.
Clearly, the construction of the gross wage is the more difficult part of the pro­
cedure. The most obvious way of assessing the accuracy of the wage estimation on the 
basis o f which wages for non-workers are predicted is to inspect the R1 o f the wage 
estimation equation; at 0.153 for those women whose husbands report a wage, this is 
clearly very low. Because wages, where missing, are predicted on the basis of two 
separate wage estimations, this measure is not comprehensive, however. It is therefore
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useful to report that the correlation between the actual wages reported by women who 
did work during the survey period, and the wages that were predicted for those women 
on the basis of either Model 1 or Model 2 o f the wage estimation procedure is 0.36. 
Again, this is low.
Table 3.4. Correlations between reported net wages and 
constructed net wages fo r  women in each hours range at each 
principal date.
Time Hours o f Work
Correlation 
Between Actual 
and Estimated 
-  Wages
Number of 
Observations
Full-Time .987 71
f = - l Part-Time > 10 .973 235
Part-Time < 10 .960 . 285
Full-Time .978 82
t~ 3 Part-Time > 10 .962 222
Part-Time < 10 .952 241
Full-Time .989 85
t a  15 Part-Time >  10 .949 243
Part-Time <  10 .961 251
Table 3.4 is useful for the assessment of the accuracy of the procedure used to  
derive the net wage rates from the gross wage rates. It appears from the table, which 
shows a very high correlation between the constructed net wages and the actual re­
ported net wages, that confidence in the simulation of the tax and NI system is justi­
fied. Thus, only the estimation of the gross wage rate for non-working women should 
give cause for any concern.
-V
3 3  The Construction of a Household Income Variable
In this section, the net wage variables for each date and hours regime of the wife are 
used to construct further components o f the total income of the household. The most 
involved task in building these variables is the simulation o f the benefits that a house­
hold is entitled to for each of the four labour supply states that the wife can be ob­
served in, and given the labour market state and wage income, if  any, of the husband.
As outlined in Section 1.3, the British benefit system is made up of three ele­
ments: UB, SB and HB. Each of these three elements involves some degree of means 
testing, so that the amount received depends on the wage income o f the recipient’s 
wife. Moreover, UB is taken into account when assessing entitlement to SB, and both 
UB and SB are taken into account in appraising HB entitlements. Hence, UB receipts 
are simulated first, then SB entitlements, and finally HB receivable, using the rules that 
applied in 1983-84.
3.3.1 Simulating Unemployment Benefit Entitlement
The amount of UB entitlement depends on three things. First, it depends on whether 
the claimant qualifies at the full rate, the three-quarter rate, the half rate, or not at all. 
This in turn depends on his previous contribution record and the circumstances of his 
leaving his last employment. Second, the amount of UB depends to a small extent on 
the number of children the claimant has; the allowance for children was being phased 
out in the years in question. Third, the amount depends on whether the claimant’s wife 
is earning more than the amount of the dependant’s allowance; if she is not, then the 
husband receives an allowance for her, while if she is, he does not. The steps required 
to calculate the UB which the husband would receive if his wife worked in each hours 
range are outlined below:
• The husband’s answers to questions on the receipt of UB are used to indicate enti­
tlement to some payment, so if he says that he is in receipt of UB, then this is usu­
ally accepted as being the case. Exceptions to this arise at the second interview, 
however, since some men claim to be receiving UB, even though they have not ex­
ited their sampled unemployment spells; since it is not possible to receive UB con­
tinuously for more than one year, these men are re-coded as not being in receipt o f 
UB at t = 15.
• If the head of household knows how his unemployment payment is divided be­
tween UB and SB, an attempt can be made to calculate the rate of UB to which he 
is entitled. By using information on the number of children in the household and on 
the wife’s actual wages, if any, the amount which the husband would receive at 
each of the three rates o f payment (full, three-quarter and half), given the observed 
labour market status of his wife, is calculated using the information in Section A3.
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Then, which of these three amounts is closest to the amount o f  UB the husband re­
ports receiving is identified. The corresponding rate o f payment is then assumed 
also to apply at t -  — 1 and t =  15, if relevant. For men who cannot separate their 
UB and SB payments, the assumption is made that they are on the full rate.
• The amount the husband would receive if his wife did not work, which is the 
maximum amount receivable, is calculated by adding allowances for a dependant 
wife and children to the basic amount o f UB entitlement; the amounts are given in 
Section A3. The basic amount and the amount receivable for the wife depend on 
the rate of payment established as described in the previous point.
•SL.
• The amounts o f UB that the husband would receive if the wife worked 7, 20 and 
37 hours are then calculated by subtracting the dependant's allowance, at the rele-
~vant rate (full, three-quarters or half) from the maximum amount receivable, cal­
culated already, if the wife’s wage income at that number o f hours exceeds the 
amount of the allowance.
3.3.2 Simulating Supplementary Benefit Entitlement
The amount of SB entitlement is calculated as the difference between needs, which de­
pend on the number and ages of dependants, and resources, which include wage in­
come and UB. SB is not payable to a man if he is employed full-time. Any mortgage 
interest which the household incurs is also receivable as SB. The steps followed in es­
timating the amount of SB receivable are described below:
• Needs are calculated on the basis o f family composition, according to the rules de­
scribed in Section A4.
• To these basic needs is added the amount o f  mortgage interest if the householder is 
a mortgage holder. This requires an estimation by regression, since 180 o f 553 
householders holding mortgages do not know how much of their mortgage pay­
ments comprise interest payments. For those who do know this information, the 
log of the fraction o f their annual mortgage payments which is interest is regressed 
on the number of years of the mortgage left to pay and on a dummy equal to one if 
the mortgage is held with a building society, for the dates of the first and second 
interviews. Using the resulting coefficients, the fraction o f the mortgage which is
8 2
interest is predicted for those households who do not know their mortgage interest 
alone, and also for those households who report mortgage interest to be higher 
than their total mortgage payment, since this is impossible; there are 59 such 
households at the first interview and 31 at the second. This fraction is then multi­
plied by the total mortgage payment reported to obtain figures for mortgage inter­
est for all mortgage holders.
• Allowances for the maintenance of the family home and for extra heating, outlined 
in Section A5, are added to needs. The amount of water rates payable is also 
added.
• The resources of the household are calculated for each date and for all possible 
hours of work of the wife - 0, 7, 20 and 37. Resources include the part of the hus­
band’s net weekly wage, if any, above the disregard of £4, and similarly, the wife’s 
net wage, if any, over £4.
• Also added to household resources are other amounts of benefit income, including 
child benefit, sickness benefit and any reported receipt of Family Income Supple­
ment (FIS). There are two difficulties with treating FIS as endogenous to the wife’s 
labour supply, which it in fact is. One is that the take-up rate of this benefit, de­
signed for families whose head is in work, is low; Dorsett and Heady (1991) esti­
mate it to be about 59% in 1984-87. More seriously, however, the calculation of 
entitlement is very difficult, as FIS is paid at a constant rate for a year even if 
household income changes, so in many cases, the income reported at a particular 
date may not qualify the household for FIS, but at some previous date the house­
hold may have qualified and therefore be in receipt of the benefit. Hence, the deci­
sion was reluctantly taken to treat FIS payments as exogenous to the wife’s labour 
supply.
• For the zero hours option of the wife, any unemployment payments, whether UB 
or SB, that she reports receiving are also added. The entitlement to unemployment 
payments that a working woman would have if she became unemployed is not cal­
culated, since insufficient information is available both on whether women are un­
employed or not participating if not working, and on past labour market history.
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• For each hours possibility, the amount o f UB received by the husband given the 
relevant number of hours of work of his wife is added.
• Finally, weekly non-labour income is added; this is calculated to include rental in­
come, and interest on savings at the rate o f 6.25% at the key date, 5.75% at the 
first interview and 7.25% at the second interview.4
• The SB entitlement at each date for each job status of the wife is then calculated as 
the difference between needs and resources. The entitlement at all hours o f work of 
the wife is reduced to zero if the household’s total savings are greater than £2,500
(£3,000 at the second interview), or if the  husband is working full-time.
r
3 3 3  Simulating Housing Benefit Entitlem ent
Housing benefit is divided into two types. The first, ’certificated* benefit, is automati­
cally receivable by those in receipt o f SB, and pays 100% of eligible rent and rates.5 
The second, ’standard* housing benefit is based on a comparison of needs and re­
sources. At the date o f the first interview o f the LSU survey, the HB system was in the 
process of being changed, and a transitional payment o f HB was available for those 
who would lose under the new system. However, since insufficient information re­
garding previous HB receipts was available in the survey to calculate these transitional 
payments, the new system was assumed to apply. Thus, the amount of HB to which a 
household is entitled, given the hours o f work of the wife, is calculated as follows:
• The needs of the household for ’standard* housing benefit entitlement are deter­
mined according to the information in Table A5.
• The resources o f the household are calculated for the different possible hours of 
work of the wife. Resources include the gross weekly income o f both the husband 
and wife. The spouse who earns more is allowed an earnings disregard o f £18, 
while the one earning less has a disregard o f £5.
4 These figures were derived from data in Table 17.9 o f the Annual Abstract (CSO, 1987). 
3 W ater rates are not included.
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• Added to these resources are weekly non-labour income, calculated to include in­
terest on savings and other benefit income, as described above for the case of SB, 
and the husband’s UB entitlement, if any.
• The starting figure for HB is 60% of rent and rates paid. From this a deduction is 
made for each non-dependant in the household, as outlined in Table A6 of Appen­
dix A.
• To this adjusted starting figure, for both rent and rates, is added a percentage - the 
‘taper’ - of the difference between needs and resources if the former arc higher 
than the latter, and a reduction by a typically higher percentage if resources are 
higher than needs. The tapers are detailed in Section A5.
• The figures for rent and rates allowances at different hours of work of the wife, and 
hence different resources of the household, are then added together, with the ad­
justment made that no less than 30p can be paid per week, so that if the entitlement 
is positive but less than 30p, the amount is adjusted upwards.
• Finally, if the husband is entitled to SB at any of the possible hours of work of the 
wife, then for the HB variable corresponding to those hours, the standard HB enti­
tlement is replaced with the certificated entitlement, which is the total amount of 
the rent and rates, less the deductions for non-dependants outlined above.
3.3.4 An Assessment of the Accuracy of the Benefit Variables
The accuracy of the benefit variables constructed as described in the foregoing sections 
depends on the accuracy both of the wage variables, which has been discussed in Sec­
tion 3.2.3, and of the procedure simulating the benefit system. The accuracy of the 
simulation procedure can be assessed by comparing the simulated values of benefit en­
titlements with the actual amount the head of household reported to be receiving in 
cases where the wives were actually working in the relevant hours range. Since these 
amounts are based on the observed wage income of the wife, such an examination ab­
stracts from the problems of inaccuracies in the wage variables and focuses on the gen­
eration o f the benefit variables only.
Clearly, the social welfare system in Britain at the time o f the survey was very 
complex, so that comparisons such as this cannot be taken as an absolute indicator o f
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the accuracy of the variables, some reported amounts also being likely to be incorrect. 
One indication of the complexity o f the system is given by the number of men who 
cannot distinguish between their UB and SB entitlements, o f which there are 483 at the 
first interview. Another is the number of men who claim to be in receipt of UB at the 
second interview, even though their answers to other questions indicate that this is im­
possible. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Table 3.5 shows some indicators of the 
accuracy of the UB and SB predicted amounts. The data collected for HB receipts was 
too piecemeal to perform the same exercise for this benefit type.
Table 3.5. Percentages o f estimated benefit receipts within 10% o f reported benefit receipt fo r  those 
whose wives actually worked the relevant number o f hours.
Time Wife’s
Hours of Work
Percentage o f Simulated Benefit Amounts within 10% of Reported
Amount
%
UB
No. Obs. %
SB
No. Obs.
UB+SB*
% No. Obs.
None 52 31 53 139 58 36
/ = - l Part-Time < 10 100 1 33 3 - -
Part-Time > 10 87 15 20 10 33 3
Full-Time 76 17 0 6 - -
None 69 367 65 423 75 421
r = 3 Part-Time < 10 78 41 24 21 80 25
Part-Time > 10 92 147 27 55 33 30
Full-Time 95 180 0 17 29 7
None 63 38 68 579 76 62
/ = 15 Part-Time < 10 50 2 52 29 40 5
Part-Time > 10 53 15 30 13 75 4
Full-Time 71 17 0 7 100 1
* Where the men could not distinguish between the SB and UB elements of their benefit payments.
Table 3.5 indicates that the calculations for amounts of UB received are fairly 
close to the actual amounts reported. The consistently lower level o f accuracy o f UB 
receipts for men whose wives do not work appears to have its source in mis-reporting 
to a large extent. For example, about a third of those for whom the difference between 
the simulated and reported UB entitlement is greater than 10% at the first interview 
claim to be receiving £25 per week in UB; this is the amount to which a man with no
children and receiving no dependant’s allowance for his wife is entitled, whereas all 
these men are entitled to a dependant’s allowance for their non-working wives.
For SB, however, the accuracy is not as high in general, and is particularly low 
for the benefit received by the husbands of fuD-time working women, although the 
small number of these women makes this issue less worrying that it might otherwise 
be. An important point to note regarding the amounts reported as being received as SB 
in the survey is that, since those who are entitled to some SB are also automatically 
entitled to ‘certificated’ HB, they do not need to apply to the local authority for the 
latter benefit and may therefore believe that HB is part of their SB. This may account 
for the lower levels of correlation between reported and simulated SB.
3.4 An Analysis of Household Income
In Section 1.3.1, the budget constraint of a hypothetical, ‘typical* woman was illus­
trated, and the areas of the constraint where she has least incentive to work identified. 
In this section, the wage variables produced as outlined in Section 3.2, and the benefit 
variables constructed according to the procedure described in Section 3.3 are used to 
illustrate the actual effect of means testing on total household income for the women in 
the LSU survey.
Total household income for a given number of hours of work of a woman 
comprises total benefit income, including child benefit, FIS and sickness benefit as well 
as unemployment payments to either husband or wife, non-labour income such as in­
terest from savings, her husband’s net wage income, if any, and her net wage for the 
relevant hours range, simulated as necessary. Table 3.6 shows the medians of the total 
household income variables for various observed job and benefit entitlement positions 
of the husbands, at each of the three principal dates.
This table is useful in that it allows a comparison of the effects of UB and SB 
on household income, as well as a measure of the effect of unemployment per se. The 
entries for the date o f the first interview are particularly useful for the comparison of 
the effects of UB and SB, since large numbers o f unemployed men fall into both the 
‘entitled to UB’ and ‘not entitled to UB’ categories at that date. On the other hand, the 
entries for the key date and the date of the second interview are more useful in con­
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trasting the situation of the employed with that of the unemployed who are on SB only, 
since a large number of men are at work at t — - l  and t —15, but few of those who 
are not at work are eligible for UB.
Table 3.6. Median total household income, in pounds, by wife’s job  status and husband’s job  status at 
the three principal dates.
Husband's Actual No. W ife's Potential Job Status
lim e Job Status Obs. None P-T < 10 P -T >  10 Full-Time
Working 1076 103.90 116.24 134.18 153.13
Not Working 651 72.43 78.26 88.73 91.84
t = -1 OnUB 106 73.78
*
78.46 85.54 ' 96.26
Not Working, Not on UB 519 73.79 80.03 85.60 92.17
All 1727 91.75 101.47 117.16 133.12
- Working 66 77.84 87.81 95.87 112.11
Not Working 1661 75.99 80.75 84.42 94.43
; = 3 OnUB 1227 75.92 81.13 85.83 97.34
Not Working, Not on UB 468 76.37 80.39 81.39 85.54
All 1727 76.10 80.95 84.89 94.81
Working 695 111.02 123.44 144.61 167.86
Not Working 1032 79.53 84.45 87.56 92.32
/ = 15 OnUB 107 85.70 90.07 92.14 104.35
Not Working, Not on UB 925 78.95 83.72 86.76 90.65
All 1727 89.50 96.70 101.69 110.65
There are several feature o f the statistics in the table which appear to be 
anomalous at fust glance and which should be clarified first. One is that total house­
hold income when the husband is working is significantly lower at /  =  3 than at t = -1  
or / = 15. This is because at the first interview, no husband is employed full-time; all 
those working are registered as unemployed and must therefore be working part-time, 
whereas at the other dates, the majority of working men are in full-time employment
A second peculiarity is that the number o f households where the husbands are 
entitled to and therefore receiving UB, and the number where the husbands are not 
working but not on UB do not add up to  the number of households where the husband 
is not working at either t -  -1  or t =  3 . This is because there are a number of men at 
both these dates who claim to be working but receiving UB. Their word on both
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counts is accepted as being true, since it is possible that these men are doing some 
work and not reporting it to the benefit administration.
Thirdly, it is notable that at both the key date and first interview, if the wife 
does not work, household income when UB is received is very close to that when there 
is no entitlement to UB, indicating that the main difference between UB and SB is not 
the replacement ratio implied by the two benefits, but the means-testing structure. At 
the second interview, however, for the situation where the wife does not work, those 
eligible for UB have an income that is higher than for those in receipt o f SB only. The 
reason for this is that benefit rates for a different year apply at the second interview, 
and in that year, both the basic UB and the "dependant’s allowance were increased by 
about 8%, while the rate of increase in the needs of each household member for SB 
was about 4%, so that in that year, a small gap opened up between the replacement 
rates of the two benefit types.
Finally, at / = -1 , the median total income of households with husbands on UB 
is the same as, or lower than that of households with husbands who are not entitled to 
UB if the wife works part-time - £78 compared to £80 if she works low part-time 
hours, and £85 in both benefit situations if she works high part-time hours. This is not 
the expected result, given that UB entails a lower level of means testing than SB. The 
important point to be emphasized here is that each row of the table is calculated for a 
different sample of individuals, and at the key date, the wives of the 106 men entitled 
to UB earned, or had the potential to earn an average of £1.91 per hour in gross 
wages, while the wives o f the 519 men not employed but not entitled to UB had a 
mean gross wage of £2.06. Thus, these medians reflect differences in wages as well as 
differences in the degree o f means testing involved. At the other two principal dates, 
the average wage rates o f the two sets of wives are almost exactly the same, so that 
this problem does not arise. Hence the key date is less useful for the comparison of the 
effects of SB and UB than the other two dates.
Having explained some unanticipated features of the tabulation, it remains to 
comment on the extent to which the other results confirm expectations. In Section
1.3.2, it was shown that the marginal gain in household income from working less than 
full-time should be very low for those affected by SB. This is borne out to a certain 
extent by the information in Table 3.6. At the first interview, for the wives of men not
89
entitled to UB, median total household income is higher by about £4 if they work 7 
hours per week rather than zero hours, and by similar amounts at the other two princi­
pal dates. This is expected, as the earnings disregard is £4. The differences in median 
household income for further hours increments are, at t -  3 , just £1 between working 
7 and 20 hours per week, and £4 between high part-time hours and full-time work. At 
the other two dates, the differences are not quite so low, with an increase in median 
household income of about £18 when increasing hours worked from none to 37 at the 
key date, and of nearly £12 at the second interview. Overall, however, the increases in 
median household income are certainly low for those affected by SB.
But it is not clear that for women facing the SB budget constraint, the positive 
effect on household income of moving to full-time work from high part-time hours is 
much larger than for the other hours increments, as might be expected, since by in­
creasing hours in this way, a woman is typically no longer on the part of her budget 
constraint that implies a 100% marginal ‘tax* rate on wage income. One possible ex­
planation for this result is that mortgage interest and other extras are added to ‘needs* 
in calculating SB receivable, thus extending the 100% tax region into the full-time 
hours range, so that median income is not as much higher for 37 hours than for 20 
hours as would be expected if this is not taken into account. It may also be that when 
working 37 hours, and leaving the segment o f the household budget constraint that is 
determined by the SB means test, women also cause household HB entitlement to be 
calculated on the basis of the ‘standard* rather than the more favourable ‘certificated* 
system.
The figures for households who are entitled to UB do not conform to expected 
patterns very clearly either. The benefit of increasing hours from 0 to 7 is expected to 
be low for a household in receipt of UB, since the dependant's allowance for the wife 
is lost, on average, at around the 7 hours per week point.6 The median values confirm 
that the difference in household income between zero and 7 hours o f work of the wife 
is low, although at the first interview, it is not as low as for those who are affected only 
by SB means testing. At t = 3, the difference in median income if the wives work 20 
hours as opposed to 7 hours is again low, albeit not as low as in the case of those enti-
6 See Table 3.3.
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tied only to SB. If women lose their dependants* allowance at around the 7 hours per 
week mark* a higher difference in median household income might be expected for the 
wives o f UB qualifiers between 7 and 20 hours per week. The absence of this feature 
may be because UB qualifying households may also receive SB, if their needs are 
greater than their resources, and at 20 hours per week, some women are on a budget 
constraint which is affected by SB. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that the increase in 
median income due to working 37 hours is larger in the case o f those entitled to UB 
than for those not so entitled.
These results suggest that the overlapping of the UB and SB systems, has im­
portant implications for the effect of means testing on household income. Indeed, it 
may be that attempting to find a distinctive effect of benefit exhaustion is mis-guided, 
since the distinction between the two benefit types is blurred. This may explain the ab­
sence o f a difference between the wives of UB receivers and the wives of non-receivers 
in the timing of their labour force transitions reported in Section 2.4.
Another useful comparison is between median household income for house­
holds headed by workers and for those whose heads are not working. In terms of the 
effect of unemployment on potential household income, at t =  -1 , income in house­
holds where the head is working is between 43% and 66% higher than where the head 
is not working, depending on the labour market status of the wife, and between 40% 
and 80% higher at t - 15.
At both the key date and the second interview, median household income for 
women working full-time is about 50% higher than if they do not work, if their hus­
bands are working, whereas if their husbands are not working, the difference is 27% at 
the key date, and just 16% at the second interview. So the husband’s job status has 
clear implications for work incentives of the wife.
Some insight into the incentives for unemployed household heads to work part- 
time if they cannot find full-time work can also be gained from the table, by comparing 
the household incomes for households where the husband is working with those where 
he is not working at the first interview, since at this date all men who are working are 
working part-time. It can be seen from the table that the higher the hours worked by 
the wife, the higher the benefit to the household o f his working part-time. If the wife
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does not work, then the difference in median household income between households 
with part-time working husbands and those with non-working husbands is less than £2, 
while if the wife is working full-time, then the difference in median household income 
is £18 per week.
Table 3.7. Median total household income in the absence o f means testing, in pounds, by w ife’s job  
status and husband’s jo b  status at the three principal dates.
Husband’s Actual No. * Wife’s Potential Job Status
Time Job Status Obs. None P-T <  10 P-T > 10 Full-Time
Working 1076 103.90 118.21 138.37 157.20
Not Working 6S1 72.43 87.51 10734 127.46
t = -1 OnUB 106 73.78 90.07 10737 128.80
Not Working, Not on UB 519 73.79 89.35 109.76 129.14
All 1727 91.75 104.91 125.04 145.21
Working 66 77.84 95.27 115.67 136.67
Not Working 1661 75.99 89.69 110.21 130.26
t = 3 OnUB 1227 75.92 89.80 110.08 130.09
Not Working, Not on UB 468 76.37 90.38 111.19 131.29
All 1727 76.10 89.97 11039 13033
Working 695 111.02 125.43 148.35 171.12
Not Working 1032 79.53 93.80 115.01 135.52
t = 15 OnUB 107 85.70 98.10 119.47 138.08
Not Working, Not on UB 925 78.95 93.07 114.50 135.24
All 1727 89.50 103.95 125.31 146.70
It is also interesting to perform the simulations of the above variables for the 
case of no means testing of benefits, and to compare the figures with those o f Table 
3.6. In Table 3.7, the total household incomes are calculated as though every element 
of means testing were removed, although the distinction between UB and SB is re­
tained, in the sense that the relevant payment rates at a given date apply. Thus, the 
differences between those entitled to and those not entitled to UB are entirely due to 
the rates of the two payment types. Again, it is noteworthy that the amounts paid un­
der the UB and SB schemes are very similar at both t = -1  and t  — 3 , although the 
gap noted in Table 3.6 between benefit rates at the first and second interviews again 
makes a difference at t =  15.
Obviously, the first column of Table 3.7 is identical to the first of Table 3.6, 
since means testing has no implications if the wife is not working. It is the differences 
in the two tables between the columns for positive hours of work of the wives that in­
dicate the effect of means testing on household income. A striking point is the extent to 
which means testing also affects households headed by working men. At all three 
dates, and for all positive hours of work of the wives, median household income for 
workers is higher in the absence of means testing. This is because HB can be received 
when working, but is means tested against the wages of both spouses.
Secondly, the point made above about the incentives for men to take part-time 
jobs if they cannot find full-time ones is reversed when there is no means testing, in the 
sense that the difference in the median household income when the husband is working 
part-time compared to those not working is constant, and low, at about £6, across the 
possible positive hours of work of his wife.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 are interesting for the statistics they contain on the overall 
effect of means testing. It is, however, also instructive to examine some individual 
cases. An exercise calculating the total household income that would pertain for two 
hypothetical cases at 1987 benefit rates is contained in Dilnot and Kell (1989). One of 
their imaginary households contains two children aged between 11 and 15 years, where 
the husband is not entitled to receive UB, they pay £20 per week in rent and £5 per 
week in rates and the wife’s gross hourly wage is £2.50. Their second hypothetical 
household has no children and the husband does qualify for UB, with the same rent, 
rates and gross wage rate of the wife.
The total income variables constructed as described above may be used to carry 
out a similar exercise, but using real cases. In order to make such an analysis compara­
ble with Dilnot and Kell’s, the LSUS data were inspected to find two actual situations 
which are as close to their hypothetical ones as possible. In one of the households se­
lected, the wife’s gross hourly wage rate is £2.55, the couple have two children aged 
11 to 15, and the family rents a council house for £17.02 per week and pays rates o f 
£8.65 per week. This household’s financial position is portrayed in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8. N et income at different hours o f work o f wife at fir s t interview; 
fam ily with two children aged 11-15, husband not entitled to UB.
Income Source
None
Wife’s Hours 
P-T < 10 P-T >  10 Full-Time
Gross Wage 0 17.85 51.00 94.35
Tax and NI Deductions 0 0 -9.59 -26.50
SB Received 57.52 43.67 20.11 0
HB Received 25.67 25.67 25.67 14.21
Other Income 12.31 12.31 12.31 12.31
Net Income 95.50 99.50 99 JO 94.37
£
This turns out to  be a striking example o f the effect o f the discontinuities in the 
budget constraint as a result o f the benefit system. The flat portion o f the budget con­
straint for those households on SB only is clear - total household income is the same 
whether the woman works 7 or 20 hours. The £4 earnings disregard results in an in­
crease in household income of that amount if she works part-time as opposed to not 
working. But most remarkable is the fact that total household income if the wife works 
full-time is lower than if she works part-time or if she does not work. This arises be­
cause if the wife works 37 hours per week, the husband’s entitlement to SB is ex­
hausted, so that the basis on which their HB is calculated changes from the 
‘certificated’ system, under which all rent and rates are paid, to the ‘standard* one. 
This results in the amount of HB received dropping by over £11 per week, with a 
drastic effect on household income. The disincentive to work is clear in this case; the 
average tax rate on part-time work is extremely high, while working full-time actually 
reduces the household’s total resources. It may be of interest that this woman worked 
part-time, over ten hours at the first interview, despite the clear lack o f incentive to do 
so.
The situation o f the second household selected is given in Table 3.9. In this 
case, the wife’s gross hourly wage is £2.65, the couple have no children, they pay rent 
o f £21.55 per week, and no rates,7 and the husband is entitled to UB. The complexity 
o f the interactions of the UB, SB and HB systems are clear here. If the wife works 7 
hours per week, her UB dependant’s allowance is withdrawn, so that her husband re­
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ceives a slight increase in SB. If she works over 7 hours, his entitlement to SB is ex­
hausted, and because of this, the basis of the calculation of their HB changes, so that 
the lower HB offsets the higher wage she is earning.
Table 3.9. Net income at different hours o f work o f wife, family with no 
children, husband entitled to UB,
Income Source
None
Wife’s Hours 
P-T < 10 P-T > 10 Full-Time
Gross Wage 0 18.55 53.00 98.05
Tax and NI Deductions 0 0 -10.36 -27.92
UB Received 40.45 25.00 25.00 25.00
SB Received 1.25 2.15 0 0
HB Received 21.55 2155 13.19 3.69
Other Income 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Net Income 63.35 67.35 80.90 98.87
In this situation, the disincentives to work are weaker than in the previous case, 
with an increase in household income of £35.52 if the wife changes from not working 
to working full-time; this amounts to an average ‘tax* rate of 64% on working full­
time, which is high, but does not entirely remove the financial incentives to work. In 
fact, this woman worked full-time at the time of the first interview.
3.5 The Effective Tax Rate Implied by the Means Testing of 
Benefits
One o f the measures of the extent of the effect o f means testing which was referred to 
in Section 1.3.1 was the effective average or marginal tax rate implied by the means 
testing of benefits. There, it was pointed out that the marginal tax rate imposed on 
household income by the benefit system for some range of income of the wife is 100% 
if her husband is on SB. This concept o f the tax rate implied by means testing is used in 
this section to give an impression of the overall effect of means testing. 7
7 It seems probable that rent and rates are included in this figure.
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The ‘tax rate’ variable is constructed by comparing the amount of benefit in­
come that a household would receive in a given range o f hours of work of the wife 
with that which they would receive in the absence of means testing,8 and expressing the 
‘loss’ of household income because o f means testing as a percentage of the wife’s net 
wage at the relevant number of hours. Thus, this is a measure of the average rate at 
which the wife's contribution to household income is reduced by the means testing of 
UB, SB and HB.
One important point does arise from the fact that the tax rate variables are ex­
pressed as percentage losses of net income. The assumption that the tax liabilities of 
each couple are assessed separately implies' that the income tax and NI payable by a 
wife do not vary with the income received by her husband; since, under joint taxation, 
a woman’s net income may indeed vary with her husband’s benefit status, allowing for 
the joint taxation of couples may change these calculations somewhat. However, I con­
sidered that this approximation was justified given the difficulties, referred to in Sec­
tion 3.2.2, of calculating the tax payable by a woman whose husband’s taxable income 
- his SB or UB - is itself dependent on his wife’s post-tax income.
The median values of this variable for each date and for combinations of hours 
of work of the wife and job and benefit status of the husband are shown in Table 3.10. 
For the key date and the second interview, the means-testing tax rate for all those 
households where the head is working is zero, apart from that implied by HB, whereas 
at the first interview, when some men are working part-time, means testing affects in­
come in a greater number of households.
Like Table 3.6, this table contains some surprising results. First, for those enti­
tled to UB, at all three principal dates, high hours part-time work by the woman is the 
category that is most penalized. If only UB is received, then it should be low part-time 
hours that are most penalized, as the loss of the dependant's allowance should, on av­
erage, take effect in this hours range. Again this confirms the impression gained from 
Table 3.6 that the applicability of SB rules for those receiving both UB and SB means 
that high hours part-time work is also disadvantaged. *
* The benefit income received in the absence o f means testing is always equal to  the benefit income 
that would be received if the wife did not work, since this is the maximum household entitlem ent
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Table 3.10. Median o f means testing tax rates, by w ife's job status and husband's job  status at the 
three principal dates. Figures in brackets give the 25% and 75% percentiles o f the relevant variable's 
distribution.
Husband’s Actual No. Wife’s Potential Job Status
Time Joh Status Obs. P-T < 10 P-T> 10 Full-Time
Working 1076 0.00 (0. .12) 0.00(0, .77) 0.01 (0, .74)
Not Working 651 0.59 (0, .72) 0.82 (.75, .88) 0.69 (.21. .90)
t = - \  OnUB 106 0.60 (.45. .75) 0.71 (.57, .84) 0.59 (.45,.72)
Not Working, Not on UB 519 0.58 (0. .72) 0.82 (.09. .88) 0.69 (.77. .90)
All 1727 0.05 (0, .54) 0.09(0, .67) 0.09(0, .50)
Working 66 034  (.73, .69) 0.55 (.37, .78) 0.46 (.22. .68)
Not Working 1661 0.66 (.57, .74) 0.83 (.59. .88) 0.67 (.48. .89)
t  = 3 On UB 1227 0.64 (.39, .74) 0.73 (.52,.87) 0.59 (.42. .74)
Not Working, Not on UB 468 0.69 (.60, .74) 0.88 (.86, .89) 0.90 (.87, .92)
All 1727 0.66 (.50, .74) 0.82 (.58, .88) 0.67 (.47. .89)
Working 695 0.00 (0, .72) 0.00(0, .72) 0.00(0, .09)
Not Working 1032 0.67 (.55, .73) 0.87 (.75, .89) 0.89 (.60, .92)
t = 15 OnUB 107 0.62 (.39, .72) 0.77 (.52, .87) 0.62 (.47,.76)
Not Working, Not on UB 925 0.67 (.56, .73) 0.87 (.82, .89) 0.90 (.70,.92)
All 1727 0.43 (0, .70) 0.55 (.02, .88) 0.45 (.02. .97)
Secondly, for those whose husbands are entitled only to SB, full-time work is, 
at t = 3 and r = 15, taxed to an even greater extent than high part-time hours. Again, 
this reinforces the points made above that the extra SB entitlements of households due 
to mortgage interest payments extends the high level of SB means testing into the full­
time hours range, and that the effect of changing from Certificated’ to ’standard* HB is 
very negative.
However, the table does confirm, as expected, that for almost all possible hours 
of work of the wife at the three principal dates, the median o f the average implicit tax 
rate for UB recipients is markedly lower than for those qualifying only for SB. All dif­
ferences in the medians are statistically significant, apart from that for working low 
part-time hours at the key date. At the first interview, the differences are significant at 
the 99% confidence level for all three hours ranges, as are those for high part-time and 
full-time work at the second interview; differences at other dates and in other hours 
ranges are significant at the lower 90% and 95% levels.
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As to the absolute values o f the variables, their medians are uniformly high, 
with a median ‘loss’ of net incoine o f between 60% and 90%. A further point w orth  
noting concerns the distribution o f  these tax rates around the median. The figures in 
brackets in Table 3.10, giving the 25% and 75% percentiles of the distribution o f the 
variables indicate that even where the medians do not differ greatly between SB and 
UB recipients, the distribution around those medians tends to be tighter in the left tail 
for those receiving SB only than for those entitled to UB. Thus, for example, at the 
first interview, the difference in the means-testing tax rate for low-hours part-time 
work between households where the husband is receiving UB and those where he is 
not is 5 percentage points - 64% compared to  69%. However, the extra information 
about the distribution shows that the 25% percentile o f the average tax rate is at 39% 
for those on UB, but at 60% for those not entitled to UB.9
Although the differences between the effects of different benefits on household 
income are not as clear-cut as might be expected from a textbook description of the 
benefit system, it may be concluded that there is a clear absence of financial incentives 
to work for the wives of the unemployed.
3.6 Attitudes to Work and the Means Testing o f Benefits
In Section 2.5, data from the LSU survey on attitudes to work when a husband is un­
employed were used to assess the extent to which the disincentive effect of means 
testing is appreciated by the women surveyed. In this section, the variables whose con­
struction has been described above, and in particular the tax rate implied by means 
testing, discussed in the previous section, are used to establish the relationship between 
a woman’s views on whether her husband’s unemployment makes it more or less sen­
sible for her to work and the reality o f her financial situation.
Here, the responses as to the main reason for a woman viewing work as more 
or less sensible because of her husband’s unemployment are used, as two of the possi­
9 Note that this pattern does not hold at the key date, where the 25% percentile is low for all hours of 
work; this is due to the high number o f individuals on government training schemes whose payment 
for the schemes reduces their SB entitlem ent to  zero.
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ble reasons refer directly to financial motivations. One response is that a woman be* 
Iieves working to be more sensible because of a positive financial benefit, while the 
other is that she believes working to be less sensible because it is not worthwhile finan­
cially. Table 3.11 gives the median o f average tax rates imposed by means testing for 
women who mention these motivations for their attitudes to work, for each possible 
hours range worked.
Table 3.11. Median tax rate implied by means testing at different hours o f work fo r  women who 
mention a financial motivation fo r  their view on paid work.
Reason for View on Paid 
Work
Hours o f 
Wife
First Interview 
(all women)
First Interview 
(if answer at 
second also)
Second
Interview
P-T<10 0.57 0.57 0.57
Positive Financial Benefit P-T>10 0.69 0.70 0.69
F-T 0.59 0.62 0.67
P-T<10 0.58 0.58 0.64
Not Worthwhile Financially P-T>10 0.78 0.77 0.84
F-T 0.73 0.71 0.86
The table shows that women who believe working not to be worthwhile finan­
cially are more highly penalized for a given hours range at any one date. Thus, for ex­
ample, at the first interview, the median rate at which those who believe that working 
is not worthwhile financially are taxed by the benefit system is 73%, compared to 59% 
for those who believe working to have a positive financial benefit. In other words, their 
beliefs appear to be reflecting their actual financial situations.
Having said this, however, it is remarkable that women who believe working to 
have a positive financial benefit are still affected so strongly by means testing. Between 
57% and 70% of their net income is withdrawn because of means testing, and yet they 
still mention a positive financial benefit from working. This result casts some doubt on 
the extent to which the unmistakably strong disincentives in the system are the primary 
determinants of the opinions of the wives surveyed; it seems likely that these answers 
are reflecting differences in wage-earning potential rather than means-testing disincen­
tives.
Another point about this tabulation is that for both attitudes to work, there is 
very little effect on the median means-testing tax-rate at the first interview when those
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whose husbands return to work by the second interview are excluded, indicating that 
the ‘type’ o f the woman does not determine the correlation between how much she is 
affected by means testing and her perception o f the benefits of working.
Finally, it is interesting to note that when an equivalent tabulation is made for 
absolute values of household income lost due to means testing, as opposed to average 
means testing tax rates, the same patterns do not arise. In fact, there is no systematic 
difference in the amounts lost between the two attitude groups. This seems to indicate 
that the women react more to the percentage o f their wage income which is ‘lost’ be­
cause of means testing than to the absolute amount lost
f
3.7 The Assumptions Behind the Household Income Variable
Both the construction of variables for total household income, and the analysis of such 
variables for evidence of the effect o f means testing on income and hence on the extent 
of disincentives to work for wives o f unemployed men implicitly entail some important 
assumptions about the way women make their labour supply decisions. In this section, 
the assumptions underlying much of the analysis in the thesis are made explicit and 
their validity discussed.
Probably the most important assumption made here and throughout the thesis is 
that all household income is pooled. The very fact that the variable constructed is total 
household income implies that it is household income that is regarded as important by 
the wives o f the unemployed, rather than income personally received. Indeed, the mo­
tivation for studying the wives of the unemployed, or indeed for the means testing o f 
benefits by the government are void if household income is not pooled, at least to some 
extent, so that the benefit income received by a woman’s husband and the wife’s wage 
income are both important for all members o f the household.
Some sociological evidence as to whether the assumption o f complete pooling 
is valid is given in Pahl (1989). Here, the money management systems used within 
households are classified into four types. O f the 102 couples interviewed in the study, 
56% pool their resources, and 9% keep their respective incomes entirely separate and 
split expenses between them, although not necessarily equally. In the remaining house­
holds, two types o f intermediate system are used. 22% use the ‘allowance* system,
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whereby the husband gives a fixed amount of money to the wife each week for spend­
ing on the housekeeping and for her personal spending, to which she adds her wages, if 
any. The other 14% use the ‘whole wage* system, where a husband gives his whole 
wage to his wife and she allocates personal spending money to him.
Thus, in 91% of these households, there is some sharing of money, although 
only in 56% is there complete pooling. There is reason to believe that in low income 
households, women have access to household income to a greater extent than in higher 
income households, since the ‘whole wage* system is more used and the ‘allowance* 
system less used at lower income levels, while shared management is equally prevalent 
at all income levels. *
However, there may be a difference between the degree of access to money 
earned by a husband in theory and the utility gained from that money in practice, par­
ticularly if spending that money has to be justified to the husband. Thus, Pahl found 
that among couples who pooled their money, 38% of the wives felt that they had to 
justify spending the pooled money, whilst just 26% of the husbands felt this restriction.
The hypothesis of income pooling is difficult to test in a more formal manner 
than in Pahl’s study because of the absence o f data on intra-household allocation of 
resources. However, Lundberg et al. (1997) use a policy change in 1977-79 in the UK 
as a natural experiment to test the pooling hypothesis. Here, child benefit was changed 
from a tax relief on the father’s wage income to a cash payment, normally to the 
mother. Under the pooling hypothesis, this redistribution of income from husband to 
wife should have no effect on expenditure patterns. Using aggregated data on con­
sumption patterns from the FES for 1973-90, however, they find that the ratio of both 
children’s and women’s clothing to men’s clothing expenditure is significantly affected 
by dummies for different family sizes in the post-policy change period, indicating an 
increase in spending on both children’s and wives* clothing which is not compatible 
with complete pooling.
Given the doubts that are clearly justified about the prevalence of income 
pooling, it is treated as a testable hypothesis where possible in the later chapters of this 
thesis, rather than as an assumption.
10 1
The second important assumption made, mentioned in Section 3.1, is that the 
wife’s labour force decision is exogenous to that of the husband. This means that the 
husband is assumed not to take his wife’s labour supply decision into account in mak­
ing his own, whilst the wife does consider her husband’s labour supply in making her 
decision; this model is dubbed the ’Male Chauvinist* model of female labour supply by 
Killingsworth (1983).
In general, this is not a very appealing constraint to impose, although it is the 
most usual result found in empirical analyses of male labour supply where it is not im­
posed, but tested (see Pencavel, 1986). In the present situation, however, such results 
need to be relied on to a lesser extent than usual, since a substantial number o f men in 
the LSUS sample are out of work at each o f  the three principal dates, and can therefore 
be assumed to be genuinely constrained in their labour supply.
A third assumption made is that women choose their hours of work from three 
broad groupings - full-time, part-time, over ten hours and part-time, less than ten 
hours. This assumption is not entirely unrealistic. It has been argued in several places 
that there are strong reasons to believe that individuals decide on an acceptable range 
of hours and accept the first offer within this range. Blundell and Laisney (1988) cite 
institutional reasons as causing only certain hours of work to be offered in the French 
labour market. Dickens and Lundberg (1993) model the labour supply decision as a 
choice among a set o f jobs, each offering a fixed quantity of hours, and suggest that 
the validity o f the model of labour supply that assumes free choice of hours requires 
sufficient mobility between jobs. Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1989) mention both institu­
tional and technical reasons for hours grouping in Finland, and suggest that in many 
cases the only way to change hours o f work is to change job, which is costly, particu­
larly if the desired hours of work are outside the usual hours ranges, so that many indi­
viduals are likely to be observed out o f equilibrium. Zabalza et al. (1980) also empha­
size this point about the costs of changing jobs in order to adjust hours worked, noting 
that, in their British data set, hours worked are not bunched at kinks in the budget con­
straint, as would be expected if continuous adjustments were possible. Thus, the 
grouping o f hours may be seen as a convenient way of accounting for optimization er­
rors.
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The use of the LSUS data requires this assumption about hours grouping, but 
the particular assumptions made about the hours worked within each range - 37 for 
full-time work, 20 for high part-time hours and 7 for low part-time hours - are open to 
question. This must be borne in mind in interpreting results.
Finally, the full take-up of all benefits is assumed in the calculation of the total 
household income variables, and throughout the thesis. Several studies have shown 
that this is certainly an unrealistic assumption. Using 1984 data from the FES, Fry and 
Stark (1989) estimate an SB take-up rate of 81% for non-pensioners, while Blundell, 
et al. (1988) use the same data to estimate a take-up rate of standard HB of 60%. For 
both studies, non-take-up is found to be significantly related to both income and the 
level of entitlement.
The alternative to the assumption of full take-up, however, would be the pre­
diction of the take-up of benefits for each household for hours not actually worked by 
the wife, and the acceptance of the responses about receipt for the observed hours 
range of the wife. This would be problematic, since the system of housing benefit, for 
which take-up is clearly the greatest problem, was in the process of being changed at 
the time of the first interview of the LSU survey. Thus, the new system was not under­
stood by all recipients and the reported figures are therefore unreliable. The decision 
was therefore taken to assume full take-up in preference to its prediction. To the extent 
that women make decisions in the knowledge that there is a safety net that they can use 
if necessary, the assumption of full take-up is not inappropriate.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, the construction of variables for household income in various labour 
market states of the wife has been detailed, and the resulting variables judged to be ap­
propriate for the representation of the effect o f means testing on household income. 
Some surprising results emerging from the analysis of these income variables include:
• For the wives of men receiving only SB, the increase in median household income 
when hours increase from 20 hours per week to 37 hours per week is lower than 
expected, and not much more than the increase in median income when hours in­
crease from 7 hours per week to 20 hours per week, for example. I concluded that
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this is the result of the effect of the change in the basis on which HB is calculated 
to a less favourable one when SB entitlement is exhausted.
• For the wives o f men receiving UB, there is no noticeable effect on household in­
come at around the point where the dependant's allowance is withdrawn, at around 
7 hours per week. I concluded that this is because of the high number o f UB re­
ceivers also receiving SB.
Two families were chosen from the LSUS data, and their benefit entitlements 
examined, revealing striking disincentives to work, particularly for a woman with chil­
dren and in rented accommodation whose husband is not entitled to  UB.
rU
The effective average tax rates implied by means testing for each hours of work 
range was also calculated; again the analysis o f these variables indicated the blurring of 
the lines of distinction between UB and SB receivers.
Women’s perceptions of the financial benefits of working were also analysed, 
and found to reflect, at least to some extent, the reality of their financial situations, as 
measured by the variables for the effective tax rates implied by means testing.
Finally, the assumptions of income pooling, the exogeneity o f the wife’s labour 
supply to the husband’s, the choice between ranges of hours of work rather than a pre­
cise number of hours, and the full take-up o f benefits were discussed and justifications 
for them advanced where possible.
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4. A Fixed-Effects Model of the Labour Supply of the 
Wives of Unemployed Men
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, the LSUS data were inspected for evidence in support of the various hy­
potheses advanced in Section 1.1 as reasons for the absence of an added worker effect 
in aggregate data. Many of the features of the data noted there support the importance 
of one particular explanation - the Similar characteristics* hypothesis, which suggests 
that, because of assortative mating, husbands and wives share characteristics that ex­
plain the patterns of labour market behaviour observed for both of them. These data 
features include:
• The wives of men who exit their unemployment spells before the second interview 
are more likely to be added workers, as shown in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
• Even before their husbands* unemployment spells began, women married to men 
whose unemployment spells were shorter had higher rates of employment; again, 
this is clear from Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
• Women who worked before their husbands* sampled unemployment spells began 
show different labour market response patterns to that unemployment than those 
who did not work. In particular, they are more likely to be movers, so they are 
more likely to react to the unemployment at all. These points are indicated by Ta­
bles 2.4 to 2.7.
One possible explanation for these features of the data, and one that is the fo­
cus o f this chapter, is that women have characteristics that are persistent over time 
which determine their labour force behaviour, these characteristics may well be shared 
with their husbands. According to this explanation, the third point noted above, that a 
woman’s current labour market status apparently depends on the state previously oc­
cupied, may arise only because past labour market behaviour reflects the persistent un­
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observable factors that actually determine behaviour. Controlling for these persistent 
individual-specific effects is the appropriate approach in this case.
In this chapter, an econometric model is employed in analysing the LSUS data 
which allows for the possibility that individual-specific effects that are constant over 
time - fixed effects - determine a woman’s labour supply. An alternative to the incor­
poration of individual-specific effects into the model is the specification of a model of 
joint labour supply o f husband and wife, with couple-specific effects. Such a model is 
not useful here because, to the extent that it can be accepted that unemployment im­
plies rationing, the husbands in the LSUS data are constrained in their labour supply, so
*
that a model that treats the simultaneous choice of hours worked by husband and wife 
as a free one is inappropriate. Rather, the husband’s labour supply is better treated as 
given, and the decision of the wife in response to his labour supply modelled accord­
ingly.
The econometric model in question is the multinomial fixed effects conditional 
logit (FECL) model. The binomial version of this model has become a standard text­
book topic,1 but the multinomial version, proposed by Chamberlain (1980) has been 
used in few instances. The FECL model is outlined in Section 4.2. Section 4.2.1 ex­
plains the problems with estimating a fixed-effects model when the dependent variable 
is discrete. Section 4.2.2 details the solution presented by Chamberlain. Section 4.2.3 
outlines the advantages and disadvantages o f applying the model, while Section 4.2.4 
deals with the practical difficulties o f doing so.
Having outlined the econometric theory behind the model, Section 4.3 dis­
cusses its specification. Section 4.3.1 presents the discrete choice utility model that un­
derlies the econometric analysis and the variables that such a model suggests. The ap­
propriateness of these variables for inclusion in the FECL model is also assessed. Sec­
tion 4.3.2 discusses the inclusion and interpretation of both choice-specific and non- 
choice-specific variables in the FECL model.
In Section 4.4, the results o f a conditional logit model which pools the data 
from all three principal dates without taking account of fixed individual effects, are
1 See, for example, Greene (1997).
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presented. This model is used as a benchmark against which the FECL results can be 
compared. Section 4.5 presents and discusses the results o f the FECL model. Section
4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit Model
4.2.1 Fixed Effects in Discrete Choice Models
In the case of a model with a continuous dependent variable, fixed effects can be ac­
counted for by including a dummy variable/ a , for each individual, with linear regres­
sion yielding consistent estimates of the parameters of interest, p, as the number of in­
dividuals N  for a fixed number of time periods, T. The estimates of the fixed ef­
fects themselves are not consistent, but in the linear case the a  are independent of the 
p, so the inconsistency of the estimates of the incidental parameters, à , is not trans­
mitted to the maximum likelihood estimates of p.
In fact, where the dependent variable is continuous, the necessity of estimating 
the fixed effects can be eliminated by regressing yu -  y« on x * - x i , where yt and xi 
are the average values o f the dependent and independent variables for the individual. 
For T -  2 , this is equivalent to first differencing the variables.
However, it is not the case for discrete choice models that the inclusion of indi­
vidual-specific dummies will yield consistent estimates of the p, since the a  are not 
independent of the p. For the binary case, where
Prfyir = 1) = F(px*+ a )
and F  is a cumulative distribution function such as the unit normal or logistic, Cham­
berlain (1980) shows that
. - 7 - 1
Plim(T2 = -------a * ,W-H. 7
so that, as shown by Hsiao (1986), for T — 2,
Plimp = 2p.
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Clearly, the inclusion of individual-specific dummies is not appropriate in discrete 
choice models, at least when T is fixed.
4.2.2 C ham berlain’s Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit Model
Chamberlain (1980) has outlined a method o f eliminating fixed effects, ou, in discrete 
choice models which does yield consistent estimates for a fixed number of time peri­
ods, T. His proposal is based on a suggestion made by Andersen (1970) for a consis­
tent estimator o f the parameters o f interest, p, in the presence of the incidental pa­
rameters, ou, for non-linear models. Andersen showed that if a minimum sufficient 
statistic sì for the ou exists that is not dependent on p, then maximizing the joint den­
sity of the yi conditional on P and on the sufficient statistics will give consis­
tent estimates of the structural parameters, p.
For the logit model, such sufficient statistics exist, while they do not exist for 
the probit, for example. The sufficient statistics for the ou for the logit model are:
=  (4.2)
t
where wuj = 1 if ya = j  and vt%- = 0 otherwise, yu being the dependent variable for 
individual i at time t and the individual being observed in one of states j  = 1,.., J . The 
conditional likelihood does not depend on the incidental parameters, so the ou do not 
have to be estimated.
The example often given to illustrate the FECL model is the case of two time 
periods, t - 1,2 and a binomial choice between states a and b at each date. Then, a 
sequence (a,b) entails wtu = 1, wnb = 0 , wn« = 0 , and wnb = 1. If s* = 0 , then it 
must be the case that sa* = 2 , while if sut =  2 , then su> = 0 , so that for individuals who 
do not change state between the two dates, s* implies the value o f s& and vice versa. 
Thus, only individuals with a sequence which entails s«» = 1 and su> = 1 contribute to 
the likelihood function. The probability o f observing a choice sequence (a,b) condi­
tional on su, for those individuals who contribute to the likelihood is:
Pr[(a,6)Isifl =  I,s* =  l]=  Pr[(a,f?)l(a,£) or (b,a)]
_____________ PlfWtla =  1] » Pr[Wi2i> =  1]___________
Pr[vtwo = 1] • Pr[w/2i — 1] + Pr[mi* = 1] * Pr[w/2<i = 1)
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Dropping the individual subscript and substituting the logistic function into the expres­
sion, this becomes
exp(pxi + or)_________ 1______
1 + exp(pxi + a) 1 +  exp(Px2 + or)
exp(Pxi + g ) + exp(Px2 4- a)
[l + exp(Pxi + a )] ■ [l + exp(pX2 + a )]
______ exp(pxi + a)______
exp(pxi + a )  +  exp(Px2 +  a )
_  1 Jr
1 + exp[p[(x2 + a )  -  (xi + a)]]
1
l+expiP(x2 -x i)]
Similarly, it can be shown that
Prl(b,a)\(a,b) or (b,a)) =  exP ^ Xi~ X|)l 
' J 1 +exp[(i(X2 -x i) ]
(4.2)
(4.3)
In this case, the FECL model reduces to a binomial logit model estimated only 
over those who make transitions, with an individual's outcome coded one if her transi­
tion is (b,a) and coded zero if the transition is (a, 6 ). and with the explanatory vari­
ables entered as differences.
The above two period, binomial choice case demonstrates the logit equivalent 
of first differencing to eliminate fixed effects in the linear m odel However, this case is 
not very general. For the LSUS data, there are more than two time periods and more 
than two choices of state. Moreover, for reasons that become clear in Section 4.3.1, a 
model with choice-specific variables is appropriate. Such a case is detailed here; other 
cases are outlined in Appendix B.
With three time periods, / = 1,2,3 and three states, j  = a . t . c ,  an observed se­
quence of (a,b,b) implies that wn* = 1, w/i* = 0 , wnc =  0 ,  w u  =  0 , win — 1, 
woe =  0 , wi3a = 0 ,  wat =  1 and wnc = 0 .  Hence, ¿w = 1 , 5» =  2 , sk =  0 .  Then
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Pr[(a,b,b)\su, = 1,su> =  2 =  0] =  PT[(a,b,b)\(atb,b) or (b,atb) o r (btb,a)]2
___________________ Pr[m»a = 1] • Pr[wm =  1] ♦ Pr[wi3j> = 1 ] ________________
Prfwtifl = l] • Pr[w,2A = 1] • Pr[wi3fr - 1 ]  +  Pr[w;ii> = 1] • Pr[wi2a = 1] ■ Pr[w«3* = 1] :
+ Pr[vwi* = 1] • Pr[wi2i = 1] • Prlw.-ja = I]
“
exp(pxi<r+a) + exp(px2*+a)+exp(px3* + a)
[exp(pxu. + a) + exp(pxit+a) + exp(Pxic+ a)] * [exp(Px2* + a)+exp(pX2*+a)
+ exp(px2i+a)] * [exp(px3«+a)+exp(Px3* + a) + exp(pX3C + a)]
[expCpxia+a) • cxp(Px2*+a) • exp(Px3*+ a)]+[exp(pxu>+a) • exp(px2- + a)
* cxp(Px»+a)]+[expCPxi*+a) • exp(Px»+ a) • exp(px3fl + a)]
[exp(Pxu + a) + exp(Pxi*+a)+exp(px«c+a)] * [exp(Px2*+a) + exp(Px2*+ a)
+ exp(Px2c+a)] • [exp(pX3o + a)+cxp(px3b+ a)+exp(Pxsc + a)]
cxp[p(xu + xu+ X3*)+3a]
exp[p(xi« +  xu + X3b) + 3a]+ exp[p(xi*+ xu + X3 *)+3a]+ exp[p(xu> + xib + X3«)+ 3a]
_____________ _______ CXp[p(Xl< + Xlb + X 3 » )]______________
exp[p(xin + xib + x^b)] + exp[P(xifr + X2« + x3*)]+ exp[p(xi*+ X2* + X3«)]
Similarly,
Pr[(b,atb)\(afb,b) or (bta,b) or (b,bya)] =
______ ____________exp[P(xifr + X2a + X3fc)]___________________
eXptP(Xla + X2i + X»)] + eXp[p(Xl* + X2a + X3i)] + eXp[p(Xl6 + Xlb + X3a)]
¡?T[(b,bta)\(a,btb) or (bfa,b) or (b,b*a)] =
______ ____________exp[p(xi» + X2* + X3a)]__________________  (f.G)
exp[p(xu + X2* + X3*)] + CXp[p(Xl» + X u  + X»)] + cxp[p(xi* + X2* + X3a)]
pr[(c,b,b)\(c*b,b) or (byctb) or (byb,c)] =
___________________ exp[p(xic + X2» + X3*)]___________________ (4.7)
exp[p(xit + xw + X3*)] + exp[p(xi* + X2e + xib)] + exp[P(xii + X2* + x3c)]
(4.4)
{4.5)
2 The possible sequences with s» = 1 are: (a ,¿ ,6 ) , (a ,c ,c ) , (b ,a ,b) (c ,a ,c ), (b .b ,a )t (c ,c ,a ), 
(a, b, c ) , (a, c, b ) , (b, a. c ) , (c, a ,b ) , (byc, a) and (c, bt a ) . Those with s» ** 2 are: (a, bf b) t 
(c .b .b ) ,  (b .b .a ). (b .b .c ) .  (b,c.b ) and (bta .b ). Those with s* =  0 are: (a .b .b ), (b ,a ,b )f 
(btb ,a ), (b .a .o ) . (a ,bt a) and (a ,a ,6). Thus, the sequences that satisfy all three conditioning re- 
quirements are (a , bt b ) , (b. b,a) and (b. a, b ) .
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and so on.
At first glance, the likelihood contribution of any individual appears similar to 
that in a multinomial logit model with a sequence of choices as the dependent variable, 
rather than the choice at one date. But the alternatives over which the denominator is 
summed are different than would be the case if such a model were estimated, since 
some potential choice sequences are excluded; here only those sequences with the 
same sy as the observed sequence are included in the denominator. This leads to the 
following log likelihood function:
i
\
y
(4.8)
where B i (dtu„.ydTj)\dj = 0 or 1; £dtf = l; 2 d * = JÿJ
is the set of sequences with the same s>j as the one chosen by individual i. The maxi­
mization of this expression yields consistent estimates of the p parameters.
The binomial version of the FECL model has been applied in several cases in 
the literature, by Bjorklund (1985) to mental health, by Cecchetti (1986) to price in­
creases and by Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) to the labour force participation of 
married women. The multinomial model has been applied by Bôrsch-Supan (1990) and 
Bôrsch-Supan and PoIIakowski (1990) to housing choices, in terms o f both size and 
tenure, and by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) to the choice by the parents of single 
mothers as to whether to make transfers to them and/or choose co-residence with 
them.
4.2 .3  Advantages and Disadvantages o f the Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit 
Model
The above description of the fixed effects conditional logit model is useful for under­
standing some desirable and undesirable features of the model. First, it should be noted 
that only those who make a transition contribute to the likelihood function, so that in­
formation on those who make no transition is not used. Thus, if there is no heteroge­
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neity, the estimator is inefficient. The appropriate test for heterogeneity is discussed in 
Section 4.5.2.
Secondly, time invariant variables are differenced out, so that their effects can* 
not be estimated. This turns out to be an important restriction on the variables which 
may validly be included in the model, as discussed in Section 4.3.1.
Third, the model excludes the possibility of true state dependence; this can be 
seen using the example of the multinomial FECL described by Equations 4.4 to 4.7. 
There it was shown that
Pr[(6,<z, fr)l(a,fr,6) or (b,a,b) or (b,bta)] =?
_______________________eXp[ft(Xl* +  Xla + X3*)]_____________ '________
[exp[P(xia +  X2b + X3*)]]+ [exp[P(xi* +  X2<*+ X3 »)]]+ [exp[P(xi*+ X2* + xm)]]
__________________exp[p(xu+ X2»+ x » )]+ exp[p(xi* + X2*+ X3«)]____________
[exp[p(xia + X2t> +  X3fc)]]+ [exp[p(xu> +  xu  + X3*)]]+[exp[p(xi* + X2* + X3«)]]
= \-'Pr[(a,b,b)Ka,btb),(b,a,b) or (btb,a)]-ì>T[{btb,a)\(a,bfb)t(b,a,b) or (b,b,a)]
This means that the effect of a variable on the probability o f having a particular 
sequence of transitions is constrained by its relationship with other transition sequences 
which entail the same sij, rather than being determined by the initial state. This can be 
seen very clearly in the case of the two period binomial model o f Equations 4.2 and 
4.3, the effect of a variable on the probability o f a transition from a to b is constrained 
to be the opposite o f its effect on the probability of a transition from a to b, since
Pr[(a,&)l(<2,fc) or {b,a)] =  1 -  Pr[(£,n)l(a,£) or (£,«)].
The difficulty o f estimating a model that accounts both for fixed individual ef­
fects and state dependence is discussed in Section 5.2.1.
There is an alternative to the assumption that the individual-specific effects are 
fixed. This is that the (x are a random sampling from a standard normal distribution, in 
which case the appropriate model is the random effects probit one. A priori, this is a 
more attractive model than the fixed effects one, since it does not involve discarding 
data, and it is more consistent to treat both the error term and the individual effects as 
random, rather than treating one type of unknown as random and the other as fixed.
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However, there are two issues that arise that militate against its use in this 
context First, whereas in the fixed effects model, there is no restriction on the correla­
tion between a  and x*, in the random effects model the form of any correlation must 
be specified; the model is realistic only if the possible correlation between a  and xa is 
accounted for, which entails making assumptions about the form of the relationship 
between them, typically that
r
C6 = X )ttt +  77.,
r-1
so that E(a\xi) is linear, and 7), is normally distributed and independent of xz. Thus,
*
the assumption that the ou are fixed is replaced with an assumption about the func­
tional form of the relationship between the cc and the xz, which does not appear to be 
any more attractive. And secondly, the difficulties of estimating a multinomial probit 
model, due to the necessity of calculating multiple integrals, are well known.
4.2.4 Applying the FECL Model to the Multinomial Case
It is clear from the specification of the likelihood function for the multinomial FECL 
model, given by Equation 4.8, that the number of terms which must be calculated in 
the denominator increases geometrically with both the number of choices, 7, and the 
number of time periods, T. It can also be shown that the computational burden in­
creases in 7 faster than in T. For example, for J  -  3 and T = 3 , up to six terms must 
be calculated for the denominator, whilst a model with J -  4 and T -  3 requires the 
calculation of up to eighteen terms and one with 7  = 3 and T = 4 means calculating 
up to twelve terms per individual.
The complexity of the likelihood function has meant that routines for the esti­
mation of binomial FECL models with many time periods ( T > 6), or of any multino­
mial FECL models, have not been included in the commonly available statistical soft­
w are.3 Although very recently, a powerful recursive algorithm for the maximization of 
the conditional likelihood has been applied to the fixed effects model,4 making the es­
3 Hence, Giannelli and Micklewright (1993) propose the use of an alternative, non-minimal sufficient 
statistic for the a  which allows the estimation of a binomial model with many periods using common 
software packages.
4 In STATA 5.0, released in September, 1996.
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timation of the model for long panels feasible, to date this algorithm has been used only 
for the extension o f the binomial model to more periods rather than to more states, so 
for the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to program the contribution of the likeli­
hood for each individual for the particular case of J  = 4 and T = 3 . This program, 
used with STATA's ml maximum likelihood maximization routine, is included in Ap­
pendix C.
4.3 Model Specification and Interpretation
£
4.3.1 Model Specification
The economic model underlying a discrete choice specification o f labour market be­
haviour of married women is:
W = /(y*, IqJK  Z/) (4.9)
where un is the utility o f the wife at time t and in labour market state y, ytj is total 
household income at time t and in state j  o f the wife, Ç  is the leisure of the wife in 
state j, if is the number of hours o f leisure o f the husband, and Zt is a vector of per­
sonal and household demographic characteristics.
In order to focus on the effects of different types o f household income on util­
ity, total household income at time t and in labour market state j  o f the wife may be 
usefully decomposed as follows:
y ^ y f + y ?
where yj"4* is that part o f household income which is endogenous to the wife’s labour 
supply, and y "  is the household income exogenous to the wife's labour supply.
y™1 can be further divided into the part of endogenous income that the wife 
receives, y ^ (w), essentially her wage income in state j  plus any unemployment pay­
ments to which she is entitled if not working,3 and the part that the husband receives, 
y*nd(k) ' w)1|c|1 amounts to any means-tested benefit income paid to him, including the
3 Recall from Section 3.4 that any unemployment payments to the wife are treated as exogenous to the 
husband’s entitlement to benefits.
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UB dependant’s allowance, SB and HB, where receivable. The advantage of this fur­
ther decomposition of endogenous income is that it allows a focus on means-tested 
income. If there is complete intra-household income sharing, then and y ^ (w)
should have equal effects on a wife’s labour supply.
The income components which are exogenous to the wife’s labour supply may 
also be decomposed further in order to allow a focus on the effects of benefits, and, by 
using a comparison with y ^ {k\  on any difference between the effects o f means-tested 
and non-means-tested benefits:
. v«tVr)it ~~ y% ~ T ft
where y'x(b~') is exogenous income coming from unemployment payments, which 
amounts to the part of UB which does not depend on the wife’s labour supply and 
y "<",v) is other exogenous income, which includes the husband’s wage income, if any, 
and other household non-labour income such as interest from savings, child benefit and 
FIS. Thus, some benefit income - that which is not related to the husband’s unem­
ployment - is included in y“ (n/r). The components of y"  are defined in this way so that 
y'z{nly) is comparable with the definition of the wife’s non-labour income that is usually 
used in studies of female labour supply.
In considering the wives of the unemployed, the specification of utility which is 
of particular interest is, therefore:
utj = ƒ  (ly + l?+ y?tlw) + yZd(h)+y;i(b~) + y « a*) + *) (4J0)
However, an examination of the likelihood function given by Equation 4.8 makes it 
clear that, since the denominator of the relevant likelihood function is summed across 
the choices, j, non-choice-specific variables fall out of the probability. Note that y " , 
/,* and zt do not vary with the choice of state, y "  by definition, the demographic 
characteristics because they are individual-specific and the leisure of the husband be­
cause it is assumed that the wife’s labour supply is exogenous to the husband’s labour 
supply decision, so the husband’s labour supply is fixed at the actual number of hours 
observed; it does not vary according to the wife’s labour supply.6 On the other hand,
6 This assumption is discussed in Section 3.7.
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both endogenous household income, y'"*, and the leisure of the wife, l* , are clearly 
choice-specific.
The solution which allows variables that do not inherently vary with the choices 
to be included, described in Greene (1997) and used, for example, in Borsch-Supan 
(1990), is to create a set of dummies for the choices and multiply them by each of the 
individual-specific variables. Of course, in this case, a set o f interactions between one 
of the /ÿ and the non-choice-specific variables must be omitted to avoid perfect multi- 
collinearity in the model.
This leads to an estimated model of the form:
U, =  +  i ; [ y r ^  +  y,“ 1””  + +  * ]) (‘t i l )
where y>~ j  if utj > ua for all k *  j . It is important to note that the choice-specific 
constant, /* , where not multiplied by another variable, drops out o f the estimation. In 
a cross-section model of labour supply, this constant can be interpreted as the disutility 
of the hours of work associated with each regime. Here, assuming that the disutility of 
each regime is constant over time for any one individual, this effect becomes absorbed 
into the fixed effects, the ou, which are not estimated. The possibility that the disutility 
of work changes over time can be allowed for; Borsch-Supan and Pollakowski (1990) 
do so, in the context of housing decisions, by including two choice-specific constants 
which summarize the 60 possible choice-specific alternative sequences.
A final point is that real values of all money variables are used in each of the 
models presented in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 below; the real values are obtained using the 
relevant values of the consumer prices index.
The terms which enter Equation 4.11 directly are interpreted as having a direct 
effect on utility; thus, both ye^ (h) and y ^ iw} are expected to have positive coeffi­
cients, being income variables. On the other hand, the terms which must be interacted 
with the choice-specific constants l" are interpreted in terms of their effects on the 
utility the individual gets from being in a given state /J ', and therefore in terms of the 
probability of being in that state. Thus, y "  is expected to have negative coefficients 
for choices entailing positive hours o f work and the coefficient on /* may be either
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positive or negative, depending on whether /* and arc complements or substitutes 
for the wife.
Specifying the model according to Equation 4.11 entails the assumption that 
income that is endogenous to the wife’s labour supply is separable from leisure, since 
the utility gained from y does not depend on the number o f hours she works to gen­
erate that income. For the other income sources, the necessity of multiplying by the 
choice-specific constants so that they will not drop out of the estimation means that 
this assumption can be tested. If income and leisure are indeed separable, the results
can be expected to show statistically indistinguishable coefficients for the effect of y"
»•*
on the probability of working full-time, and its effect on working part-time, for exam­
ple.
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics fo r variables used in the fixed effects conditional logit model
Variable Mean
(All)
Mean
(FECL)
Standard
Deviation
Between Group 
Standard Dev.
Within Group 
Standard Dev.
end{w) F _ T  
J tj 56.65 55.00 26.73 25.10 9.26
P-T>10 35.27 33.82 15.17 14.15 5.50
P-T<10 14.15 13.67 7.28 6.85 2.49
None 0.83 1.20 5.34 3.33 4.18
end(h) ¥ T  
*tj 8.69 7.86 12.73
9.49 8.49
P-T>10 16.19 14.04 17.41 12.23 12.40
P-T<10 27.23 23.16 23.61 15.38 17.92
None 32.89 11S1 27.10 17.01 21.12
ex(ben)
y t 6.90 7.00 11.20 4.64 10.19
vm (»w 51.23 58.89 68.33 43.17 52.99
Wife's Age 36.1 36.8 10.94 10.93 0.47
(Wife's Age)2 1434 1473 840.83 840.96 36.34
No. Children Aged 0-4 0.48 0.34 0.61 0.59 0.19
No. Children Aged > 4 0.84 0.82 1.02 1.00 0.22
Local Unemployment 14.02 13.76 3.31 3.22 0.76
Husband at Work 0.35 0.42 0.49 0.25 0.43
Notes: All columns refer to the subset of the data used for the FECL estimation, except Column 1, 
which refers to the whole sample. All money variables are measured in pounds.
Table 4.1 presents some summary statistics for the variables proposed for in­
clusion in the FECL model. Because the estimation of the effect o f a variable in this
1 1 7
j
model requires variation both between individuals (between-group variation) and for a 
given individual over time (within-group variation), the table reports these sources o f 
variation separately, as well as overall variation.
The between-group standard deviation is calculated as the standard deviation of 
Xi, the average of xu over time for each woman. The within-group measure is the 
standard deviation o f (xu -  xi + x ) , where f  is the average over all observations; thus,
m
it gives the variation of each woman’s deviation from her mean. The means given in 
Column 2 are for the individuals used in the estimation of the FECL model, all o f 
whom make at least one transition between principal dates, whilst those given in Col­
umn 1 are for all individuals in the LSUS data. Thus, a comparison o f these columns 
indicates differences between the whole sample and the estimation sample.
The table raises several interesting points. First, if the degree of variation in
is examined, it is clear that, for each hours range, there is very little within- 
group variation.7 8 This is because o f the manner in which the wage variable must be 
constructed for those women not working at a particular date. As indicated in Section 
3.2.1, in order to make the wage variable as accurate as possible, particularly given the 
absence of information on education levels, information on wage inflation was used to 
extrapolate the gross wage rate from dates at which a woman worked to dates at 
which she did not work. Since most women in the sample used in the estimation of 
Chamberlain’s fixed effects model make transitions between working and not working 
rather than between working states, the within-group variation in wages is the same for 
many women, the variation having been generated using the rate of wage inflation. 
There is little genuine variation over time in the wage variables.9
A second variable for which Table 4.1 raises concerns is y*x{bm). Here, the 
between-group standard deviation is low, and the within-group measure accounts for 
much of the overall variation. The problem here is that this variable is very nearly a
7 J  is added to make the results comparable.
* Its value for zero hours o f work might be regarded as an exception; this is because of the addition of 
any unemployment payments received by the wife for this status.
9 420 women make transitions o f some kind between the key date and the second interview. Of these, 
81 (19%) work at all three dates; these women are making transitions between working states. For 
these women, the variation over time is likely to differ from the rate o f wage inflation.
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dummy; apart from some small amount of allowances for children, it is identical for all 
those entitled to receive it. The implications of this for its inclusion in estimated models 
is returned to in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
The most striking result included in the table, however, is the decomposition of 
the standard deviation for age. This variable has no within-group deviation. Although 
time-varying, age varies to exactly the same extent for each individual in the sample. 
Each individual is obviously one year older at the second interview than at the first, and 
has the same age at the first interview as at the key date. Age2 does have some small 
degree of within-group variation, since its relationship with calendar time is non-linear, 
but this is a small component of the overall variation in the variable.
Clearly, age is not suitable for inclusion as a variable in an FECL model, since, 
in such a model it captures calendar time rather than that which it purports to repre­
sent. On the other hand, Borsch-Supan (1990), Bdrsch-Supan and Pollakowski (1990) 
and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) all include age and its square as variables in FECL 
models, also using data sets with observations at fixed intervals. It is only because of 
the necessity of multiplying by choice-specific dummies, and the concomitant necessity 
to exclude the interaction between age and one of the choices, here ‘not at work*, to 
avoid perfect multicollinearity, that any variation in the contribution to the likelihood 
of individuals is generated, so that the model can be estimated. But even if the model 
can be estimated, the results for age are not meaningful.
The variables for the number of children also show little within-group variation. 
Clearly, the number of children in a certain age group varies little over time for a given 
woman. The time variation in these variables is generated by children leaving an age 
group by getting older, by children who are four years old at the first interview be­
coming five years old by the second, and, for the ‘children aged 0-4* variable, by 
women giving birth. Finally, the local rate of unemployment does not, apparently, 
change significantly over time, its variation being dominated by the between-groups 
component.
In comparing the first two columns of the table, some indications of selectivity 
into the group over which estimation is carried out are evident. Women in the FECL 
sample have fewer pre-school children than in the whole sample, as might be expected.
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since» by definition, all the women who make a transition during the survey period 
work at one of the principal dates. Moreover, the mean values for the ‘husband at 
work1 variables show that their husbands are less likely to be out of work, a point 
which is also reflected in their consistently lower average level of y ' nd{h). On the other 
hand, they also have a consistently lower level of potential wage income, y™*'*’, indi­
cating that the selectivity issue may not be important.
4.3.2 Mode! Interpretation
An important point concerns the interpretation of the estimates. As is the case for all 
non-linear models, the coefficient on a variable does not represent the marginal effect 
of an increase in the value of the variable. While it is possible to calculate the marginal 
effect of Xtj on the probability of having a given sequence o f choices, say P(a,b,b)t 
this is not very useful for the interpretation o f coefficients in a general way. Instead, 
the fact that the P are consistent estimates o f the multinomial conditional logit coeffi­
cients when there is unobserved heterogeneity can be used. Since
P(y = j) =
exp(Pxtf)
Xexp(px/>)
j
then
and
dP,j _  [Z^exp(Pw )][Pexp(Pw )]-[exp(|it,)lPexp(Pn/)]
[ Z yexp(pw)]2
= p p „ - p [ /v ] 2 (4.12)
dPt)
dx.ii
-  [exp(pifl) J p  exp(Px»)]
[Zyexp(P*</)]
= -fiPtjPtk for k *  J .
Note that the marginal effects for all states may be computed.
For non-choice specific variables, the coefficients are the same as would be 
obtained in a multinomial logit model, so their interpretation is based on:
(4.13)
12 0
Inspection of Equation 4.13 shows that, for non-choice-specific variables, the calcula­
tion of the marginal effects is particularly important because the sign on the coefficient 
may be reversed when the marginal effects are calculated, indicating that even the di­
rection of the effect cannot be seen from the sign of the coefficient
For non-choice-specific variables, since the normalization that /?o = 0 is used, 
the marginal effects give the change in the probability of being in the relevant state 
compared to the probability of being in the benchmark state, j  = 0 . Typically, the 
benchmark state is the most commonly observed one, as is the case here, so the mar­
ginal effects reported in the remainder of the chapter are for the change in the prob- 
ability of being in the relevant state compared to the probability of not working.
For both choice-specific and non-choice specific variables, the above partial 
derivatives are valid only for continuous variables. To calculate the effect of a dummy 
variable, the probability o f being in a particular state, j 3 is calculated at the mean of the 
values of the other variables, with the dummy set equal to zero, and then with the 
dummy set equal to one; the difference in the probabilities then gives the effect of 
‘switching on’ the dummy for the average woman.
4.4 Results from a Pooled Conditional Logit Model
Before presenting the results of the FECL model, the results from a pooled model of 
the labour supply of the wives of the unemployed men surveyed in the LSUS are out­
lined here. ‘Pooling’ entails combining the data on all individuals from all three princi­
pal dates. A multinomial conditional logit model is then estimated on these data. When 
a pooled model is used, no account is taken o f the fact that there may be a correlation 
between the three observations contributed by each woman.
There are two reasons for estimating a pooled model as well as the FECL 
model. One is that it is useful for the purposes of comparison, to examine what 
changes, if any, are brought about by accounting for fixed individual effects. To this 
end, it would also be possible to run cross-section conditional logit models separately 
for each of the three principal dates. But the pooled model is useful for the further rea­
son that, in the absence of heterogeneity, the FECL model is less efficient than the 
pooled one because it does not use the information that a  = a , and it typically uses a
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subset of the same data, and so it is the pooled model that is suitable for comparison 
using a Hausman test, as discussed in Section 4.5.2.
Table 4.2. Results fo r  the pooled conditional logit model. Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets.
Non-Choice- Full-Time Part-Time > 10 Hours Part-Time < 1 0  Hours
Specific Variables Coefficient 
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
ex(ben)
■'l
0.0100 
(2.10)
0.0010 0.0179
(3.94)
0.0021 0.0201
(2.86)
0.0008
y t
-0.0092
(-6.42)
-0.0013 -0.0039
(-3-55)
-0.0003 -0.0008
(-0.61)
0.0001
Wife’s Age 0.2644 
(7.88)
0.0308 .0.3220 
r (8.52)
0.0370 0.1613
(2.97)
0.0038
(Wife’s Age)2
•r 100
-0.3771
(-8.61)
-0.0457 -0.3759
(-8.03)
-0.0418 -0.1968'
(-2.85)
-0.0044
Number Children 
Aged< 1
-2.4002
(-8.02)
-0.2940 -2.1862
(-5.18)
-0.2379 -13595
(-3.41)
-0.0346
Number Children 
Aged 1-4
-1.8498
(-13.59)
-0.2503 -0.7497
(-6.70)
-0.0633 -0.2351
(-1.84)
0.0063
Number Children 
Aged > 4
-0.7660
(-12.43)
-0.1086 -0.0943
(-2.02)
0.0020 0.0218
(0.32)
0.0069
Husband at Work 1.4901
(9.05)
0.1288 1.1689
(7.87)
0.1006 0.8647
(4.25)
0.0258
Husband’s Bad 
Unemp. History
-0.0695
(-2.62)
-0.0089 -0.0596
(-2.25)
-0.0067 0.0056
(0.16)
0.0011
Constant -6.1533
(-10.13)
- -8.7105
(-11.87)
— -6.2500
(-6.23)
-
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient t-Statistic
F-T
Marginal Effects x 102 
P-T >  10 P-T < 10 None
end{w)
y ij 0.0274 (13.31)
0.3376 0.3178 0.1252 0.6018
end(h)
y ti
0.0004 (0.12) 0.0043 0.0041 0.0016 0.0077
No. Observations: 5111 Pseudo-R2: 0.398 Log Likelihood: -4214.3
Notes: All money amounts are in pounds. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample probability of 
occupying the relevant state. Here, Pr(FT) = 0.144, Pd.PT > 10) = 0.134 and Pr(PT < 10) *» 0.048.
The results o f the pooled model are shown in Table 4.2. The first point to note 
about the model presented here is that it includes variables that are not time varying - 
in particular, it includes the number o f times that the husband had been unemployed in 
the five years prior to his sampled unemployment spell, as well as the wife’s age and its 
square. Since no account is taken o f fixed effects here, there is no necessity for the
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variables to vary with time. The model presented here was selected according to the 
results of a series of LR tests.
Income Variables
Whilst some of the results shown in the table conform to the expectations outlined in 
Section 4.3.1 above, others clearly do not. y the wage (and unemployment pay­
ment) income of the wife has a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient, 
indicating, as anticipated, that income received by the wife has a positive effect on her 
utility.
The marginal effects columns show^that this income is also a fairly important 
determinant of a woman’s labour supply. The marginal effects on full-time work and 
high part-time hours of work are of similar size, and indicate that, for an increase in 
wage income of £3 per week, and for a woman with the average probability of working 
either full-time or high part-time hours, the probability of her choosing the relevant 
hours range increases by about 1 point. For a woman working part-time, this entails a 
larger proportional increase in her wage than for a full-time worker, but it is, nonethe­
less, a relatively small increase required to induce this effect. The effect of wage in­
come on the average woman’s probability of working low part-time hours is smaller, 
with a £7 increase in weekly income required to increase her probability o f working in 
this hours range by 1 percentage point, which is, proportionately speaking, a large in­
crease in wage income. But this is a result of the construction of the model, in particu­
lar the assumption implicit in the use o f one choice-specific variable for wage within a 
conditional logit structure, that income and leisure are separable, a point which was 
discussed in Section 4.3.1; this must be taken into account in interpreting these results. 
The effect of an increase in the income to the wife when not working on the probability 
of not working is larger; giving £2 to a woman who has the average probability of not 
working to stay out of the labour force increases her probability of not working by 
over 1 point
The wage income a woman receives has the expected effect on labour supply. 
On the other hand, means-tested benefit income received by the husband but deter­
mined by his wife’s labour supply, y£d{h), appears to have no effect on the labour sup­
ply of the wife. The coefficient is positive, but completely insignificant
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A possible explanation for this result is that unobserved individual effects are 
counteracting the effect of means-tested benefit income on labour supply. This expla­
nation would suggest that the higher utility from higher income is offset by the fact that 
men who receive more means-tested benefit income at the first interview are those who 
do not qualify for UB, and are likely to be less attached to the labour market, and by 
extension, if their wives share these characteristics, they get greater than average disu­
tility from working. Since this unobserved ‘taste for work* is controlled for in the 
FECL model, it can be expected that this result will not hold in that model.
By the same token, the results for y ^ iw) may over-state its effect. For wages,
e
the unobserved taste factor works in the same direction as the positive effect o f income 
on utility, since women with higher taste for work may both earn higher wages and be 
more likely to be observed working, all other things being equal. Thus, a reduction in 
the importance of y ^ * 0 may be expected in the results of the FECL model.
The positive effect of unemployment benefit income that is not means-tested, 
yx{bfn)  ^ js ak 0 unexpected. In this case, the points raised in Section 4.3.1 regarding the 
suitability of this variable for inclusion in an FECL model are relevant also to under­
standing this result. There, it was pointed out that this variable is effectively a dummy 
for the receipt of UB by the husband. This explains the positive effect reported in Table
4.2, even though a priori it is anticipated that the wife would regard this as unearned 
income, yielding a negative effect on the probability of working. In fact, this variable is 
capturing similarities in characteristics between husbands and wives, whereby men en­
titled to UB, and hence their wives, have better employment characteristics than those 
men not entitled to i t
The final income variable included in the model, non-labour income, y"**^, 
does show the expected sign, with significant negative effects on the probability of the 
wife choosing to work full-time or high part-time hours. The marginal effects show 
that the effect of this variable is relatively small in economic terms, although it is sig­
nificantly different from zero.
Demographic Variables
Turning to the demographic variables, the age variables show that the older a woman 
is, the more likely she is to choose to work positive hours rather than zero hours. It is
124
important to note, however, that the effect of the age variable is quadratic, and in each 
case, the negative effect of age2 begins to dominate well within the values of age ob­
served in the sample. Thus, if a woman is aged over 35 years, she is less likely to work 
full-time than not at all, and less likely to work high or low part-time hours if she is 
over 43 and 41 years respectively.
The negative effects of the number of pre-school children in the household are 
large, particularly for the higher hours ranges, and strongly significant. As would be 
expected, the number of children aged under one year old has a larger effect than the 
number of children aged between one and four years, which in turn has a larger effect 
than the number of older children in the households; the negative effect o f older chil­
dren on the probability of working full-time is o f a similar size to the effect of children 
aged one to four on the probability of working high part-time hours.
Husband's Labour Market History
The variable for the husband having had a bad history of prior unemployment also has 
a significant negative effect on the probability o f the wife working in the higher hours 
ranges. The marginal effects of these variables indicate that the probability of a wife 
working these hours is reduced by up to 1 percentage point for every extra spell of un­
employment that her husband has had in the five years prior to his sampled unemploy­
ment spell. The significance of this variable indicates the importance of similarities in 
characteristics between husband and wife in explaining the labour supply of the wives 
of the unemployed. It should be noted here that it does not seem likely that the differ­
ence in the effect on employment probabilities between a husband having had no spells 
of unemployment and having had one spell would be the same as that between four and 
five spells, for example. However, when changes are made to the specification in an 
attempt to reflect this likely non-linearity of the effect, the performance o f the model is 
worse.10
10 In comparing non-nested models, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used. This is given by: 
AIC =  - L  + K , where L  is the log likelihood and K  is the number of parameters to be estimated. The 
preferred model is that for which the AIC  is smallest
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Husband's Job Status
Finally, one of the most striking results of the table is the strong positive effect of the 
husband's being at work on the probability o f the wife working. The marginal effects 
are very high, indicating that this dummy being 'switched on* increases the probability 
of the average woman of working full-time by nearly 13 points, and of her working 
high part-time hours by about 10 points. Since fixed effects are not accounted for in 
this model, it seems most likely that this result is due to strong similarities in charac­
teristics between husbands and wives, rather than strong complementarity of leisure 
times, but it is not possible to distinguish between these two reasons using a pooled 
model. f
4.5 Results from a Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit Model
4.5.1 Results
In order to disentangle the effects o f the persistent characteristics that a woman has 
that determine her labour supply from the effects of changes in the household situation, 
fixed effects are accounted for using the FECL model. The results of that model are 
given in Table 4.3.
Income Variables
The most striking thing about these results is how similar they are, in qualitative terms, 
to the results of the pooled model presented in the previous section. For the income 
variables which are o f greatest interest here, the results for endogenous income are 
very similar. y ^ {w) has a positive coefficient which is significant at all usual levels of 
confidence, albeit much less significant than for the pooled model This lower level of 
significance is expected, as suggested in Section 4.4, since a pooled model is likely to 
overstate the importance of a wage variable.
The marginal effect of y ^ lw) on the probability of a woman choosing any of 
the hours ranges is very close to those detailed in the previous section. Thus, a £3-£4 
rise in weekly income will increase a woman’s probability o f choosing full-time or high 
part-time hours by around 1 percentage point. Again, the rise in weekly income neces­
sary to increase a woman’s probability o f working low part-time hours is much higher -
12 6
iA  i * l J
about £10, which entails a very large increase in hourly income. A £2 payment for not 
working will increase a woman’s probability of choosing that state by about 1 point, 
however.
Table 4.3. Results fo r  the multinomial fixed effects conditional logit model Asymptotic t-statistics in 
brackets.
Non-Choice- Full-Time Part-Time > 10 Hours Part-Time < 10 Hours
Specific Variables Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
exinly)
yt -0.0079(-2.57)
-0.0009 -0.0075
(-2.92)
-0.0008 -0.0086
(-2.69)
-0.0003
Dummy: Children 
Aged 0-4
-5.5705
(-3.80)
-0.1482 £3.9775
(-3.79)
-0.0099 -2.0098
(-2.50)
0.2028
Dummy: Children 
Aged > 4
0.7109
(1.07)
0.0471 0.0882
(0.1S)
-0.0024 1.6106
(2.14)
0.0778
Local Rate of 
Unemployment
-0.0853
(-0.70)
-0.0090 -0.2133
(-1.82)
-0.0277 0.1166
(0.90)
0.0076
Husband at Work 1.8881
(4.83)
0.1288 1.6689
(5.02)
0.0030 1.3433
(3J0)
0.1318
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient t-Statistic
F-T
Marginal Effects x 102 
P-T> 10 P-T < 10 None
rnd{w)
y‘j
J j i _____________
0.0221 2.41 0.2722 0.2562 0.1009 0.4852
0.0006 0.07 0.0071 0.0067 0.0026 0.0126
Number o f  Observations: 420 Log Likelihood:-4\6.9
Notes: All money amounts are in pounds. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample probability of 
occupying the relevant state: see the Notes to Table 4.2.
Again, the results for benefit income that is received by the husband but en­
dogenous to the wife’s labour supply, y ^ {k\  has an insignificant coefficient. There is 
no evidence here that women take the benefit income that their husbands receive into 
account at all when making their labour supply decisions.
It should be emphasized how surprising this result is. It indicates that the rea­
son for the absence of the expected significant positive effect o f y ^ {h) on the wife’s 
utility is not due to unobserved fixed effects, since even when the possible importance 
of such unobservables are accounted for, this income is not regarded by the wives o f 
unemployed men as a factor in their labour supply decisions. The most likely reason for 
this is that there is less than full income pooling within the household.
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Non-labour income, y‘x{nh\  has a negative effect on the probability of working 
in any of the positive hours categories, with statistically indistinguishable coefficients 
for all three hours o f work ranges. This is interesting, as the separability of income and 
leisure is supported by this result, whereas in the pooled model, the coefficients on this 
variable increased with the hours of work entailed in the relevant labour market status. 
This indicates that unobservable fixed effects generate results that would lead to the 
rejection of the hypothesis of the separability of income.
As regards income variables, it should be noted that is not included
here, its exclusion not having been rejected^ by an LR test. This outcome may be the 
result of the lack o f between-group variation in this variable referred to in Section
4.3.2. However, it is more likely that it is because the 'similar characteristics* that 
caused it to have a positive effect on the probability of working in the pooled model 
are taken account o f in the FECL model. Nonetheless, taken with the insignificant re­
sult for y^ {h), this result indicates that the income her husband receives when unem­
ployed is not a significant determinant o f a woman's labour supply, perhaps because of 
expectations of the duration of the husband's unemployment
Demographic Variables
One of the more interesting results of the FECL model is that the effect of the presence 
of pre-school children in the household is actually larger when fixed effects are taken 
into account than otherwise. The marginal effect of the presence o f small children is 
such that this dummy decreases the probability of working full-time by almost IS 
points, of working low part-time hours by about 20 points, and o f  working high part- 
time hours by about 1 point. In this model, dummies for the presence of children of 
different age groups are found to be better at explaining the labour supply decisions 
made than the number o f children in each category, so the direct comparison of the re­
sults in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 is not valid. However, if Table D1 in the Appendix is used 
for comparison instead, since it reports the results for a pooled model that contains all 
o f the variables included in the FECL model, then it is clear that the effect of the pres­
ence of children is estimated to be much larger using the latter.
It might be expected that accounting for unobserved persistent effects would 
decrease the estimated effect of children, since women with low taste for labour mar­
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ket work may also have a high taste for having children. However, this result is one 
that is often obtained using fixed effects models, as discussed in Chamberlain, (1984, 
pp. 1304) and Maddala (1987, pp. 323). It is possible that this result is obtained be­
cause much of the within-group variation in the variable comes from the birth of chil­
dren, as well as from children moving from the pre-school age group into the next age 
group; the probability of observing a woman in the labour force is surely much lower 
around the time of childbirth than for other mothers of young children. However, when 
the dummy for children aged up to four years old is split into dummies for children 
aged less than a year and another for those aged between one and four years, the re­
sults, which are not reported here, show that the effect of children aged between one 
and four years is still much stronger that that found in the pooled model.
The fact that the effect of the presence of children of school-going age becomes 
insignificant for high hours o f work, and significantly positive for low part-time hours 
in the FECL model11 shows that, in cross-section models, children in this age group 
have an effect on labour supply largely because of the taste for labour market work 
that is reflected in child-bearing, whereas even after such fixed effects are controlled 
for in the FECL model, the fact of having children o f pre-school age in the household 
generates costs of working that are much higher than for older children, because of the 
cost of alternative child-care arrangements.
Local Labour Market Variable
The omission of the local rate of unemployment in the FECL model was not accepted, 
as it was for the pooled model. Here, at least for the probability of working high part- 
time hours, the rate of unemployment in the county of residence has a negative effect 
that is significant at the 90% confidence leveL The marginal effect for this hours range 
is also quite large, a 1% increase in the unemployment rate decreasing the probability 
of choosing this hours range by nearly 3 points. This supports, at least partially, the 
hypothesis that local labour market conditions are important in determining the re­
sponse of wives to their husbands* unemployment
11 Note that the coefficient on the dummy for the effect of children aged over 4 years on the probability 
of working low part-time hours reported in Table D2 is also positive and significant However, the 
coefficient on this variable in the FECL model is considerably larger.
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Finally, the expected change in the role of the husband’s employment status in deter­
mining the labour supply of the wife does not occur. The significance of the effects 
drops in each case, but the marginal effects o f  the variables are very similar to those 
obtained in the pooled model. This result indicates that, even after accounting for the 
possibility that a husband being out of work indicates unfavourable labour market 
characteristics which his wife may share and which may, in turn, determine her labour 
supply, the fact of a husband’s being out o f work makes his wife less likely to work. In 
fact, ‘switching on’ this dummy makes her about 13 points more likely to work either 
full-time or low part-time hours. This result indicates a remarkable degree of comple­
mentarity of leisure times between husbands and wives.
In order to establish the robustness o f this result, the variable for the husband 
being at work was dropped from the FECL model and the consequences examined. 
The results, which are not reported here, show that the coefficient on y ^ w becomes 
statistically significantly positive at the 99% level of confidence and that shows 
a significant negative effect on both full-time and high part-time hours of work, as 
would be expected. However, the coefficient on the local rate of unemployment is left 
virtually unaffected, so that the possibility that the husband being in work is strongly 
correlated with the wife’s being in work because of local labour market conditions is 
not supported by the data. This leaves complementarity o f leisure times as the most 
plausible explanation for the result
4.5.2 Testing the Importance of Accounting for Fixed Individual Effects
The results obtained from the FECL do not differ from those obtained in the pooled 
model for many of the variables that are common to both. Therefore it is important to 
test whether accounting for fixed effects are important at all as if it is not, the FECL 
estimates are inefficient and the results from the pooled model preferable. Since the 
fixed effects are not estimated in the FECL model, the hypothesis that these are the 
same for every individual, a  = a , cannot be directly tested as a restriction. Moreover, 
it is not possible to use an LR test to compare the model with the alternative which is 
suitable in the case o f homogeneity, the pooled model, since the FECL model is esti­
Husband’s Employment Status
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mated on a restricted set of data and the likelihoods of the two models are therefore 
not comparable.
Instead, the Hausman test can be used. The variance of the vector of differ­
ences between the coefficients, (Pre -  is
V [ P « - p ?l = V(Pre) + V (p^)-C ov(Pre,P i.) -C o v (p ra,p j. r .
Hausman (1978) established that under the null hypothesis o f no systematic difference 
between an efficient and an inefficient estimator, here the pooled conditional logit 
model and the FECL model,
=  (¿v (P re,P , ) - V ( P ,)  = 0
=*Cov(Pre,P ,) = V ( P ,) ,  (4.14)
so
^ P « - P c ]  = ' /(Pra) - K ( P f ). (4.15)
The relevant Wald test for the difference of the estimators is, therefore,
X \  = [ P ™ - P , ] V ,£ - V ,] " [ P r e - P , ] .  (4.16)
This test statistic has a %2 distribution with K  degrees of freedom, where K is the 
number o f variables that are common to both models, p ,  is the K x 1 vector of com­
mon coefficient estimates from the pooled conditional logit model, p w  that from the 
Chamberlain model, and VP and VFE are the estimated variance matrices from the two 
models.
Because o f the differences in specification between the pooled and conditional 
logit models shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the pooled model is re-estimated so that all 
the time-varying variables included in the FECL model are also included in it. This in­
volves changing the specification of the variables that reflect the effects o f children so 
that they are dummies rather than continuous, and adding the county unemployment 
rate. The result of this estimation is shown in Appendix D.
The calculated test statistic for the hypothesis of no difference in the estima­
tors, and hence no heterogeneity, is X\i =57.41, while the tabulated values are 
Xh,oM ~ 27.59 and Xh.o.o\ — 33.41, which implies firm rejection of the hypothesis of
13 1
homogeneity at all usual levels of confidence. Clearly, accounting for fixed individual 
effects is important
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter has entailed the estimation o f a  multinomial fixed-effects conditional logit 
model of the labour supply of the wives o f  unemployed men. The results obtained 
show that:
• It is important to account for individual-specific heterogeneity.
• There is no evidence that the income received by a husband when unemployed that 
depends on the labour supply o f his wife is a determinant of her labour supply deci­
sion.
• The local rate o f unemployment has some small negative effect on the probability 
of a woman being observed working.
• The strongest determinants of the labour supply of wives of unemployed men are 
the presence of small children in the household, and a very strong complementarity 
of leisure times between husband and wife.
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5. A Dynamic Model of the Labour Supply of the 
Wives of Unemployed Men
5.1 Introduction
In Section 4.1, it was emphasized that many of the patterns in the ISUS  data that 
emerged from their inspection in Chapter 2 could be explained by persistent 
heterogeneity among the women surveyed. In particular, it was noted that the wives o f 
men with longer unemployment spells had a lower level of labour market participation, 
even before their husbands* unemployment began; that subsequently these women had 
a lower level of added worker activity; and that those who did not work before their 
husbands* spells began had a lower level of transitions either towards or away from 
work. These patterns are consistent with the presence of unobserved characteristics, 
possibly shared with the husband, that determine the reactions of wives to their 
husbands* unemployment.
However, several o f these features may also be accounted for by an alternative 
explanation, namely that the labour market state occupied by a woman at the date of 
her husband becoming unemployed determines her reaction to that unemployment to a 
significant extent. This is known as ‘true’ state dependence, meaning that the 
experience of an event changes preferences, budget constraints or prices so that 
choices in one period affect choices in future periods. This may arise for several 
reasons, including:
• If human capital depreciates whilst a woman is out of the labour force, so that the 
quality of women who have been out of the labour force is reduced.
• If  employers use current employment as an indicator of the quality of an applicant, 
in terms of her attachment to the labour force.
• If  preferences are endogenous, so that they are formed by habit, as discussed, for 
example, in Kapteyn and Woittiez (1990).
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‘Spurious’ state dependence» on the other hand» means that previous 
experience appears to determine future experience solely because it is a proxy for 
unobservables which affect choices and which are persistent over time. Only this 
‘spurious’ state dependence is allowed for in using the Fixed Effects Conditional Logit 
model (FECL) of Chapter 4 to estimate the determinants o f the labour supply of 
women married to unemployed men. It was stressed in Section 4.2.3 that the FECL 
model allows for no true state dependence. In order to allow for true state dependence* 
a model which allows for the dynamics of labour supply must be employed.
It is the application of such a model to the LSUS data that is the subject of this 
chapter. In Section 5.2« a Markov model o f labour supply is discussed« in theoretical 
terms in Section 5.2.1 and in terms o f the modelling issues that arise in applying it to 
the LSUS data in Section 5.2.2. Section 5.3 goes on to discuss a modification of the 
Markov model, the Mover-Stayer model, again with the application of the model 
discussed in Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4. The results of using this latter model are 
reported and discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Markov Models
5.2.1 The Theory o f Markov Models
Markov models are dynamic, discrete-state, discrete-time models, and are therefore 
appropriate for the modelling of transitions. In such models, the probability distribution 
of y# is specified as a function of past values o f itself, where y* =  1 if individual t is in 
state j  at time t.
The most commonly applied Markov models are first order ones; these allow 
only for the possibility that y& depends on ya. r - 1 , but not on ya.» -  2 , ya,i - 3 , and so 
on. A first order Markov model is completely characterized by the initial conditions 
together with the transition probabilities, which are
Pijk.t = Prfyib =  Uytf.r- 1 = 1]
The Markov matrix is the J x J  matrix associated with each individual 1 in which each 
element is the probability of a transition between two particular states, where J  is the
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number of possible states. It is these probabilities that are estimated in a Markov 
model. If Pt, i is the same for all t, then the model is stationary, if Pi. jt. t is the same 
for all i, the model is homogenous. Interestingly, Amemiya (1985) points out that if the 
y.p are independent over t, so that transitions into states are the same regardless of the 
original state, then the likelihood function o f the Markov model is reduced to the 
likelihood function of a cross-section discrete-choice model. Thus, the Markov 
framework may be seen as generalizing cross-section models.
Where homogeneity is not assumed, the determinants of the elements of the 
Markov matrix may be estimated econometrically. The standard first order Markov
5
model, with explanatory variables, for a binomial choice is:
P[yif = 11 y>. t - 1] = F(pxn+ yjuy.i - 1)
Then Pi.jk.t = F(px*)
and Pi.u.i = F((y +p)xn) (5.1)
Thus, yi.t-i is included in the set of independent variables, and can be treated as 
exogenous, for the purposes of asymptotic results. If the process generating the ya is 
genuinely first-order Markov, then maximum likelihood estimates o f the p and y are 
consistent for fixed T as N —> <*> (Amemiya, 1985).
There are several advantages to using Markov models of labour supply. First, 
in contrast to the FECL model used in Chapter 4, information on all individuals is used 
in estimating the parameters. Thus, none of the questions o f sample selectivity that 
arose in Chapter 4 arise in this case. Second, Markov models allow for state 
dependence of the transition probabilities. Again, this contrasts with the FECL model, 
as mentioned already. Thirdly, both time-varying and time-constant variables may be 
included in the specification of these models. Although the restriction that variables to 
be used in the FECL model must be genuinely time-varying does not affect the 
estimation of the parameters on the variables of interest, since these variables are time- 
varying, it may also be useful to assess the importance of some demographic variables 
which are constant over time, such as age, for example.
However, the importance of the first-order assumption, where used, should not 
be under-estimated. In a pure first order Markov model, past history affects the future
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only through its influence on the state occupied at t — I .  Thus, the past values of 
variables should have no effect on the current realization of the state. Often a first- 
order model is assumed for convenience, or because the data required to apply higher- 
order models are not available, rather than because economic theory really predicts 
first-order Markov behaviour. This is important because if it is all past experience, 
rather than the state occupied at t - 1  alone that determines current behaviour, then no 
consistent estimator o f the parameters is available, unless one of two assumptions hold.
One possibility is that the process is in equilibrium. Since it is very likely that 
there are long adjustment delays in implementing labour supply decisions,1 and since in 
all the households surveyed, an event has taken place - the husband becoming 
unemployed - which makes a recent reconsideration of the optimal labour force status 
more likely, it is improbable that the process observed in theLSUS data set is in a long- 
run equilibrium. Unless the husband's unemployment is perfectly anticipated, it is likely 
to cause a reassessment of the wife's labour supply decision, because of the new 
information about future household income that it carries.
The alternative condition which ensures that a first order Markov model will 
yield consistent estimates of labour supply parameters is if the pre-sample history of 
the process being examined is truly exogenous. This is unlikely in any model of labour 
supply, since the process of making labour supply decisions begins where compulsory 
education ends; data over such long periods are rarely available, and certainly not in 
the LSU survey. So the assumption o f an exogenous pre-sample history may not be 
valid here.
Because of the importance of the validity of the first order assumption for the 
consistency o f the parameter estimates, several tests of the first order assumption have 
been developed. The most obvious method entails the inclusion o f higher order terms 
in the regression equation and testing for their collective significance. However, it has 
been pointed out (Hsiao, 1986; Maddala, 1987) that it is not necessarily the case if 
higher order terms are found to be significant that this indicates true state dependence 
o f a higher order. Rather, it may be that unobserved persistent heterogeneity is causing
1 For example, Pudney and Thomas (1992) estimate a mean adjustment lag of 96 weeks for the wives 
of unemployed men.
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serial correlation in the model, so that past values of the dependent variable seem to 
have explanatory power, whereas in fact it is the correlation between these past values 
and the current error term which is being captured.
A true first order binomial Markov model, without any exogenous variables is
y* = py*- t-i + oc+eu (5.2)
where y«» = 1 if y* > 0 and yu = 0 otherwise, while a model with serial correlation 
and no state dependence is
y£ = ce + w, ut =  put-t+et (5.3)
T+
Thus, it is necessary to eliminate the possibility that any second order effects are due to 
serial correlation. A proper test for true higher order state dependence should therefore 
control for the unobserved individual-specific effects which cause serial correlation.
However, it is not enough to test for
Pr(yi/Iy t .i - t ,x n ,a )  -  Pr(yi/Ix*,os) (5.4)
where ou are the individual-specific fixed effects and £ is the order of state 
dependence being tested. This is because their not being equal could be because of past 
yn containing information on the current m . Chamberlain (1984) argues that in a 
serial correlation model, a change in x has its full effect immediately, whereas if there is 
true state dependence, the change in x  has lasting effects. Thus, an appropriate test is 
to include lagged independent variables in a fixed effects model, but not the lagged 
dependent variable:
Pr(yir = I l x i i , x u - = Prfyb = Ilx«,C&) (5.5)
This equality holds if there is no true state dependence and is false if there is true state 
dependence.
If the conclusion is that there is both heterogeneity and true state dependence, 
there is no model in which both fixed individual effects and lagged dependent variables 
may be included. Chamberlain (1985) does suggest an auto-regressive fixed effects 
logit model, but Maddala (1987) points out that a major drawback of the model is that 
no exogenous variables can be used with it. Moreover, data with T ^  4  are needed to 
estimate a model in which first order state dependence is allowed for, and with T  £  6
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to estimate a model with second order effects, since the sufficient statistics for the a  
are y/o, 2 f yu, and yir for the first-order model and y»o, yn , 2 ,  y«» » y«r - 1 and yrr for 
the second order model; conditioning on these statistics typically involves discarding 
much of the data. The second order model has been used by Narendranathan and Elias 
(1993) to test for the effect of y u - 2  on current unemployment in order to justify the 
subsequent estimation of a first order model, while Magnac (1996) used both first and 
second order versions. But because exogenous variables may not be used, these 
models are not of interest when analysing the labour supply of the wives o f 
unemployed men.
S
The estimation of a dynamic model in which individual-specific effects are 
specified as random is also complicated, particularly if the assumption of the 
exogeneity of the initial conditions is not valid. One solution, suggested by Heckman 
(1981) is that the initial state, y/o, be modelled as a function o f x*, and estimated 
jointly with the auto-regressive model of Pi, jk. t .
For each of these proposals, the question surely arises as to what extent any 
attempt to account for both persistent unobserved heterogeneity and true state 
dependence in a panel o f  just three waves, as with the LSUS data, is likely to be over­
demanding of the data. This is a point also raised by Alessie et al. (1992) when 
modelling labour market transitions based on a  two-period survey.
A further, more fundamental, point should also be raised. Throughout the 
above discussion, the emphasis has been on the consistent estimation o f the effects of 
economic and demographic variables on the long-run probability of occupying a 
particular state. This is certainly the appropriate approach for tackling many policy 
issues, as in the analysis o f the effects of changes in the taxation system on overall 
participation, for example. However, it can be argued that, given that unemployment is 
typically a temporary phenomenon, it is the short-term effects o f the social welfare 
system that are relevant to the labour supply of the wives of unemployed men.
Equally, for the purposes of evaluating policy changes in the treatment of 
income earned by the wives o f the unemployed, the decomposition of state dependence 
into true state dependence and individual heterogeneity is not of central importance.
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For these reasons, a Markov model employed in the present context is best 
interpreted as a reduced form model of the determinants of transitions between states, 
and where conditioning on the initial state carries the burden of accounting for both 
state dependence and all of the unobserved heterogeneity in the sample.
The inclusion of y u - \ as an independent variable in a Markov model is 
equivalent to the separate estimation of the for each y/.r-i. This can be seen 
from the fact that if, instead of estimating the model over all individuals, the sample is 
separated according to the initial state, then, in a binomial choice setting, the model is:
Pi.jk.t = F(pXk)
Pi.jt.t — F(yxu)
with Y * P . This is the model used in Boskin and Nold (1975). But this is equivalent 
to
P(y„ = lly/..-i) = F [p * + (Y -P )x i.y i..-i]  (5.6)
which is of the same form as the standard model defined by Equation 5.1 above.
In a multinomial context, this extends straightforwardly to
/* , -  FXPxk +  yxmE ^ - O  (5.7)
j
for j  - 1 .  For a given initial state,y, this can be estimated as
P[y» =  k\yu - i  = / ]  = F(Pxjt) (5.5)
which is equivalent to re-writing Equation 5.7 as
Pm ~  F [<P “  T ) * + 7*«Z y* -  ' j  (S.9)
5.2.2 Modelling issues
Some practical issues arise in applying a model of transitions to the LSUS data. 
Crucially, the cell sizes for some transitions are very small, and in some cases non­
existent, a point which was raised in Section 2.3.2. Tables 2.4 to 2.7 show that the 
problematic cells for estimation purposes are, for the transitions between the key date 
and the first interview, Pr(Ypr<io.3 )^,fT.-i)» >^r(Yfr.3^/T<io.-i)»
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Ptoffwoj'yiTiiüL-i). and between the two interviews, for P r iy ^ io js ^ f r j )  and 
Pr(>frj5^iT<io.3) * The estimation of models of these transitions is difficult
There are several ways to address this issue. One is to ignore the problem. 
Then no inference can be drawn as to the effect of some variables on the probability of 
being in a given state, but where standard errors are calculated, they can be taken to be 
accurate. However, the estimation of some models, in particular those for women 
working full-time at t = - I ,  and for women working part-time, less than ten hours at 
t ~ -1 , is not possible using a standard software package; in these cases, the models 
do not converge.
%
A second option is to condition on certain destination states not being possible 
given a particular initial state. Thus, for example, for women working full-time initially, 
the destination state of low part-time hours would be excluded from the choice set, so 
that the constraint would be imposed that PrCjVrcKu^fr.-i ) =  0 .  Similar constraints 
could be imposed for the other problematic cells detailed above.
The clear disadvantage of this approach is that it is no more true that low part- 
time hours is not an option for women working full-time initially then it is for women 
working high part-time hours initially. However, in practice, the results obtained using 
this approach are very similar to those obtained using the first approach of ignoring the 
problem of small cell sizes and estimating over all individuals in the relevant initial 
state, with all destination states possible.
A third possibility is to group the states at time t - 1 into two states - working 
and not working, combining full-time work and both part-time work states into one. In 
this way, the number of individuals over whom estimation would be carried out for 
women working at t - 1 would be large enough that standard errors could be 
calculated for all variables and destination states. It is useful to  note that the model 
combining the three working states into one initial state is equivalent to the estimation 
o f the three models separately, but restricting their coefficients to be equal. O f course, 
in the current situation, such restrictions may not be tested because of the numerical 
problems under discussion.
This latter approach has theoretical validity if it is true that the dependence of 
the destination state on the initial state arises not because of the number o f hours a
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L*-*-
woman worked in that initial state, but because of the fact that she worked at all at the 
initial date. This hypothesis is certainly not an unreasonable one; it may be true, for 
example, that employers regard participation per re as an indication of positive 
unmeasured characteristics and hire from the pool of participants first, or that women 
get utility from working that does not vary with the number of hours worked, and it is 
this aspect of work which generates a state dependence in their labour supply. For 
example, women may enjoy daily contact with their colleagues, but be indifferent 
between two and eight hours of daily contact with them.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it lessens the extent to which the
£
model can be regarded as one of transitions. While the emphasis on movement between 
participation and non-participation is not lost, it is not possible to interpret the effect of 
a variable on the probability of working, say, full-time, at t conditional on working any 
positive hours at t - 1  as its effect on the probability of changing state, since the state 
of origin may also have been full-time work.
Nonetheless, this third approach is the most suitable in a model of labour 
market status whose aim is to account both for heterogeneity and state dependence. It 
is on this concept of a Markov model, in which the importance of the job status of the 
previous period is based on whether that state entailed participation or not, that the 
model used in Section 5.4 is based.
Finally, when discussing the implications of the small cell sizes for some 
transitions, it should be mentioned that this feature of the LSUS data also makes the 
estimation o f any second order Markov models very difficult. With sufficiently large 
cell sizes, it would be possible to estimate
P\yu = j\y,. t - i,yi.r -2] = F(Pxm + yxu^ yat - 1 + tlx*Xyy» - 2)
t J
But with the LSUS data, few coefficients on the state occupied at f - 2  can be 
estimated. In any case, given that it is difficult to think of a theoretical model which 
would predict that the states occupied in the previous two periods, but no more, would 
determine labour supply, the estimation of second order terms is interesting only to the 
extent that it controls further for heterogeneity within a group. Other explanatory 
variables are also available which may satisfactorily control for such heterogeneity.
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53 Models of Mover-Stayer Behaviour
5.3.1 Description of the M over-Stayer Model
In Section 2.3.2, the point that there was evidence o f a mover-stayer pattern in the
data was mentioned. The Mover-Stayer model (Blumen et al.t 1955; Goodman, 1961)
proposes a particular form of extreme heterogeneity in the population that cannot be
captured by a Markov matrix, namely that there are some individuals in the population,
the stayers, who will never leave the state they occupy, so that they have a zero
probability of making a transition. The remainder, the movers, make transitions
*•
according to a first order Markov chain model.
If Sj is the proportion o f the sample who are stayers in state j  and Vjt is the 
probability that a mover is in state k  at time t given that she was in state j  at time t - 1 ,  
then the transition probabilities o f  an individual who has not been identified either as a 
stayer or a mover are
Pffi^Sj + a-SjyVjit
and Pjh = (1 — Sj)Vjb (5.10)
Goodman proposes a simple non-parametric estimator for the 5), the 
proportion of the sample who make no transition throughout the sample period. 
Generally however, unless the observation period is long, some movers will be
A
mistakenly identified as stayers; hence Goodman describes his estimator, Sj, as an 
upper bound for the true Sj, since if any o f those who do not move throughout the 
sample period are in fact movers rather than genuine stayers, then the true Sj are 
lower. Frydman (1984) confirms that Sj is not the Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
(MLE) of Sj unless T is large, and develops the MLE of Sj. The calculation of 
Frydman’s Sj is detailed in Section 5.3.3 and its application is discussed in Section 
5.3.4.
A
5.3.2 The Application of the M over-Stayer Model using Goodm an’s Sj
Prior to addressing the issues that arise in using Goodman's estimator of Sj in the 
estimation o f a Mover-Stayer model o f transitions, it is useful first to discuss the 
estimation of the model when information exists that perfectly identifies movers and
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stayers in the sample. The implications of the possibility that Sj is an over-estimate of 
the true Sj can then be clarified and the issues that arise specifically from the use of Sj 
isolated.
Two methods of estimating a Mover-Stayer model are considered here. One 
approach is based on the Double-Hurdle (D-H) model proposed by Cragg (1971). In 
D-H models, an individual must pass two hurdles before she is observed making a 
transition; first, she must be a mover and second, she must wish to make a transition. 
Modelling behaviour in this way is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals may 
be divided into movers and stayers, since stayers do not consider making transitions, by 
definition.
Examples of the application of D-H models are provided by Blundell et al. 
(1986) in their work on female labour supply, where the first hurdle to be overcome is 
an unemployment constraint, and by Jones (1989) in his study of cigarette 
consumption, where the first hurdle is a participation decision. In both of these 
examples, both hurdles are specified parametrically, but it is also possible to estimate 
the first hurdle non-parametrically, as in Micklewright et al. (1990), in their 
investigation of early school leaving, where the first hurdle is calculated using 
administrative school-leaving rules.
The D-H model that is relevant to the Mover-Stayer framework may be written 
as follows:
Observed choice: yn -  j  where Pw > Pm V k *  j
Pijjt = Sj + (l-Sj)Vijf,
Pijb = (I -  Sj)Vijh
Mover hurdle: w i-axi + vs i a mover if w > 0
/ a stayer otherwise.
Choice of state j  if t a mover. um = px* + eu
Vm = F$x* + ea) (5.77)
However, in this case, the ‘mover hurdle’ is not estimated parametrically; rather,
A ___
estimates of the population Sj, such as Sj, are used. The Sj included as the first hurdle
are, therefore, not individual-specific except to the extent that they depend on the state 
j  occupied by the individual at t =  - 1 .  The likelihood function for the D-H model can 
therefore be written as:
i -  = n I l s + ( 1 - Si)V,n 11(1 - S)V* (S./2)
In the alternative approach to the estimation of the model, the determinants of 
the movers* transition matrices are estimated only over those identified as movers. 
Thus, data on individuals not observed to move throughout the sample period are not 
used. This is the estimation procedure that is usually understood by the term ‘Mover- 
Stayer Model’, following its application in this way by McCall (1971). In the case 
where there is no error in identifying movers and stayers, estimation in this way yields 
consistent results.2
It is useful to note that where the Sj are consistently estimated, the McCall and 
D-H approaches are equivalent, since the Cragg Double-Hurdle model described by 
Equation 5.11 may also be applied in a two-stage procedure, consistently estimating 
the first hurdle, and then, conditional on this hurdle, estimating the second hurdle 
(Jones, 1989, pp.25 n .l); this is precisely the procedure entailed in the McCall 
approach.
In practice, the Sj are not known and must be estimated; this means that the 
possibility of error in their estimation arises. A survey over sixteen months, such as the 
LSU survey, would not normally be regarded as having a  sufficiently long time-span to 
identify movers and stayers accurately; T = 3 cannot be regarded as ‘large*. 
Admittedly, this problem is mitigated to some extent by the fact that the women in this 
survey are observed during a period when the household’s financial situation is 
changing in a way that makes transitions more likely. As detailed in Section 2.3.1, the 
level of transitions in this population of the wives of the unemployed is higher than for 
all married women. Hence, it is possible to argue that the circumstances under which 
the LSUS was undertaken make the observation of movers making transitions more 
likely. Nonetheless, it seems likely that some movers are mis-identified as stayers using
2 There are other circumstances in which the estimation of McCall’s Mover-Stayer model gives 
consistent results; these are discussed below.
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Goodman’s method o f calculating Sy, and it is important to consider the consequences 
of the over-estimation of the Sj for the consistency of the parameter estimates.
In the D-H approach to the estimation of the model the inconsistent estimation 
of the first hurdle clearly implies inconsistent estimates of the determinants of the Vijt. 
Thus, if the Sj are incorrect, estimation of the model using the D-H approach is not 
appropriate. Moreover, where the Sj are correct, it may be argued that while both the 
McCall and D-H models produce consistent results, the McCall version is superior in 
terms of efficiency, since it uses extra information that the D-H model does not use 
about the identity of the movers. Although the D-H model uses information on all
ÿ _
individuals to estimate the determinants of the movers’ transition matrix, the extra 
individuals it uses in the estimation are irrelevant, since they are, by assumption, 
stayers.
In order to discuss the implications of the possible over-estimation of the Sj for 
the consistency of the McCall approach, it is useful to write the model as follows:
Vtji* = F(px* + eu)
Ii = yq, + Ui (5.13)
where I  is the propensity of a mover to be identified as a mover; i is identified as a 
mover if I  > 0 and as a stayer otherwise.
Recall that the McCall model entails estimation only over those identified as 
movers, for whom /  > 0 .  Thus, the over-estimation of Sj results in the estimation of 
the determinants of the transitions over a smaller set of individuals than would be the 
case if the true Sj were known; clearly this results in inefficiency. Moreover, if the 
error in the identification of movers, u, is correlated with the error in the choice of 
destination state, e, then the problem of sample selection bias also arises. If there are 
unobservable factors that determine whether a true mover is observed to move or not 
that also determine an individual’s destination state, then the estimates will be biased. 
This might arise if, for example, within the group of movers, women who have higher 
labour market motivation are most likely to make a transition quickly, and so to be 
included in the set of observed movers, and are also most likely to make transitions 
into destination states entailing higher hours of work. This may be more plausible for
14 5
women not working initially, and for whom a transition, by definition, entails a move 
into work.
On the other hand, it is also possible that within the group of movers, who are, 
by definition, more flexible in their attitude to their working hours than are stayers,3 
those who are most flexible are likely to move sooner than those who are less flexible, 
and are therefore more likely to be observed as movers. There is no obvious reason 
why flexibility with regard to hours o f work should be associated with a particular 
destination state. In this case, cov(u,e) =  0 and the estimation only over those with 
ƒ > 0 is consistent
Although it is not clear whether cov(u,e) =  0 or not, this assumption is 
maintained for the remainder o f this chapter. The assumption cannot be tested 
formally, since the equation giving the propensity of a mover to be identified as such is 
not estimated parametrically. The implication of the independence assumption is that if, 
as seems likely, the Sj over-estimate the true Sjf the estimates of a Mover-Stayer 
model using the McCall approach are inefficient but unbiased. Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4
a
attempt to improve the efficiency of the estimates obtained using Sj.
The McCall Mover-Stayer models reported in Appendix G are of the
A
determinants of the transitions o f those asserted to be movers when Sj is used as the 
estimator of the proportion of stayers in the sample. When specifying the models to be 
estimated, the modelling issues arising in the discussion of the application of the 
Markov model in Section 5.2.2 are taken into account. Hence, two sets of transitions 
are estimated for each of the two initial states, working and not working, for 
transitions between t = -1  and / = 3 , and for those between t = 3 and t =  15. Thus
the models estimated for those who are defined as movers are:
= FT or PT > 10 or PT < 10, i £ Sj) =  F(Px</3) (5.74)
Priy^uly,^ = FT or PT > 10 or PT < 10, i £ Sj) — F(pxyis) (5.75)
Pityy3ly,>l = None, i € Sj) =  F(px#3) (5.76)
PrCy^uly^ = None, i £ Sj) — F(px^u) (5.77)
3 Such flexibility may derive from a woman having no strong culturally-determined opinion on the 
'appropriate' labour m arket behaviour o f a wife.
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Of course, for stayers:
PrOW -^i = 7. *€$) = I
= j .  i ^ *Sf)= 1 (5-/9)
(5./5)
For example, Equation 5.17 should be read to mean that the probability of 
occupying state y at t =  15 for a woman who was not working at t = 3, and given that 
she has been identified as a mover, is a function of explanatory variables x at the values 
they take at t = 15. Note that for a woman who has been identified as a mover, she 
does not necessarily make a transition between the two dates in question. For example, 
a woman who moves only between the first and second interviews will register no 
transition in the model of transitions between the key date and first interview, given by 
Equation 5.14, but is still included in the estimation sample.
The functional form used for F  is the logistic one. The explanatory variables are 
the same as were described in Section 4.3.1, and since some of these are choice- 
specific, a multinomial, conditional logit framework is the appropriate one. Hence, the 
interpretation of the coefficients is as described in Section 4.3.2.
There are two reasons for estimating the transitions between t = -1 and t -  3 
separately from those between t - 3 and r = 15, rather than pooling the destination 
states and modelling the destination states conditional on the initial states together, that 
is, rather than estimating Equations 5.14 and 5.15 together, and Equations 5.16 and 
5.17 together. First, the events that occur between the key date and the first interview - 
the husband becoming unemployed - differ from those that occur between the two 
interviews - the husband returning to work, or exhausting his UB entitlement. These 
events can be anticipated to varying extents. While the husband's unemployment may 
well be entirely unexpected, the exhaustion of his UB, once unemployed, is capable of 
being perfectly anticipated. This means that if there is a delay in implementing decisions 
once taken, the parameter estimates will depend on the date of the initial date and the 
destination date.
Secondly, even if this were not the case, and the Markov matrix for movers 
were expected to be stationary, different amounts of time elapse between the two pairs 
o f dates; four months pass between the key date and the first interview, and twelve
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months between the two interviews. This automatically requires the separate 
estimation of these transitions.
5 .33  The Calculation of Goodm an’s Sj and  Frydm an’s Sj
In calculating Sj, as much information as possible should be used to identify movers. 
Thus, all transitions, including those among working states as well as those between 
work and non-work, are counted as valid for the identification o f a mover. Moreover, 
rather than examining the job status of each individual only at the three principal dates 
to identify movers, the weekly data collected retrospectively for a year at the second 
interview, and examined in Section 2.4, are also used. Individuals who are in the same 
states at the first and second interviews, but who report having made a transition 
between those two dates, are therefore also included in calculating the Sj. As 
mentioned in Section 2.4.2, there are 65 women who fall into this category.4 Note that, 
for these women, no transition is made either in the model of transitions between the 
key date and the first interview, or in that between the first and second interviews.
As pointed out in the previous section, it seems likely that, however much 
information is used in the calculation of Sj, these estimates may over-state the true Sj, 
and Frydman (1984) proposes an alternative estimator which yields consistent 
estimates. The estimator proposed by Frydman is:
njo-nj 
/yo(l—Vjfr)
(5.20)
where wo is the number o f individuals in state j  at the beginning of the sample period,
A
t = 0 , m is the number of individuals observed in state j  in all periods, and Vjfr is the 
relevant element o f the diagonal o f the transition matrix according to which a mover 
moves between t =  0 and t - T .  The quantity (njo-nj) is the observed number o f 
individuals starting in state j  and making at least one transition by time T, whilst 
/iyo(l -Vjfr) is the number of individuals expected to make a transition out o f state j  if 
all njo individuals are movers. Thus Frydman's estimator can be thought o f as the
4 It was also mentioned in Section 2.4.2 that 12 o f these women make only one transition, which must 
be a mistake. However, I considered that if a woman reported making transitions, then she was 
probably a ‘mover*, even if the nature o f the transition was reported incorrectly.
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proportion of expected movers observed to stay in one state throughout the sample 
period, rather than the proportion o f the whole sample observed to stay.
Frydman suggests a recursive method for estimating the Var* but given that 
data are available in the LSUS which might reasonably be expected to explain the 
pattern of transitions o f movers, it seems more appropriate to use predicted 
probabilities from an estimation over observed movers only to calculate the Vj/t . 
Assuming, as discussed in Section 5.3.2, that there is no correlation between the error 
in the identification of movers and the error in the choice o f destination state, such an 
estimation will yield consistent, although not efficient estimates o f the effects of 
variables on the probability of occupying the alternative states if everyone in the sample 
is a mover. Hence, the procedure used to estimate the Sj is as follows:
• For each state j t the determinants of the probability of occupying that state at t =  3
A
are estimated only over individuals identified as movers according to Sj, and 
separately for those working at t = -1 and for those not working at that date; this 
entails estimating Equations 5.14 and 5.16.
• Using the coefficients obtained, the probability of occupying each state is predicted 
for all individuals.
• The state predicted to have the highest probability of being chosen is then identified 
as the predicted state, and those predicted to occupy a different state at t = 3 than 
that observed to have been occupied at t = -1  are identified as predicted movers.
• The same procedure is repeated for predicting movers between t — 3 and t =  15;
A
Equations 5.15 and 5.17 are estimated, again using Sj.
• The number of individuals predicted to make a transition between either pair of 
dates is taken as the number of individuals that would move if all individuals moved 
according to the transition matrix o f movers, VjkT.
• The proportion of those in each initial state who are predicted to move during the 
sample period and are observed to move is then taken as the proportion of movers 
in that initial state; Sj is the difference between this quantity and one.
5 The method suggested assumes a stationary Markov process, which is unlikely to hold here.
Table 5.1. The elements used to calculate Sj and S j.
State (ni) m l* (/I/O — ni)rtEB t n A l- V „ ) Sj Sj
Full-Time 299 180 105 265 0.602 0.574
Part-Time, > 
10 Hours
237 127 97 207 0.536 0.507
Part-Time, < 
10 Hours
72 22 48 71 0.306 0.310
None 1072 884 88 374 0.825 0.738
* Excludes all transitions, including those o f individuals not predicted to move, 
t  Includes only transitions by those predicted to move.
jy *
Table 5.1 gives the elements used m the calculation o f  both Sj and S j , and 
allows a comparison of the two estimates. The table shows small differences between 
Sj and Sj for those working full-time o r high part-time hours before their husbands 
became unemployed and virtually no difference for initial low-hours part-time workers. 
However, a notable difference does arise for women not working at r = - l .  
Nonetheless, the proportion of stayers estimated by Sj among the initial non-workers 
is still very high, at 74%.
5.3.4 The Application of the M over-S tayer Model using F rydm an’s Sj
The incorporation o f Sj into a Mover-Stayer framework raises no new issues if 
estimation is carried out according to the D-H approach detailed in Section 5.3.2. The 
values of Sj calculated in Section 5.3.3 are substituted for Sj, with consistency of the 
results depending on the consistency of the S j .
However, a point raised in Section 5.3.2 in comparing the D-H and McCall 
approaches remains valid; some individuals can be positively identified as movers by 
the fact that they are observed making transitions, and the use o f this information on 
the identities of some movers improves the efficiency of the estimates.
A Double-Hurdle-based approach to estimation, using Equation 5.12 as the 
likelihood function, treats any individual who is in the same state at two successive 
dates in the same way, whether o r not she moves at another point during the sample 
period. It seems preferable to use the fact that, for an individual who is observed to 
move at some stage, her probability of being a mover is one, and then to use the extra
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information implied by the calculation of Sj to assign a probability of being a mover to 
those who are not observed to move.
In order to develop this point further, it is convenient to use a simplified model,
entailing a two state world of participation and non-participation. Thus, a transition
may be made either from work to non-work or from non-work to work. If the
information that some individuals are certainly movers is to be incorporated into the
model, sample separation is necessary. For those who are observed to move during the
*
survey period, with i G Sj, the transition probabilities may be specified as follows:
Vjk =  Prfi 6 5y)F(Pxi) = F( p*/) t
Vm = Pr(/ e $ j ) *  1 + Pr(i <£ Sj)( 1 -  F(fixg)) = 1 -  F(Px*) (5 .2  J)
These expressions are based on the point that, for an individual who is observed to 
make a transition, the probability that she is not a stayer, Pr(i e S j) , is one and, as a 
corollary to this, that the probability that she is a stayer is zero. The contribution of 
these individuals to the likelihood function is therefore identical to the contribution of a 
mover to the McCall Mover-Stayer likelihood. Note that the probabilities of making a 
transition and not making a transition sum to one.
For those who are not observed to move during the survey period, and so with
i e« f .
Vjk =  Pr<i g Sj)F(pXij) = (1 ■-3v)F(Pxif)
Vjj = Ptfi g 5 ) * 1  + Pr(i € Sj)( I -  F(P»;)) = ?/ + (1 -  s j)(  1 -  F(px*))
— 1 — (1 — SO)F(Pxiy) (5.22)
It is not true for an individual who does not move at any stage that the 
probability that she is a mover, Pit« g Sj), is one. Rather, she has positive probabilities 
both of being a mover and of being a stayer. The magnitudes of these probabilities, 
(1 -7 ;)  and 7;, are not as in the D-H version of the model, however. (1 -  Sj) and Sj 
must be adjusted, since they express probabilities for the sample as a whole, whilst the 
probability o f an individual who is not observed to move being a stayer must be 
significantly higher than for the whole sample, since the probability of being a stayer is 
zero for those that are observed to move.
1 5 1
The reasoning followed in calculating the sj for those not observed to move 
during the sample period is shown below; the detailed calculations are included in 
Appendix F.
(1 -  Sj) = Pr(observed mover is a mover) * Pr{observed to move)
+ Pr(observed stayer is a mover) * ^{observed to stay)
-  1 * (1 -  Sj) + Pr{observed stayer is a mover) * Sj 
Thus, Pr{observed stayer is a mover) = [(1 -  Si) - ( 1 - 3 j)]/Sj (5.23)
It is important to note that, as in Equation 5.22, the probabilities of making and 
not making a transition also sum to one in Equation 5.23. However, although the 
probability of an individual who is not observed to move during the sample period 
making a transition is positive, this outcome is never observed and so is not included in 
the likelihood function. Since this model resembles a mixture o f the McCall and D-H
approaches to estimating the Mover-Stayer model, I refer to it as the mixed Mover-
Stayer model. Equation 5.24 gives the likelihood function for this model.
¿<=11 ny* nv* nv« (sw
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Again, the determinants of the destination states, y, are estimated separately for those 
working initially and those not working initially, for transitions between t -  -1  and 
t -  3 and for those between t — 3 and t = 15.
5.4 Results of a Mover-Stayer Model
The results presented in this section are the estimates from the mixed Mover-Stayer 
models given by Equations 5.21, 5.22 and 5.24, since this is the preferred approach to 
applying the Mover-Stayer model. Both the McCall model and the D-H model using 
Sj are reported, for the purposes of comparison, in Appendix G. For both the mixed 
and D-H models, the likelihood functions were programmed in ST AT A and maximized 
using that package's ml maximization routine. These programs are included in 
Appendix H.
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5.4.1 Results for Movers W orking a t t -1
Here, the estimated determinants of the destination states of movers at the first and 
second interviews are reported for those working at t - 1 .  The destination states at the 
first interview for movers who worked at the key date are estimated as reported in 
Table 5.2, while Table 5.3 gives the results of modelling the state occupied at the 
second interview for movers who worked at the first interview.
A first point that should be made about the results shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
concerns the differences in the variables that are included in the two specifications. For
some variables, these differences arise because of the nature of the variation in the
*
variables. Thus, the husband’s job status may be included for transitions between t -  3 
and / = 15, since many have re-entered employment by the second interview, whereas 
at the first interview, all husbands are unemployed, so the variable cannot be included 
for transitions between t = -1 and / = 3.
Similarly, difficulties are likely to arise in the estimation o f the effects of y'xlbm) 
and y'x{nly) on certain transitions. In the case of the former, this difficulty comes from 
the fact that, although at the first interview some individuals’ husbands are eligible for 
UB, the non-variable part of which comprises this variable, while others' are not, by 
the second interview almost every husband has exhausted his entitlement to UB. The 
only variation in this variable at t - 1 5  comes from those husbands who have exited 
their sampled spell and then re-entered unemployment by the second interview, and 
who are entitled to receive UB, making it difficult to estimate this variable’s effect on 
transitions between t -  3 and t =  15.
On the other hand, difficulties with the precise estimation o f y“{Hty) are more 
likely to occur in estimating transitions between t = -1 and r = 3 , since in many cases 
this variable is made up almost entirely of the husband’s wage, which, because the 
husbands are unemployed at the first interview, shows little variation at that date. 
Thus, a well-determined effect is not expected for this variable at t = 3 , whereas at 
t - 15, many husbands have returned to work, thus generating the required variation.
Income Variables
The significant positive coefficients on the wage variable, y ^ {w), in both of these 
models indicates that these women do respond to economic variables in making their
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labour supply decisions. For transitions both between r = -1 and t = 3 and between 
t = 3 and r = 15, the effect of y ^ {w) is estimated to have a quadratic relationship with 
utility.
For both sets of results, a £1 increase in the weekly wage in the relevant hours 
range increases the probability o f working in that range by between 0.5 and 1.75 
percentage points, while being given £1 not to work increases the probability of being 
observed not working by around 1 point. A  £1 increase in the full-time wage is a much 
lower proportional increase than a  £1 rise in the part-time weekly wage, but again, this 
is a result of the use of one choice-specific variable for the wage within a conditional 
logit structure, a point which was discussed in Section 4.4.
Table 5.2. Results o f  the mixed Mover-Stayer model o f  destination states at t = 3 fo r  women who are 
movers and were working at t = - \ .  Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets.
Non-Choice- Full-Time Part-Time > 10 Hours Part-Time < 10 Hours
Specific Variables Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
€X(nty)
yt -0.0806
(-2.40)
-0.0227 -0.0317
(-1.01)
0.0029 -0.0878
(-2.62)
-0.0053
(y,“ (BW) 2
0.0012
(2.21)
0.0003 0.0006
(LOS)
-0.0000 0.0012
(2.33)
0.0001
Dummy: Children 
Aged 0-4
-1.1098
(-L53)
-0.2139 0.4587
(0.89)
0.1058 1.2335
(2.16)
0.1482
Dummy: Children 
Aged > 4
0.0897
(0.19)
-0.0648 0.4808
(L25)
0.0561 1.0428
(2.38)
0.0738
Wife’s Age -0.0178
(-0.96)
-0.0131 0.0349
(2.04)
0.0123 0.0450
(2.17)
0.0045
Constant -2.0239
(-2.16)
— -3.4089
(-4.03)
- -3.3314
(-3.48)
—
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient t-Statistic
F-T
Marginal Effects x  102 
P-*D>10 P-T<10 None
y tj 0.0556 3.71 1.3082 1.2414 0.5577 0.7960
( C l ’
-0.0002 -2.79 -0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0017 -0.0024
«"¿(A)
- i f _____________
-0.0041 -0.31 -0.0955 -0.0906 -0.0407 -0.0581
Number o f  Observations: 608 Log Likelihood: -350.0
Notes: All money amounts are in pounds. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample probability of 
occupying the relevant state. Here, P it FT) = 0 3 7 8 , Pr( ZT > 10) = 0336 and P it FT < 10) = 0.113.
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One disconcerting point does arise for this wage result, however. That is that 
the quadratic effect estimated for both these regressions implies a maximum that is 
within the sample range, at £139 for the destination state at the first interview and at 
£89 for the state at the second interview, which are both within the observed range for 
both full-time and high-hours part-time workers, although above the average in each 
case. This result implies that beyond a relatively modest weekly income, utility falls 
with income, a result which is difficult to believe.
Table 5.3. Results o f the mixed Mover-Stayer model o f destination states at t  = 15 fo r  women who 
are movers and were working at t ^  3 . Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets.
Non-Choice- Full-Time Part-Time > 10 Hours Part-Time < 10 Hours
Specific Variables Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
exinly)
y t
-0.0118
(-2.74)
-0.0036 -0.0074
(-2.07)
-0.0006 -0.0087
(-1.63)
-0.0001
ex(ben)
y t
0.0823
(2.34)
0.0299 0.0255
(0.66)
-0.0031 0.0142
(0.30)
-0.0025
W ife’s Age 0.4345
(2.86)
0.1108 0.3589
(2.64)
0.0427 03524
(2.81)
0.0227
(W ife’s Age)2 -0.0054
(-2.69)
-0.0015 -0.0040
(-2.34)
-0.0004 -0.0066
(2.67)
-0.0003
Husband at Work 2.8504
(4.05)
0.4363 1.0704
(1.89)
0.0786 0.7277
(1.02)
-0.0788
Constant -12.4273
(-4.33)
- -10.0664
(-3.84)
- -12.7746
(-3.42)
—
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient t-Statistic
F-T
Marginal Effects x 102 
P-T>10 P-T<10 None
end{w)
y tj
0.0711 3.63 1.7219 1.5579 0.5709 1.0362
( > r i !
-0.0004 ‘2.90 -0.0091 -0.0082 -0.0030 -0.0055
crut(h)
y ti
-0.0044 •0.35 -0.1072 -0.0970 -0.0356 -0.0645
Number o f Observations: 559 Log Likelihood: -274.1
Notes: All money amounts are in pounds. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample probability of 
occupying the relevant state. Here, Pr(FT) -  0.411, P r(/T  > 10) = 0324 and Pr{PT  < 10) = 0.088.
The results for y'"J(>r) clearly show a statistically significant effect of economic l
variables on the labour supply decision of those women who were working at the 
relevant r - 1 .  In contrast, yf-<*># which is the variable of primary interest in these 
models, is completely insignificant at both the first and second interviews, indicating
155
that these women do not take the benefit income that their husbands receive into 
account when making their labour supply decisions.
There arc several reasons why this result might hold. First, there may not be 
pooling o f income in these households, a point which is discussed further below. 
Secondly, the wife’s beliefs as to the likely duration of her husband’s unemployment 
may counteract her evaluation of the effect of means testing on her optimal labour 
supply decision. However, the inclusion in the model of the destination state at t = 3 
of a dummy variable for whether the husband leaves his sampled unemployment spell
by / = 15, which might capture the expected duration of the husband’s unemployment,f
is firmly rejected by an LR test, which casts* some doubt on the validity of this second 
explanation.
In both Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, the part of household income that is
exogenous to the wife’s labour supply, but not received as unemployment payments by 
the husband, has a negative effect on the labour supply of the wife, which is significant 
in every case except for the probability o f choosing high part-time hours at t = 3 . As 
pointed out above, a well-determined effect is not expected for this variable at t -  3 , 
since most husbands are unemployed and not earning a wage, whereas its significance 
in the model of Table 5.3 is not surprising. The other sources o f income included in 
this variable, such as interest payments, child benefit and FIS, must be driving this 
result. This is in itself surprising, as these elements would not be expected to change 
significantly over time, so conditioning on the initial state might be expected to account 
for the effect of this variable.
A further surprising result is the retention of y“lbtn) in the model o f Table 5.3, 
but not in that o f Table 5.2. As noted above, the only variation in this variable at 
t = 15 is from husbands who have exited their sampled unemployment spell, and then 
re-entered unemployment, but are still entitled to UB. In Section 4.4, the point was 
made that can be expected to have a positive effect on the probability of
participation in the labour market to the extent that this variable picks up similarities in 
characteristics between UB-receiving husbands and their wives, and a negative effect 
to the extent that the variable is regarded as non-labour income by a wife. The positive 
effect on the probability o f working full-time here indicates that it is capturing similar
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characteristics between husbands and wives; it does not reflect the fact of the 
husband's unemployment, since this is accounted for by a dummy for his work status.
Demographic Variables
The age variable estimates from Table 5.2 indicate that the older a woman is, the more 
likely she is to be in part-time work at t — 3 , given that she worked at f = - l ;  the 
result for the effect on the probability o f working full-time is insignificant. For the 
destination state at t =  15, the results show a positive effect of age on the probability 
o f working either full-time or part-time as opposed to not working. The relationship is 
quadratic, with age reducing the probability o f working full-time beyond the age of 40, 
and beyond 45 and 42 for high and low part-time hours respectively. Overall, the effect 
o f age is to encourage working women to stay in work; perhaps as women get older, 
habit plays a greater role in the labour supply decisions of women, up to a certain 
point.
The most surprising results given in these models, however, are those for the 
variables for the presence of children of different ages in the household. Here, both 
pre-school and school-aged children are important to labour supply at the first 
interview, but not at the second interview. But more unexpected are the signs on the 
coefficients and marginal effects for these variables. They show that, at i = 3, younger 
children have a negative, but insignificant effect on the probability of working full-time, 
a completely insignificant effect on the probability of working high part-time hours, 
and a significant positive effect on the probability of working low part-time hours. 
Older children have no effect on the probability of working full-time or part-time, more 
than ten hours, but again have a positive effect on the probability o f working part-time, 
less than ten hours per week. At / = 15, children have no effect on any of the hours 
choices
Moreover, the marginal effects of these dummies for the presence of children 
are large, where positive. For example, the presence of a younger child in the 
household increases the probability of a woman working part-time, less than ten hours 
per week at t = 3 by nearly 15 points over the probability that she would have of 
working in this hours range if there were no young child in the household.
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It is not possible that this result arises only because o f the fact that all these 
women are already working, and thus are likely to have child-minding arrangements 
already in place when taking the decision modelled. This fact would explain 
insignificant results for the presence o f children, but not significant positive effects. 
Moreover, these positive coefficients for low hours of work also arise for women who 
do not work initially, as discussed in Section 5.4.2 below.
The pattern of the results across the different hours ranges, whereby the effects
are increasingly positive as the number o f hours worked decreases, suggests that there
is a positive effect of children of the probability of participation for these women that is
*
counteracting the usual negative effect, which typically decreases with the number of 
hours worked in any case. One possibility is that the positive effect of children on the 
probability of working is due to an ‘income’ effect caused by the higher needs of 
households with children. If, when a husband becomes unemployed, these needs are 
not matched by the definition of needs used in the calculation o f the entitlement to SB, 
then a woman may be more inclined to work if she has children. This positive effect 
may be counteracted by the usual negative effect o f children on the probability of 
working, which would explain why there tend to be negative effects of children for 
high hours ranges. In this case, the unimportance of children to the destination state at 
/  = 15 should be interpreted as the result o f the positive and negative effects 
counteracting each other for all hours ranges.
However, for the above explanation to be valid, there must be a plausible 
reason why a positive income effect would manifest itself in a dynamic model of labour 
supply, but not in a static one, or, alternatively, why the negative effect o f children 
would not be strong enough to counteract the always-present income effect o f children 
as usual. For those working initially, the likelihood of having child-care arrangements 
already established, thus reducing the search costs element o f the fixed costs o f 
working implied by children can be used as an explanation. The discussion of the 
results for those not working initially is postponed until these results are presented in 
Section 5.4.2.
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Husband's Work Status
The final variable that requires comment is the husband’s employment status variable, 
which is included in the specification of the destination state at t - 15. The results 
show that the husband being at work has a positive effect on the probability of the wife 
working in any of the three hours ranges, although the result is only clearly statistically 
significant for full-time work, and marginally significant for high part-time hours. The 
marginal effect of this variable on the likelihood of working full-time is also particularly 
large, with a 43 point increase in the probability of the average woman being observed 
in this hours range when this dummy is ‘switched on*. This result may indicate either 
complementarity of leisure times between husband and wife, or personal characteristics 
common to both husband and wife that make it more likely that both o f them work.
Other Variables
Finally, it is worth commenting on the variables that are absent from the specifications 
shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. First, the inclusion of many of the variables that may be 
included to control for heterogeneity was rejected by LR tests. I refer here to variables 
such as the number o f times the husband had been unemployed in the five years prior 
to the first interview, or whether the husband exited his sampled unemployment spell 
by the second interview. This suggests that conditioning on the state occupied by a 
woman at / — 1, and on her being a mover, provides adequate control for 
heterogeneity.
Further, it should be noted that the local rate of unemployment is not included 
in these specifications. This is plausible for two reasons: firstly, because women who 
are already working can choose to remain in the same job, although it might be 
expected that the unemployment rate would increase the probability of working if it 
encourages inertia because of fear of being unable to find another job should the 
household’s situation change again; but secondly, because areas o f high unemployment 
tend to have persistently high unemployment, and only changes in the rate of 
unemployment would be expected to affect the probability of a woman’s participation 
in the labour market.
159
5.4.2 Results fo r Movers Not W orking a t t  -1
In this section, the results of the mixed Mover-Stayer model for those not working at 
each of the two initial dates are reported and discussed. Table 5.4 gives the estimated 
results for the destination states chosen at t =  3 by women who are movers, but who 
did not work at r = - l ,  while Table 5.5 reports the estimated determinants of the 
labour force status at / = 15 of movers who were not working at t = 3 .
Table 5.4. Results o f the mixed Mover-Stayer model o f  destination states a t t = 3 for women who are 
movers and were not working at t - - \ .  Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets.
Non-Choice- Full-Tune Part-Time > 1 0  Hours Part-Time < 10 Hours
Specific Variables Coefficient
(r-Stoi.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
{t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient 
(t-Stat.) '
Marginal
Effect
ex(ben)
y. -0.0394(-1.45)
-0.0004 -0.0368
(-1.95)
-0.0008 0.0126 
(i0.46)
0.0002
Wife’s Age -0.1172
{-2.66)
-0.0013 -0.0497
{-1.96)
-0.0011 -0.0555
{-1.67)
-0.0006
Constant -0.9187
(*0.59)
- -1-5968
{-1.55)
- -2.1098
{-1.79)
—
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient t-Statistic
F-T
Marginal Effects x 102 
P-T>10 P-T<10 None
rnd(w)
( c ) 2
0.1071 3.48 0.1165 0.2303 0.1269 0.4698
-0.0005 -2.39 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0022
«**(*)
_____________
0.0556 2.78 0.0605 0.1196 0.0659 0.2440
Number o f Observations: 1072 Log Likelihood: -165.3
Notes: All money amounts are in pounds. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample probability of 
occupying the relevant state. H oe, Pr{FT) = 0.011, Pr(FT > 10) *  0.022 and PrfPT < 10) = 0.012.
Income Variables
The results shown in Table 5.4 indicate a strong importance o f economic variables for 
the labour supply decision at t — 3 o f women who were not working at f = —1. 
Turning first to the results for , the wage variable, the relationship with utility is 
shown to be quadratic, with a positive effect of wage income on utility, but only up to 
a weekly income o f £107 per week. Beyond this point, the effect is negative, again, 
well within the sample range of weekly wages. The coefficient size is also notable; it is 
larger than that found for either o f the models reported in the previous section for 
women working at t - 1 .  The marginal effects indicate that a £1 increase in the weekly
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wage would increase the probability of working of the average woman by between 0.1 
and 0.25 percentage points, and, if she received a £1 payment for not working she 
would be about 2 points more likely to be observed not working.
The most striking result of Table 5.4, however, is that has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on utility, a result that has not been found previously in 
this study. As to the size of its effect, it is smaller than that for the wage variable, 
although the fact that the latter is included as a quadratic makes direct comparison 
difficult. However, the results indicate that a £16 increase in the means-tested benefit 
income that a man would receive if his wife worked full-time would be necessary to 
increase his wife’s probability of working in that hours range by 1 percentage point, 
with a similar rise necessary to increase her probability of working in the low part-time 
hours range, and a raise of about £8 being sufficient to raise her probability of working 
part-time more than ten hours per week by 1 point. An increase of £4 in the benefit 
income which the household would receive if she did not work would increase her 
probability of not working from 95% to 96%.
It must, of course, be taken into account that many of those not working 
initially do not react at all to this or any other variable when making their labour supply 
decisions, by assumption, because they are stayers. Thus, if, for example, the earnings 
disregard of SB were increased from £4 per week to £8 per week, then amongst 
movers, the probability of choosing not to work would decrease from 95% to 94%. 
But since movers comprise just 26% of those not working at the key date according to 
S j , the effect on participation of the wives o f the unemployed would be to increase it 
by about 0.25%.
It is interesting to note that this result does not change significantly when 
stayers are included in the estimation sample, however. When the model is estimated 
over all women who were not working at t — -1 , the results are very similar to those 
reported in Table 5.4, both in terms of coefficient size and statistical significance.
Turning to the other income variable that is included, it is found to
have a negative effect on both the probability of working full-time and that of working 
high part-time hours, although the effect for the former hours range is not significant at 
usual levels of confidence. The negative marginal effects of this variable on the
16 1
probability of working in these hours ranges are o f a similar order to the positive 
effects of an increase in means-tested benefit income on these probabilities. These 
women appear to be much more sensitive to unemployment payments, whether 
endogenous or exogenous to their labour supply, than women who were working 
before their husbands became unemployed.
A possible reason for this is that pooling is more complete in households where 
a woman does not work outside the home, of necessity. Thus, if her husband becomes 
unemployed, the unemployment payments which he receives have a greater effect on 
her utility than if she were working. m
T
However, unlike women who worked at t = — 1, the women here, who were 
not working at that date do not appear to take y ^ ^  into account when making their 
labour supply decisions, although it should be pointed out that since there is little 
variation in the value of at t = 3 because o f the fact that all husbands are
registered as unemployed at that date, it is the emergence of this variable as statistically 
significant for women working at f =  - l  that is noteworthy rather than its non- 
significance in the case of women not working initially.
Turning to the results for income variables for women who were not working 
at t = 3 , the impression gained from Table 5.4 that women not working initially might 
be more sensitive to the functioning o f the benefit system than their working 
counterparts is reversed. The wage variable, is statistically significant and
positive, but smaller than that found for the destination state at t = 3 of women who 
were not working at r = -1 . Moreover, the means-tested benefit income variable, 
ye*{k), is once again insignificant, and y “ ("w does not emerge as important either.
One important point should be made about this particular model. In this case, 
when this model is estimated over all women not working at f =  3 , without accounting 
for the possibility that some individuals may be stayers, the wage effect is significant 
and negative, a result that contradicts a fundamental tenet of economic theory. It was, 
in fact, this result which motivated the adoption of the Mover-Stayer framework used 
here. The fact that this result changes completely when the possible presence of stayers 
is allowed for indicates that heterogeneity within the group o f women not working at 
t = 3 is severe. However, as mentioned above, for the estimation of the destination
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state occupied at t = 3 by those not working at / = -1 , accounting for stayers makes 
little difference to the estimates. It is also significant that this difference according to 
whether stayers are allowed for or not arises for women who were not working 
initially» as in Section 2.3.2, attention was drawn to the greater tendency of women 
working before their husbands' unemployment began to be movers.
Table 5.5. Results o f the mixed Mover-Stayer model o f destination states at t = 15 for women who 
are movers and were not working at t ~  3 . Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets.
Non-Choice- Full-Time Part-lim e > 10 Hours Part-lim e < 10 Hours
Specific Variables Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Coefficient
(t-Stat.)
Marginal
Effect
Number Children 
Aged (M
-1-5512
(-3.37)
-0.0512 -0.3006 (- 
0.88)
-0.0143 0.4884
(1.65)
0.0183
Number Children 
Aged > 4
-0.2541
W O )
-0.0098 0.4658
(2.74)
0.0247 0.4934
(2.66)
0.0157
Wife’s Age -0.0275
(-L3D
-0.0010 0.0385
(1.71)
0.0021 0.0095
(0.37)
0.0003
Husband at Work 1.7673
(2.79)
0.0798 2.9289
(5.93)
0.3331 1.9202
(4.63)
0.0956
Constant -1.7675
( -U 4 )
- -5.0575
(4.28)
— -3.8271
(-3.28)
-
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient t-Statistic
F-T
Marginal Effects x 101 
P-T>10 P-T<10 None
end(w)
y tj
end(h)
0.0184 2.01 0.0586 0.0938 0.0586 0.1939
-0.0063 -0.48 -0.0200 -0.0321 -0.0200 -0.0663
No. Observations; 1154 Log Likelihood: -320.0
Notes: All money amounts are in pounds. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample probability of 
occupying the relevant state. Here, Pr(/*T) = 0.033, Pr(FT > 10) = 0.054 and PrfPT < 10) = 0.033.
Finally, it is useful to point out that when the model of transitions between the 
key date and the second interview is estimated, thereby modelling the choice at t =  15 
o f those who were not working before their husbands* unemployment spells began, 
does not emerge as significant. Thus, not only is the significant effect of means- 
tested benefit income limited to movers who did not work before their husbands* 
unemployment spells began, it also appears to be a short-term effect
Demographic Variables
I turn now to the results for the variables representing children in these two models. 
First, no variables for either the presence o f or the number of children of different ages
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in the household were retained in the model of the destination state at t = 3 . For the 
model of Table 5.5, on the other hand, both younger and older children were found to 
be important to labour supply, with the same pattern as described above for transitions 
by women who did work at t = — 1 of increasingly positive coefficients for decreasing 
hours of work. There it was suggested that a positive income effect of children might 
be outweighing the usual negative effects of children on labour supply. For women 
who worked initially, having child-care arrangements already in place might be 
sufficient to suppress the usual negative effect of children, but for women not working 
initially, a different mechanism must be relevant. It may be that cross-section models
it
find that women with children work less not because children actually have a negative 
effect on labour supply, but because they proxy an absence from the labour force 
which makes it more difficult to enter or re-enter the labour force, because of true state 
dependence.
In the model of the state occupied at t — 3 by women who were not working 
before their husbands* sampled unemployment spells began, age has a negative effect 
on the probability o f working any positive hours. The older a woman is, the less likely 
she is to work full-time or high part-time hours at the first interview, given that she is a 
mover who was not working at the key date; the same is also true for low part-time 
hours, although this effect is only marginally significant. Taken together, this means 
that an older woman is least likely to enter the labour force immediately after her 
husband becomes unemployed. For the destination state at the date of the second 
interview, however, there is a marginally positive effect o f age on the probability of 
working high part-time hours.
Husband*s Work Status
One o f the more interesting results given in these two tables is that for the work status 
of the husband. For women not working initially, this effect is positive for all three 
destination states involving positive hours of work. Unlike the case of initial workers, 
however, the coefficients are significant for all three working states. In this case, the 
coefficient is particularly large for its effect on the probability o f working high part- 
time hours. The fact that the results are so much better determined in this case seem to 
indicate that for women working initially, the complementarity between their leisure 
times and their husbands’ is less strong. This may be because o f the endogeneity o f
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tastes referred to in Section 5.1, whereby habit may mean that women who work at 
/ -1  become accustomed to spending less time with their husbands.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a mixed Mover-Stayer model was chosen as the appropriate vehicle for 
controlling for both true state dependence of destination states, and unobserved 
heterogeneity of the sample. Thus, the labour market states occupied by the wife at the 
two dates subsequent to the husband becoming unemployed, given that she was either 
working or not working at the previous date, are modelled for movers only. Stayers 
have a zero probability of making a transition. It was estimated that:
• Of those not working before their husbands* unemployment began, 74% are stayers, 
with corresponding figures for the proportion of stayers of 57%, 51% and 31% 
among those working full-time, high part-time and low part-time hours at the key 
date.
The results obtained for women working initially who are movers are:
• There is no evidence that these women take their husband’s benefit income into 
account when deciding on their optimal labour market states.
• The presence of children causes these women to be more likely to work, due to an 
income effect of their husbands’ unemployment
• Complementarity of leisure times emerges as an important determinant of a 
woman’s labour supply.
For women not working initially, the results are similar, with the exception
that:
• These women are less likely to work a given number of hours the lower their 
husbands’ means tested benefits when they work that number of hours. However, 
this effect is a short-term one, determining transitions only in the period 
immediately after a husband’s unemployment begins. Moreover, because it applies 
only to movers, who are a small proportion of those working initially, the 
aggregate effect of the means testing of benefits is small.
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6. Conclusions
This chapter attempts to provide an overview of the conclusions drawn in this thesis. 
To this end, Section 6.1 gives an assessment of the contribution that this thesis makes 
to the understanding of the labour supply of the wives of unemployed men. In order to 
put these results in context. Section 6.2 recalls the explanations that were suggested as 
candidates in accounting for the absence in aggregate data o f an added worker effect in 
Section 1.1, and details the support found in the thesis for each of these explanations. 
Where there are contradictions within the thesis, the likely sources of the 
inconsistencies are identified. Finally, as is customary, Section 6.3 makes some 
recommendations regarding the direction any future research on the question of the 
labour supply of women married to unemployed men should take, with particular 
consideration of the format a survey used to examine the issue might take.
6.1 The Contribution of this Thesis to the Understanding of the 
Labour Supply of the Wives of Unemployed Men
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the labour supply o f the wives of 
unemployed men in several ways, detailed below.
Data
I use a data source that has not been used before to analyse the issues involved. The 
LSU survey is unusually rich for the purposes at hand, both in terms of sample size and 
information collected; this makes it surprising that this is the first attempt to exploit it 
to investigate the labour market behaviour of the wives of unemployed men.
Variable Specification
The variables used to test the effects of the means testing o f benefits have been 
specified veiy carefully. The advantages of these specifications over those used in other 
studies are outlined below.
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• Household income is specified for each of four different hours of work o f the wife. 
Given that the disincentives to work part-time are expected to be stronger than the 
disincentives to work full-time, a point supported by the analysis of household 
incomes under means testing regimes in Chapter 3, the modelling of the 
participation decision as one determined by the income at the participation margin, 
when the wife works zero hours, is likely to yield misleading results. This was the 
approach taken in, for example, Kell and Wright (1990) and Garcia (1991).
• Throughout the thesis, a distinction is drawn between the income that a woman
receives that is endogenous to her labour supply, and that which her husband
9
receives. This allows for the possibility that women get different utility from 
income that they themselves earn than from that which is received by their 
husbands, either due to the absence of income pooling, because they feel less 
entitled to spend income received by their husbands, or because they do not 
perceive the true effect of their hours of work on means-tested benefits.
• Housing Benefit entitlements are included as means tested income. This is 
important given the evidence discussed in Chapter 3 regarding the severe 
discontinuities introduced by HB. This benefit is not included in specifying means- 
tested income in the Garcia (1991) paper.
Methodology
The econometric models used in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis are well suited to the 
examination of the issues of interest, and have not previously been applied to the 
labour supply of the wives of unemployed men. The important and novel features o f 
the models used are indicated below.
• In Chapter 4, the multinomial version o f the Fixed Effects Conditional Logit model 
was applied to the data. The use o f the binomial FECL model has become 
increasingly common in recent years, but there are few examples of the use of the 
multinomial version, and none for the topic addressed here. The fact that this 
model is not commonly applied is reflected in its non-availability in any of the 
popular statistical software packages, which meant that it was necessary to 
program the likelihood function and maximize it using an appropriate routine. 
Thus, the use o f the multinomial FECL is in itself a novelty.
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• In Chapter 5, the Mover-Stayer model is used. Although several studies, including 
for example, Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) and Lundberg (1985) use Markov 
models of the labour market transitions of married women to infer the reaction of 
women to their husbands’ unemployment, accounting for heterogeneity by allowing 
for the possibility that there are stayers in the sample has not been done before for 
the labour supply of the wives of unemployed men.
• In the application o f the Mover-Stayer model, the estimation o f the proportion of 
stayers in the sample, using a method based on a proposal by Frydman (1984), 
rather than making an assumption about its value, allows the efficiency of the 
model to be improved; again, this extension of the Mover-Stayer model has not 
been attempted previously.
Results
The results of the analysis of the LSUS data extend the existing understanding of how a
woman’s labour market behaviour is affected by her husband’s unemployment, as
follows:
• Strong evidence is found, in the descriptive analysis of the transitions data of 
Chapter 2, of differences in the patterns of transitions between different types of 
wives. The reality that these wives have a lower participation rate prior to their 
husbands’ unemployment is well established, as detailed in Table 1.1, but to this 
fact, evidence is added on the variation in pre-unemployment participation rates of 
women according to their husbands’ duration of unemployment and their benefit 
entitlements.
• The disincentives to work generated, in theory, by the British benefit system are 
well-known, and described in detail in, for example, Dilnot and Kell (1989). By 
examining household income carefully, as in Chapter 3, information on the extent 
of these disincentives in practice can be added. This analysis showed that although, 
as in theory, the disincentives to work appear to be stronger for part-time than full­
time workers, the differences are not very large among the women in the LSU 
survey. Moreover, the differences between households entitled to SB and UB are 
not as strong as might be expected; this is because both the receipt of HB and the 
joint receipt of UB and SB blur the distinctions that arise in theory.
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• Strong evidence emerges suggesting that means-tested benefits are not important 
determinants of the labour supply o f the wives o f unemployed men. Only for 
women not working before their husbands* unemployment began does it appear 
that the amount of means-tested benefit income is a  determinant of their behaviour, 
and even then, the effect appears to be a short-run one.
6.2 Explanations of the Level of Labour Supply of the Wives of 
Unemployed Men
«*
6.2.1 Local Labour Market Conditions and the Discouraged Worker Effect
As outlined in Section 1.1, a high rate of local unemployment may explain the negative 
correlation between the unemployment o f husbands and the rate of employment of 
their wives if the same shock to the labour market that caused a man’s unemployment 
reduces the probability of his wife finding a job if she decides to seek one. In this case, 
any added worker effect (AWE) is suppressed. Alternatively, a high rate of local 
unemployment may reduce participation by discouraging women from entering the 
labour market.
Given the lack of data on whether individual women are seeking work in the 
LSUS survey, the possible importance of local labour market conditions is accounted 
for by including a measure of the local rate of unemployment as a control variable in 
the econometric analyses of Chapters 4 and 5; thus, no distinction can be drawn 
between demand-side and discouraged worker effects of unemployment
The results obtained are not entirely conclusive. In the fixed effects model of 
Chapter 4, whose results are shown in Table 4.3, there is a  marginally significant 
negative effect of the local unemployment rate on the probability of a woman working 
high part-time hours, with a large marginal effect, a one point increase in the local 
unemployment rate decreasing the probability of working in this hours range by nearly 
3 points. For other hours of work possibilities, however, the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant
When the Mover-Stayer model is applied to the data, the results show that both 
for women not working initially and for those working initially, the inclusion of the
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local unemployment rate is rejected in every case. This result is surprising, as it might 
be expected that a model that allows for different effects according to the initial state 
occupied would be better able to capture the importance of local unemployment to a 
wife's labour market state than the static FECL model, since it seems reasonable that 
the effect of unemployment on the probability of a woman’s starting to work would be 
negative, whilst the effect on the probability of a woman’s continuing to work would 
be positive, discouraging her from giving up a job for any reason that might be 
temporary, such as her husband’s unemployment
Overall, the evidence of the importance of the local unemployment rate is 
weak, and it seems that this is not a major factor determining the labour supply of the 
wives of the unemployed. However, two points suggest that this conclusion can be 
drawn only tentatively. First, to the extent that high unemployment tends to persist in 
given areas, the controls for heterogeneity in the sample may account for the 
discouraged worker effect of locally high unemployment. And secondly, it should be 
noted that the control used for local unemployment here is the county unemployment 
rate; the travel-to-work area unemployment rate would be preferable, but was 
unavailable.
6.2.2 Sim ilar Characteristics of Husbands and Wives
In many ways, the LSUS data are not well-suited to allowing for the possibility that 
characteristics common to both partners in a marriage determine their labour supply. In 
particular, information on neither the education level nor the race o f the spouses was 
collected, so that variables that are usually classified as observables are unobserved, 
rendering accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the women especially important, 
and at the same time making any distinction between the importance of characteristics 
that are usually observable impossible. Despite the absence of some variables which are 
usually available, however, the panel nature of the survey allows unobserved 
heterogeneity to be accounted for, whether by the use of the FECL mode! of Chapter 4 
or of the Mover-Stayer model of Chapter 5.
The relevance of similar characteristics cannot be measured directly, but can be 
inferred in several ways from the thesis. First, the results o f the tabulations included in 
Section 2.3.3, showing the transitions made by women according to whether their
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husbands had left their sampled unemployment spells by the date of the second 
interview or not, indicate that women whose husbands have longer spells are less likely 
to be added workers after their husbands become unemployed, and are less likely to 
have been working before their husbands became unemployed. Because it is likely that 
men who exit sooner have favourable labour market characteristics, this indicates a 
correlation between the labour market characteristics of individuals.
On the other hand, when this variable is included in the econometric 
specifications of Chapter 5 as a dummy equal to one if the husband exited his 
unemployment spell, it is not retained in any model This is probably because the
5-»
account that is taken of unobserved heterogeneity in using a Mover-Stayer model 
already controls for the importance o f such proxy variables. Nor are other observable 
variables which might be expected to proxy characteristics of the husband which may 
be shared by his wife significant in any o f  the models accounting for heterogeneity. 
Significantly, however, the number of spells of unemployment the husband has had in 
the previous five years has a significant negative effect on the probability of working 
full-time or high part-time hours in the pooled conditional logit model, reported in 
Table 4.2, which does not control for unobserved heterogeneity.
More formally, the importance of unobserved characteristics can be judged by 
the comparison of the pooled conditional logit model reported in Table 4.2 and the 
FECL model of Table 4.3; the formal test o f the difference between the results from 
these two models, the Hausman test outlined in Section 4.S.2, indicates that accounting 
for heterogeneity is important, the hypothesis of homogeneity being firmly rejected.
Hence, while unobservables* importance cannot be quantified, the approaches 
used in the thesis allow me to infer that this is indeed an important factor in explaining 
the low level o f labour supply of women married to unemployed men. This result is not 
surprising given the fact that variables such as education and race can be accounted for 
only as unobservables. To go further and demonstrate clearly that it is similarities in 
these unobservables between husband and wife that drive the absence of an AWE in 
the wives o f unemployed men is not possible here.
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6.2.3 Complementarity of Leisure Times of Husbands and Wives
In testing for the importance of the complementarity of leisure times, it is necessary to 
control for the financial effects o f unemployment; thus, in Chapters 4 and 5, carefully 
specified variables for the income of the household given the husband’s employment 
situation are included. Moreover, because a correlation between the employment status 
of husbands and wives can also emerge due to their having similar labour market 
characteristics, it is important to account for heterogeneity; this is achieved by using 
models which control for heterogeneity in Chapters 4 and 5, applying the FECL and 
Mover-Stayer models respectively.
The results obtained show a remarkably consistent, large, positive effect of a 
husband’s unemployment on the probability of his wife working. For the FECL model 
of Chapter 4, the effect of a husband’s being employed is to increase his wife’s 
probability of working either full-time or low part-time hours by 13 points.
For the Mover-Stayer model, Table 5.3 shows a similar pattern in the 
coefficients on the husband’s job status for movers who were working at the first 
interview,1 the husband’s working increasing the probability of his wife’s working full­
time by 44 points, and of her working high part-time hours by 7 points. However, the 
statistical significance of the variable in this model is lower than in the FECL model; 
while the coefficient for full-time work is significant, that for high part-time hours is 
significant at the 10% level but not at the 5% level, and that for low hours part-time 
work not at all.
Interestingly, for women who are movers, but not working at the first 
interview, the results o f the Mover-Stayer model show that the coefficients for all three 
hours choices are significant. For these women, the largest positive effect is on high 
part-time hours of work rather than full-time work. These results, with higher levels of 
statistical significance in all hours ranges for those not working at the first interview 
than for women working at that date, offer some support for the possibility that the 
correlation between the employment status of husbands and wives is due to the
1 Recall that this variable cannot be included for transitions between the key date and the first 
interview, as all husbands are unemployed at the tatter date, so there is no variation in the husband’s 
job  status.
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unwillingness of wives to take on the bread-winning role of the husband when he 
becomes unemployed, rather then because o f a desire to spend as much time together 
as possible. This suggests that the complementarity o f leisure times found in every 
model applied in this thesis is specific to the wives o f unemployed men, and to the 
situation in which these women find themselves. Thus, similar results should not 
necessarily be expected in models o f the labour supply of all women.
6.2.4 Inertia and Adjustment Delays
Although neither the implications of women’s expectations o f the duration of their
a
husbands* unemployment, nor o f the time «taken to implement decisions to change 
employment status are incorporated in a structural model that addresses them directly, 
some evidence on the importance of these dynamic issues may be inferred from the 
analysis in this thesis.
With reference to the importance of adjustment delays, it is noted in Section
2.3.1 that the average monthly rate o f transition in the LSUS data between t =  -1 and 
f = 3 is greater than that between t = 3 and t = 15; the monthly rate of entry to the 
labour market is 1% between t = 3 and / =  15, and slightly higher between t = -1  and 
t = 3 , while for exit, the monthly rates are 1.5% between t = 3 and t = 15, and 4.3% 
between / = -1 and f = 3 . These statistics indicate that much of the reaction to 
women’s husbands becoming unemployed occurs in the period immediately following 
the start o f the unemployment spell, suggesting that for many individuals, desired 
adjustments are achieved within three months of the change in the household situation.
As to the effect of the husband’s unemployment spell being expected to be 
short on the wife’s response to his unemployment, this is accounted for in the Mover- 
Stayer models estimated for the state at the first interview by including in the 
specifications a dummy variable for whether the husband exits his sampled spell by the 
date of the second interview. If the expectations of wives as to the duration of their 
husbands* unemployment spells are rational, then when used as an explanatory variable 
for the state occupied by the wives at the date of the first interview, when all husbands 
are still unemployed, this variable reflects the expected duration of an unemployment 
spell, albeit in very approximate terms. This variable may also be interpreted as a proxy 
for characteristics o f the husband which are shared by the wife; for those working
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initially, the two effects would reinforce each other, whereas for those not working at a 
given t - 1 ,  this variable would be expected to have two opposing effects. Thus, it is 
important to account for unobserved heterogeneity amongst the wives in order to 
allow the ‘expected duration’ effect to emerge. This is achieved in the use of a Mover* 
Stayer model by conditioning both on the initial state and on being a mover. This 
variable cannot be used in the FECL model as it is not time-varying.
If the expectation o f the duration o f the husband’s unemployment is important, 
the dummy for the husband having exited his spell by the second interview is expected 
to have a positive effect on the probability of working women continuing to work, and
p-
a negative effect on the probability of non-working women beginning to work. In fact, 
the variable has no effect on either transition type. Thus, there is no evidence that the 
eventual duration of the unemployment spell is related to the wife’s labour supply
decision.
However, it must be borne in mind that the variable used to capture this effect 
is crude, being a dummy, and relying on the assumption that women are all correct in 
their assessments o f how long their husbands can be expected to be out of work, or at 
least that if they are wrong, as is possible given the point mentioned in Section 2.2.3 
that the rate of long term unemployment increased dramatically in the years in which 
the survey was conducted, they are all wrong to the same extent. It seems conceivable 
that individuals differ in the degree of optimism about an event such as a husband 
becoming unemployed.
Note, however, that the use of a Markov model, in which the state occupied 
may depend on the state occupied in the previous period also accounts for adjustment 
delays to the extent that such delays differ according to the state initially occupied. The 
importance of state dependence can be assessed by comparing the specifications and 
results of the models estimated for those working initially and for those not working 
initially. Given the differences described in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, it is clear that 
there is state dependence, which may be caused by adjustment delays that are specific 
to the state occupied initially.
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The results obtained in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate only patchy evidence of women 
taking the income received by their husbands that is exogenous to their labour supply 
into consideration. The variables that are relevant to the presence of an AWE in these 
chapters are y " lbfn\  exogenous UB income, and y*x{Hty\  other exogenous household 
income, which includes the husband’s wage income, if any. In the FECL model, there 
is no effect of y " ibtn) found, whereas y“ {Hty) is found to have a significant negative 
effect on the probability of working in all three positive hours ranges, albeit with small 
effects, of less than a tenth of a percentage point
For the Mover-Stayer model, the results differ according to the initial state 
conditioned on. For women working initially, the results, shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, 
are similar to those obtained using the FECL model in that they show a negative effect 
of y" infy). For transitions between t =  — 1 and t = 3 , however, the marginal effect of 
y<n*iy) on the probability of being observed in full-time work is over two points, and 
0.5 points for low part-time hours, which are large effects compared to other models, 
and to the results typically found for British women; the negative effect of non-labour 
income on the probability of working at t =  15 for women working at t = 3 is, as is 
more usual, small, at up to one third o f a percentage point. y 'x{btn) has a positive effect 
on the probability of working full-time at this date, reflecting positive unobserved 
heterogeneity rather than an income effect
For movers who are non-workers initially, on the other hand, the results of the 
Mover-Stayer model reported in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show no effect of y 'x{nly) either for 
the destination state at t -  3 or for that at t = 15, but do indicate a negative effect of 
y'Mtoti) on the probability of working either full-time or high part-time hours at t = 3 , 
although the coefficient on the probability of working full-time is not significant at 
conventional confidence levels, yf*4“0 is found to have no effect on the probability of 
working at t -  15.
Thus, the results show that in every model, the husband’s income, whether 
from working, or UB, or both, is a determinant of the wife’s labour supply behaviour, 
except in determining the labour supply at t = 15 of women not working at t -  3.
6.2.5 Unemployment Insurance and  the Added W orker Effect
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Chapter 3 deals extensively with the nature of the disincentives generated by the means 
testing of UB, SB and HB in Britain in 1983-84. In Section 3.5, median effective 
average tax rates o f between 58% and 90%, depending on the point in time and the 
number of hours of work concerned, are illustrated. The examples of specific 
households given in Section 3.4 illustrate the functioning of the benefit system clearly.
Despite the clear disincentives to work that exist, Section 3.6, which analyses 
the relationship between women's attitudes to working while their husbands are 
unemployed and the relevant effective tax. rate, shows only tentative evidence that 
women's attitudes to the benefits of working while their husbands are unemployed are 
determined by the financial implications o f the means testing o f benefits. Although, as 
shown in Table 3.11, it is true that those believing their working not to be worthwhile 
tend to be more highly taxed by the means testing of benefits than those who believe 
their working to be worthwhile financially, the median tax rate affecting this latter 
group is nonetheless calculated to be between 57% and 70% o f net wage income, 
which is very high.
This impression that the disincentive effect of means testing has little 
importance in determining the labour supply of the wives o f  unemployed men is 
confirmed to a large extent by the econometric analyses of Chapters 4 and 5. The fixed 
effects model of Chapter 4 finds that the potential benefit income that is endogenous to 
the wife's labour supply has no effect on the wife’s labour supply decision. Similar 
results are found for women working initially when the Mover-Stayer model is applied 
in Chapter 5, both for t -  3 and /  = 15. The exception to the rule arises for the state 
occupied at the first interview by women who are movers and were not working before 
their husbands* unemployment began. Here, the benefit income which a husband 
receives is an important determinant o f his wife's labour supply, with a coefficient 
about half the size of that on the weekly wage variable in that particular model, and of 
a  similar size to that found for the wage variables in the other models estimated. Thus, 
the econometric analysis indicates that the effect of means testing on benefits is to 
make women not working initially and who are movers less likely to start working 
immediately after their husbands become unemployed, the greater is the tax imposed by
6.2.6 The Means Testing of Unemployment Payments
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means testing. Since movers comprise just 26% of all women not working at the key 
date, and hence just 17% of all wives in the LSUS sample, this effect is small.
The policy implications of these results are clean the recent increase in the 
extent to which households headed by unemployed men are means tested, owing to the 
reduction of the UB entitlement period from a year to six months, will not decrease the 
participation o f the wives o f  unemployed men in the labour market further. The 
sources of the differences in participation rates lie elsewhere.
6.3 The Direction of Future Research
Recommendations for future research may be made both in terms of the data required 
to improve on the analysis contained here, and in terms of the behaviour that should be 
focused on.
Data
Although the LSU survey is richer than most surveys available to investigate the labour 
supply of the women married to unemployed men, there were limitations imposed by it 
that could be avoided in collecting data for future research. These are addressed here.
• Some data were not included in the survey that would be neither expensive nor 
sensitive to collect, and whose absence created difficulties at some points in the 
thesis. I refer here to information on education and race. A more general point that 
can be made is that household surveys that focus on unemployed individuals should 
ideally collect as much information as possible on characteristics that may be 
shared by spouses, and that are relevant to their labour force participation.
• It is a drawback of the LSUS that information on just three points in time are 
available, although this survey strategy clearly has enormous advantages over a 
single cross-section. Whilst the Mover-Stayer model is useful in accounting for 
heterogeneity at the same time as true state dependence, albeit it in a rather ad hoc 
manner, it is probably not the most efficient way of dealing with these important 
issues. Had data for four or more points in time been collected, both fixed 
individual-specific effects and dynamics could be accounted for in one model, as 
indicated in Magnac (1996).
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Intra-Household Allocation o f Income
One of the most interesting points raised by this thesis is the limited extent to which the 
neo-classical assumption that households may be treated as a single entity is supported. 
It would be interesting and useful to investigate how income within the household is 
allocated, and whether this allocation mechanism changes in times of a husband's 
unemployment.
Complementarity o f Leisure Times
The result that a complementarity of leisure times between husbands and wives 
dominates the reactions of women to their husbands’ unemployment is a strong one. It 
would be interesting to explore whether this complementarity arises only in times of 
the unemployment of the ‘primary earner’, or holds more generally. In other words, it 
seems possible that there is an asymmetry in the complementarity o f leisure times at the 
point of participation, so that whilst complementarity holds where a husband is not 
working, leisure times are substitutable if he works beyond a certain number of hours. 
This possibility seems worthy of investigation.
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Appendix A Details of British Tax, National
Insurance and Benefit Rules, 1983-84
A l. Tax System Rules
• The Single Person's Allowance was £1,785 in 1983-84 and £2,005 in 1984-85.
• Tax rates for the relevant financial years were as follows:
Table A l. Tax rates fo r ¡983-84 and 1984-85.
Tax Rate Applies to Annual Taxable 
Income Between (£)
Tax Rate 1983-1984 1984-1985
30% 0 - 14,600 0-15 ,400
40% 14,601 - 17,200 15,401 - 18,200
45% 17,201 - 21,800 18,201 -23,100
50% 21,801-28,900 23,101-30,600
55% 28,901-36.000 30.601-38.100
60% 36,001 - 38,100-
A2. National Insurance System Rules
• In both 1983-84 and 1984-85, the Class 1 contribution rate was 9% for contracted- 
in employees.
• The annual lower earnings Limit, below which no contributions were paid, was 
£1,689.96 in 1983-84 and £1,767.96 in 198485.
• The annual upper earnings limit above which no further contributions were paid 
was £12,219.96 in 1983-84 and £12,999.96 in 1984-85.
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A3. Unemployment Benefit Rules
The basic rates of UB payment were:
Table A2. Weekly basic UB fo r  1983-84 and 1984-85.
Rate o f UB Entitlement of Husband
Year Full Rate Three-Quarter Rate Half Rate
1983-84 £25.00 £18.75 £12.50
1984-84 £26.90 £20.29 £13.53
• The allowances for a dependant wife, who is defined to be one who does not earn
4'
more than the amount of the dependant’s allowance, were:
Table A3. Weekly UB dependant’s allowances fo r  1983-84 and 1984-85.
Rate o f UB Entitlement of Husband
Year Full Rate Three-Quarter Rate Half Rate
1983-84 £15.45 £11.59 £7.73
1984-84 £16.70 £1253 £8.35
• The UB allowance for each dependant child was 30p in 1983-84 and 15p in 1984- 
85. It was abolished in the following year.
A4. Supplementary Benefit Rules
• Needs were defined according to: •
Table A4. Amounts o f weekly ’needs* fo r  SB purposes.
Family Component 1983-84 1984-85
Couple £41.70 £43.50
Child Aged Under 10 Years £8.75 £9.15
Child Aged 11-15 Years £13.15 £13.70
Dependant Child Aged 16-17 £15.80 £16.50
Dependant Child Aged 18 £2055 £20.55
• Heating allowances, added to needs if there was someone in the household aged 
under 4 years, or over 70 years, were £1.90 in 1983-84 and £2.05 in 1984-85.
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An allowance for home maintenance was paid if the head of household owned ha 
own home. This amount was £1.70 in both years.
A5. Standard Housing Benefit Rules
• Needs were defined according to:
Table AS. Amounts o f weekly ‘needs'for HB purposes.
Family Component 1983-84 1984-85
Couple ^ £61.00 £63.50
Each Dependant Child £11.40 £12.90
• The "starting figure' for standard HB was 60% of rent and rates paid. Deductions 
from the ‘starting figure’ for non-dependants were:
Table A6. Amounts of deductions from the HB ‘starting figure' for non­
dependants.
1983-84 1984-85
Age of Non-Dependant Rent Rates Rent Rates
18-20 Years £3.95 £1.60 £6.15 £2.05
21 Years - Pensionable Age £4.70 £1.85 £6.15 £2.05
Over Pensionable Age £2.20 £0.90 £2.20 £090
• The rules for the calculation of the amount of HB payable were:
Table A7. Taper rules fo r HB.
1983-84 1984-85
Taper Rule Rent Rates Rent Rates
If Needs > Resources. Add % of Difference to 
‘Starting Figure*
25% 8% 25% 8%
If Needs < Resources. Subtract % of Difference 
from ‘Starting Figure’
21% 7% 26% 9%
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Appendix B Individual Likelihood Contributions for 
Fixed-Effects Models
Section 4.2.2 includes the individual likelihood contributions for two types of FECL 
models. The first of these is the simplest case, the two period, binomial choice model 
with no choice-specific variables. The second is the model used in Chapter 4, the multi­
period, multinomial choice model with choice-specific variables. For completeness, this 
appendix gives a further two cases
B l. The Individual Likelihood Contribution in the Two Period, 
Binomial Choice FECL Model with Choice-Specific Variables
If the variables are choice-specific, then the choice in each period is a conditional logit 
one; substituting this means that Pr[(a,b)|j*a = l,s» = l] should be expressed as:
expCpxia+ a)  exp(pX2*+a)(p exp(pX2*+a)
[exp(Pxia+a )+exp(pxi*+a)] • [exp(px2*+a)+exp(px2*+a)]
expCpxia +  a )  • exp(px2*+ a )
[exp(pxifl +  a) * exp(pX2*+ a)]+ [exp(Pxw>+ a) • exp(pX2*+ a)]
exp[p(xia + X2fc)+ 2a]
exp[P(xia + X2») + 2a]+exp[p(xw + X2*)+2a]
1 + exp[p(xi» + X2a) + 2a -  P(xi« + xw) -  2a] 1
1 +  exp[p[(x2a -  X2*> -  (xi* -  XI»)]]
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B2. The Individual Likelihood Contribution in the Multi-Period, 
Multinomial Choice FECL Model with No Choice-Specific 
Variables
With three time periods, f = l,23  and three states, j  = a,i>,c, for a sequence of
(a,b,b) , w.ifl = 1, Win. = 0 , wir = 0 ,  wi* = 0 ,  wub = 1, w.ic = 0 ,  Wiu = 0 , w,ib = 1,
wi3c = 0 and j « = 1, su> = 2 , s« = 0 . So
PT[(a,byb)\sia = 1,Sib = 2,Sic -  0] = Pr[(fl>f£»)I(a,bjb) or (b,atb) or (b,b,a)]
_____________________ Pr[w.ia = 1]»Pr[tva* =  !]♦ Pr[w<3* =  1]___________________
i" Pr[w.ia =  1] • Pr[wi2* = 1] • Pr[wi3* =  1] + Prfwi* = 1J • Pr[wua = 1] • Pr(w«* = 1] "I
[_ + Prfvviii» = 1] * Pr[w/2* = 1] * Pr[w3« = 1]J
If the variables are not choice specific, so that the choice at each date is modelled as a 
multinomial logit one, then this expression becomes:
_____________ exp(p«xt + a ) • exp(pbX2 + a) ■ exp(pbX3+a )_____________
[exp(pdti + a ) + exp(pbxi + a ) + exp(p«xi + a )] * [exp(p»x2 + a )  + exp(PbX2 + a )
exp(pcX2 + a)] * [exp(p^C3 + a) + exp(pbX3 + a )  + exp(PcX3 + a)]
[exp(p*xi + a )  * exp(pbX2 + a) • exp(pbX3 + a)] + [exp(pbxi + a ) • exp(p«X2 + a )
______________ * exp(pbX3 -f a )]  + [exp(PbXi + a ) • exp(pbX2 + a )  • exp(p»X3 + a)]
[exp(P*xi + a ) + exp(ptxi + a)  + exp(pcxi + a)] - [exp(p»X2 + a ) + exp(PbX2 + a)
+ exp(pex: + a)] ■ [exp(p«X3 + a )  + exp(PbX3 + a )  + exp(p«X3 + a) j
____________________ exp(p«xi + pbX2 + pbX3 + 3«)__________________________
[exp(p*xi 4* pbX2 +  pbX3 + 3a )  + exp(pbXi +  p*xz + pbX3 + 3 a ) + exp(PtXi + PbXi +  p«X3 +  3 a)]
_____________________exp[p«xi + pb(x2 +  X3)]___________________
exp[p*xi + pb(X2 + X3)] + exp[p«x2 + pb(xi + X3)]+exp[p*X3 + pb(xi + x:)]
Similarly,
194
Pr[(¿>,a,¿>)l(a,£f6) or (bta,b) or (b,b,a)] -
exp[ß.X2 + ßo(xi+ Xi)]
exp[ß«xi + ßb(x2 + X3)] + exp[ßjt2 + ß*(xi + xj)]+ exp[ß»X3 + ß*(xi + X2)] 
and
Pr[(b,b,a)\(aib,b) or (b,a,b) or (¿>,6,ö)] =
exp[ß«X3+ ßb(xi + X2)]
CXp[ß*Xl + ßt»(X2 + X3>] + CXp[ß*X2 + ßb(Xl + X3)] + CXp[ß»X3 + ßb(Xt + X2)]
and so on. :
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Appendix C STATA Program for Multinomial
Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit Model
The data set used in the estimation of the model is as follows:
• The individual identifier is 'newease ’. Each newcase has 12 observations, one for 
each state and each date.
• I constructed a variable 'alt' for each individual, with values running from 1 to 96, 
according to the choice sequence observed. Values of alt from 1 to 36 represent 
sequences with two states the same in the choice sequence, for example (a,b,b) . 
Values between 37 and 60 give sequences with three different states over the 
survey period, for example (a,b,c) . Values from 61 to 96 are for sequences with a 
state missing at one of the three dates.
• I constructed 6 variables, d l to d6 to represent the elements o f D, the alternative 
choice sequences with the same stj as that actually observed. In each case, dl is 
one for the state actually observed at a date, and zero otherwise, so dl is the actual 
choice sequence. For individuals with a state missing at one o f the dates {alt = 61 
to alt = 96), there is only one element of D apart from dU so d3 to d6 are missing. 
For individuals with the same state at two of the dates (alt =  1 to alt = 36 ), there 
are two elements of D apart from d l. Individuals with three different states 
( alt = 37 to alt = 60 ) have 5 alternative choice sequences.
C l. Maximum Likelihood Program
The following program, ‘domaxcl’ maximizes the likelihood specified in Section C2,
*myclt3j4'? using the variables included in ‘varlist’, of which there must be at least one,
with no constant. In this case, the starting values are a given by a vector of zeroes.
program define domaxcl 
version 4.0
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local varlist "req ex min(l)" 
parse
tempname b 
eq eqn: d l 'varlist' 
ml begin
ml function myclt3j4
ml method derivO
ml model 'b* = eqn, nocons
ml sample mysamp 'varlist*
tempname If V f
ml max ' I f '  V*
ml post feci
ml mlout feci
end
C2. Program Specifying the Individual Contribution to the Likelihood
The following program specifies the likelihood function for each individual.
program define myclt3j4 
version 4.0 
local b " ' r  
local f  T "
tempvar nomin denomin z l z2 xl x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 it div rr2 
#delimit;
sort newcase date state; 
matrix score double 'zT='b*;
qui by newcase: gen double vz2’=sum($S_mlwgt*cond(d 1 z 1 *,0)); 
qui by newcase: gen double 'nomin'=exp(C z2’[_N])) if $S_mlwgt; 
qui by newcase: gen double 'x  1 =(sum($S_ml wgt*cond(d 1 ,'z  1 *,0))); 
qui by newcase: gen double'  x2’=(sum($S_mlwgt*cond(d2,'z 1 ‘,0))); 
qui by newcase: gen double 'x3=(sum($S_mlwgt*cond(d3,'zl\0))); 
qui by newcase: gen double 'x4'=(sum($S- mlwgt*cond(d4t'z  1 \0 )));
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Iqui by newcase: gen double 'x5’=(sum($S_m]wgt*cond(d5,'z 1 ’,0))) ; 
qui by newcase: gen double '  x6-(sum($S_mlwgt*cond(d6,'z 1 ’,0))) ; 
qui by newcase: gen double '  denomin ,=($S_mlwgt*exp('xI'[_N])) +
($S_ml wgt*expf x2’LN])) ;
qui by newcase: replace 'denomin' = 'denomin' + ($S_mlwgt*exp('x3'LN])) if 
ait<=60 ;
qui by newcase: replace 'denomin^'denomm' +  ($S_mIwgt*(expf x4'[_N]))) +  
($S_mlwgt*(expOx5’L_N]))) + ($S_mIwgt*(expfx6,LN ]))) if alt>=37 & 
alt<=60 ;
qui gen double 'd iv '=f nomin'VCdenomin') if $S_mlwgt ;
qui by newcase: gen double 'rr’=$S_mlwgt*cond(_n=_N,ln(' div'),0) ;
qui gen double 'rr2'=sumCrr1) ;
scaIar'F='rr2'LN] î
#delimit cr
j
l
!
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Appendix D Pooled Conditional Logit Model Used
for the Hausman Test of Section 4.5.2
The pooled conditional logit model which is used for testing the hypothesis of 
individual homogeneity in Section 4.5.2 is shown in Table Dl.
Table DL Results fo r  a pooled conditional logit model that is comparable with the FECL model o f 
Table 4.3. Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets. ■
Non-Choice- Full-Time Part-Time > 10 Hour? Part-Time < 10 Hours
Specific Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
ex(ben)
w 0.0076 1.60 0.0173 3.79 0.0195 2.75
exliity) -0.0106 ■7.12 -0.0044 ■3.94 -0.0009 -0.72
Wife’s Age 0.2630 7.70 0.2955 7.71 0.1215 2.12
(Wife’s Age)2 
*100
-0.3722 ■8.37 -0.3388 ■7.17 -0.1471 ■2.12
Dummy: Children 
Aged 0-4
-2.3174 ■16.01 -1.1719
Mod« •0.6416 ■3.53
Number Children 
Aged > 4
-1.3029 -11.60 -0.0718 0.69 0.3504 2.13
Husband at Work 1.5321 9.24 1.1905 7.98 0.8764 4.28
Local Rate of 
Unemployment
-0.0140 ■1.05 -0.0079 ■0.61 -0.0071 ■0.35
Husband’s Bad 
Unemp. History
-0.0649 ■2.44 -0.0572 ■2.15 0.0073 0.203
Constant -5.9726 9.15 -8.2959 ■10.83 -55524 •5.23
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient t-Statistic
rnd(w) 0.0287 13.81
end(k)
J j i _______________________
0.0021 0.71
No. Observations: 5111 Pseudo-R2: 0.394 Log Likelihood: -4244.4
The variables included are all those that are included in the FECL model of 
Table 4.3» in addition to other variables reflecting individual heterogeneity that are 
either found to be insignificant when fixed effects are accounted for, such as y,“**"0 . or
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that are not time-varying and therefore cannot be included in the FECL model, such as 
age and the husband’s unemployment history.
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Appendix E Calculation of the Probability that an 
Observed Stayer is a True Stayer
In the mixed Mover-Stayer model of Section 53.4, the probability that an individual 
who is observed to stay in the same state throughout the sample period is a true stayer 
may be calculated from the information contained in S j . This appendix provides the 
details of the calculation of these probabilities, s j . Equation 5.22 notes that
(1 -  sj) -  Pr{observed stayer is a mover) -  [(1 -  Sj) -  (1 -  Sj)]/Sj 
and this is the basis of the calculations shown below.
Stayers in Full-Time Work:
S ft = 0.574 =* (1 -  S ft) = 0.426; S ft = 0.602 =* (1 -  S ft) = 0398
0  -3>r) =
0.426 -  0398 
0.602
= 0.047 s f t  -  0.953
which means that the probability that a woman who is observed to stay in full-time 
work throughout the sample period is, in fact, a mover is less than 5%.
Stayers in High Hours Part-Time Work:
S pt > io =  0307 = >  (1 — S pt > io) =  0.493 ; S pt > io =  0336 =>  (1 -  S ft)  =  0.464 
0.493 -  0.464
(1 — s p t  > to) = ----- = 0.054 => s p t  > io = 0.946
0336
Stayers in Low Hours Part-Time Work:
S pt < io = 0310 => (1 — S pt < io) = 0.690 ; S pt < io = 0306 (1 — S pt < io) = 0.694
(1 — s p t  < io) =  0  = *  s p t  < io =  1
Stayers out of Work:
S none = 0.738 => (1 — S none) = 0362 ; S none — 0525 =* (1 — S none) = 0.175 
0362-0 .175
(1 — sno ne)  = ---- — —------= 0.105 snone = 0595
0.825
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Appendix F Results of McCall Mover-Stayer Model 
and Double-Hurdle Model with S j
This appendix gives the results of the McCall Mover-Stayer model and the D-H 
Mover-Stayer model using Frydman’s S j ; these are the two models discussed in 
Section 5.3 as alternatives to the mixed Mover-Stayer model presented in Section 5.4.
Table FI. Results o f the McCall and Double-Hurdle Mover-Stayer models o f  destination states at t  = 3 
for women who were working at t  — — 1. Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets.
M cCall Model Double-Hurdle Model
Full-Time Part-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time Part-Time
Non- > 10 Hours < 10 Hours > 10 Hours < 10 Hours
Choice-Specific Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variables (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic) (t-Statistic). (t-Statistic)
« (n(y) -0.0798 -0.1310 -0.0878 -0.0604 -0.0479 -0.0717
(-2.40) (-1.00) (-2.64) (-L36) (-1.33) (-1.74)
( y T ly)J
0.0012
(2.23)
0.0005
(LOS)
0.0012
(2.35)
0.0006
(1.08)
0.0005
(0.99)
0.0007
(L29)
Dummy: Child -1.0767 0.4493 1.2311 -2.6104 0.4789 1.2041
Aged 0-4 (-L49) (0.88) (2.16) (-2.25) (0.65) (L02)
Dummy: Child 0.1133 0.4518 1.0395 -1.9705 1.2098 1.6379
Aged > 4 (0.24) (L18) (2.38) (-1.67) (2.36) (2.52)
Wife’s Age -0.0171 0.0339 0.0449 -0.0674 0.0587 0.0813
(-0.92) U-98) (2.17) (-2.19) (2.49) (2.25)
Constant -2.0470 -3.3471 -3.3099 -1.7933 -5.8183 -6.2693
(-2.19) (-3.96) (-3.46) (-4.77) (-3.56)
Choice-Specific
Variables Coefficient (t-Statistic) Coefficient (t-Statistic)
end(w)
y *j
(> r w>) 2
0.0542 (3.61) 0.1007 (4.37)
-0.0002 (-2.72) -0.0003 (-2.99)
tnd{h) -0.0043 (-0.33) 0.0106 (0.57)
No. Observations 279 608
Log Likelihood -339.15 -441.77
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Table F2. Results o f the McCall and Double-Hurdle Mover-Stayer models o f destination states at
t = 15 for women who were working at t ^  3 . Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets.
McCall Model Double-Hurdle Model
Non-
Full-Time Part-Time 
> 10 Hours
Part-Tune 
< 10 Hours
Full-Time Part-Time 
> 10 Hours
Part-Time 
< 10 Hours
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t*Statistic)
Coefficient
(f-Srorirric)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
ex(nly) -0.0096 -0.0071 -0.0088 -0.0141 -0.0087 -0.0079
(-234) (•1*98) (•1*64) (-2.82)2 (•2.21) (-1*46)
a{ben) 0.0845 0.0243 0.0015 0.0853 0.0381 0.0172
>1 C2.37) (0.63) (0.32) (233) (1.02) (0.36)
Wife’s Age 0.4922 0.3318 0.5444 0.3266 0.3751 0.6268
(3.05) (2.45) (¿75) (2.07) (2.69) '  (3.00)
(Wife’s Age)2 -0.0060 -0.0037 -0.0065 -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0077
(-2.55) (•2.17) (-2.62) (-2.01) (•2.43) (•2.94)
Husband at 2.5346 1.0225 0.7436 2.7817 1.0842 0.4763
Work (3.58) 0*79) (1*04) (3.64) (1*79) (0.66)
Constant -13.7186 -9.5546 -12.6677 -9.3135 -9.4664 -13.4077
(-4.45) (-3.67) (-3.37) (•3.15) (-3.55) (-335)
Choice-Specific
Variables Coefficient (f-Statistic) Coefficient (t-Statistic)
emHw)
*tj
0.0742 (3.63) 0.0621 (3.21)
-0.0004 (-3.06) -0.0003 (-2.40)
end(h)
' t i
-0.0053 (-0.41) 0.0017 (0.13)
No. Observations 225 559
Log Likelihood -255.09 -497.05
Table F3. Results o f the McCall and Double-Hurdle Mover-Stayer models o f  destination states at t — 3
for women who were not working at t  — -1. Asymptotic ¡-statistics in brackets.
M cCall Model Double-Hurdle Model
Non-
Full-Time Part-Time 
> 10 Hours
Part-Time 
< 10 Hours
Full-Time Part-Time 
> 10 Hours
Part-Time 
< 10 Hours
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
{¡-Statistic)
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
ex (ben) -0.0424 -0.0406 0.0094 -0.0325 -0.0302 0.0193
>t (-1.55) (-2.11) (0.34) ( - U 6 ) (-1.57) (0.70)
Wife’s Age -0.1207 -0.0479 -0.0576 -0.1177 -0.0491 -0.0542
(-2.60) (-1.75) (-1.62) (-2.71) (-2.03) (-1.71)
Constant -0.4187 -1.2794 -1.6413 -0.9434 -1.6139 -2.2471
(-0.26) ( - U 9 ) (-1.32) (-0.58) (-1.50) (-1.99)  !
Choice-Specific
Variables Coefficient (/-Statistic) Coefficient (/•Statistic)
end(w)
y  .J tj
0.1159 (3.59) 0.1017 (3.01)
( > r i
-0.0006 (-2.51) -0.0004 (-2.13)
end(h) 0.0556 (2.73) 0.0615 (2.64)  j
No. Observations 188 1072 i
Log Likelihood -144.14 -237.24 i
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Table F4. Results o f the McCall and Double-Hurdle Mover-Stayer models o f destination states at
i =  15 for women who were not working at t - 3 . Asymptotic t-statistics in brackets.
McCall Model Double-Hurdle Model
Non-
Full-Um e Part-Time 
> 10 Hours
Part-Time 
< 10 Hours
Full-Time Part-Time 
> 10 Hours
Part-Time 
< 10 Hours
Choice-Specific
Variables
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient 
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Coefficient
(t-Stcuistic)
No. Children -1.2383 0.0422 0.9274 -1.707 -05819 0.2054
Aged 0-4 (-2.63) (0.11) (2.60) (-3.06) (-1.61) (0.68)
No. Children -0.1311 0.6091 0.6549 -0.2609 0.3471 0.3533
Aged > 4 (-0.59) (3.34) (3.32) (-1.09) (1.95) (1.95)
Wife’s Age -0.0236 0.0430 0.0113 -0.0444 0.0203 -0.0108
(-1.09) (1.83) (6.40) (-1.80) (0.85) (-0.42)
Husband at 1.7530 2.8133 1-5371 1.7070 2.8767 2.0182
Work (2.74) (5.56) (3.53) (2.42) (5.47) (4.78)
Constant -1.8679 -5.0709 -35477 -1.0416 -4.0984 -2.9692
(-1.60) (-4.13) (-2.81) (-0.80) (-3.28) (-2.58)
Choice-Specific
Variables Coefficient (r-Statistic) Coefficient (r-Statistic)
y end(w)
y tj
end(h)
0.0196 (2.10) 0.0105 (1.07)
-0.0161 (-U 9 ) -0.0026 (-0.18)
No. Observations 246 1154
Log Likelihood -266.24 -529.11
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Appendix G ST A T A  Programs for Mixed Mover 
Stayer and Double-Hurdle Models
In the data set used to estimate these Mover-Stayer models, the individual identifier is 
'newcase'. Each newcase has 4 observations, one for each state. *Mover’ is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the individual is identified as a mover by Sj, and 
zero if not. *Sjobsitk’ is the job status of the individual at the key date, and takes the 
value 1 for a full-time worker, 2 for a woman working part-time, more than ten hours 
per week, 3 for a woman working part-time, less than ten hours per week, and 4 for a 
woman not working at that date; sjobsitl and sjobsitl are the equivalent variables for 
the state occupied at the first and second interviews.
G l. Maximum Likelihood Program
The following program, ‘domovstl’ maximizes the likelihoods specified in Sections G2 
and G3, ‘mixedms’ and ‘doubhurd’, using the variables included in ‘varlist*, of which 
there must be at least one, with no constant. In both cases, the starting values are taken 
from the results of the estimation over the whole sample. The example shown is for 
transitions between the key date and the first interview, with conditioning on the state 
occupied at t = -1  achieved using an *if statement. Equivalent maximum likelihood 
programs were used for transitions between the first and second interviews, 
substituting sjobsitl for sjobsitk and sjobsit2 for sjobsitl.
program define domovstl 
version 5.0
local varlist "req ex min(2)" 
local if "optional" 
parse * 
tempname b bO
clogit actual 1 '  varlist’ '  if , group(newcase)
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matrix 'bO'=get(_b) 
eq eqn: sjobsitl 'varlist' 
ml begin
ml function mixedms *1 or doubhurd /*
ml method derivO
ml model 'b'=eqn, nocons fromfbO')
ml sample mysamp 'varlist* 'if
tempname If V
ml max 'If ' V\ trace
ml post results f
ml mlout results
end
G2. Program Specifying the Individual Contribution to the Mixed 
Mover-Stayer Likelihood
The following program specifies the likelihood function for each individual.
program define mixedms 
version 5.0 
local b"T" 
local f "'2’"
tempvar nomin denomin div indlogl logl zl state actual
gen double 'nomin’=0
gen double 'denomin’=0
gen double 'state'=mod(_n-l,4)+I
gen double 'actual'=($S_mldepn='state*)
matrix score double 'zl'^'b*
qui by newcase: replace' nomin’=$S_ml wgt*condf actual’, expCzl*),0) 
qui by newcase: replace 'nomin*=sum($S_mlwgt*'nomin*) 
qui by newcase: replace 'denomin,=sum($S_mlwgt*exp('zl,))
#delimit;
qui by newcase: gen double 'div*=Cnomin*Ln])/Cdenomin’Ln]) if $S_mIwgt;
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qui by newcase: replace 'div,=0.895-K(('nomin'Ln])*0.105)/'denomin,Ln]) if 
$S_mlwgt & mover=0 & sjobsitk=4;
qui by newcase: replace 'div^.953+{(CnominLji])*0.047)/'denomin,Ln]) if 
$S_mlwgt & mover=0 & sjobsitk=l;
qui by newcase: replace 'div,=0.946+((fnomin,Ln])*0.054)rdenomm,Ln]) if 
$S_mlwgt & mover=0 & sjobsitk=2;
qui by newcase: replace 'div'-l if $S_mlwgt & mover=0 & sjobsitk=3; 
#delimit cr
qui by newcase: gen double 'indlogr=$S_mlwgt*cond(_n=_N, lnfdiv‘),0) 
qui gen double 'Iogl-sumf indlogl’) c 
scalar T^logl'LN] 
end
G3. Program Specifying the Individual Contribution to the Double 
Hurdle Mover-Stayer Likelihood
The program doubhurd is used with the same dataset as is described above, 
program define doubhurd 
version 5.0 
local b " ' r  
local f " 'l'"
tempvar nomin denomin div indlogl logl zl state actual sumdiv
gen double 'nomin’=0
gen double 'denomin’=0
gen double 'div'=0
gen double ' s tate’=mod(_n-1,4)+1
gen double 'actuaT=($S_mldepn='state')
matrix score double 'zl - 'b f
sort newcase
qui replace 'nomin-$S_mlwgt*expOzV )
qui by newcase: replace 'denomin'=sum($S_mlwgt*expOzn)
qui by newcase: replace 'denomin ='denomin’LN]
2 1 1
tfdelimit ;
qui replace 'div’=((('nomin')*0.262)/'denomin*) if $S_mlwgt & sjobsitk=4 & 
'state'~=4 ; 
sort newcase ;
qui egen double 'sumdiv' = sum f div'), by(newcase) ;
qui replace 'div’= K  sumdiv' if $S_mlwgt & sjobsitk=4 & 's ta te '= 4  ;
drop 'sumdiv' ;
qui replace 'div,=((fnomin')*0.426)/'denomin1) if $S_mlwgt & sjobsitk= l & 
'state '-=I ;
sort newcase ; £
qui egen double 'sumdiv' = sum f div'), by(newcase) ;
qui replace 'div'=l-'sumdiv' if $S_mlwgt & sjobsitk= l & 's ta te '= l  ;
drop 'sumdiv* ;
qui replace 'd iv = ((f nomin')*0.493)/'denomin1) if $S_mlwgt & sjobsitk=2 &
'state’~=2 ; 
sort newcase ;
qui egen double 'sumdiv' = sum f div'), by(newcase) ;
qui replace 'div'=l-'sumdiv* if $S_mlwgt & sjobsitk=2 & 'state’= 2  ;
drop 'sumdiv' ;
qui replace 'div'=((('nomin')*0.694)/‘denomin') if $S_mlwgt & sjobsitk=3 & 
'state'-=3 ; 
sort newcase ;
qui egen double 'sumdiv' = sum f div'), by(newcase) ;
qui replace 'div'=l-'sumdiv' if $S_mlwgt & sjobsitk=3 & 'state’= 3  ;
drop 'sumdiv' ;
qui gen double 'indlogr=$S_mlwgt*cond($S_mldepn=='state\ ln f  dW)fO) ; 
qui gen double 'logl=sum f indlogl') ; 
scalar'f= 'logl’[_>î] ; 
end;
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